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Summary 
 
In this thesis I examine emergent technological practices relating to tablet computers 
in scientific research laboratories. I ask four main questions: To what extent can tablets be 
considered scientific instruments? How do tablets help to construct technoscientific 
imaginaries? What role do tablets play in the construction of technoscientific subjectivities? 
Can tablets, positioned as popular everyday computing devices, be considered in terms of 
expertise in the context of laboratory science?  
To answer these questions, research is presented that examines the situated practices 
of scientists using tablet computers. I use textual analysis to examine the marketing 
discourses relating to laboratory-specific tablet apps and how their material structure 
defines scientific community and communication. Ethnographic research into the way that 
tablets are being introduced as part of a new teaching laboratory in a large UK university is 
presented, focusing on how institutional power affects the definition of the tablet. A 
second ethnographic research case study addresses how two chemists define their own 
scientific subjectivity by constructing the tablet as a futuristic technology. In a third large 
ethnographic research case, I consider the way that tablets can be used in practices of 
inclusion and exclusion from sites of scientific knowledge.  
I draw on literature from media and cultural studies and science and technology 
studies, arguing that the two fields intersect in ways that can be productive for research in 
both. This serves as a contribution to knowledge, demonstrating how research into identity, 
politics and technologies can benefit from a focus on materiality drawn from the two 
disciplines.  
I contribute to knowledge in both fields by developing two key concepts, ‘affordance 
ambiguity’ and ‘tablet imaginary’. These concepts can be applied in the analysis of uses of 
technology to better understand, firstly, how technologies are made meaningful for users 
and, secondly, how this individual meaning-making affects broader cultural trends and 
understandings of technologies.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Genealogy of the Tablet 
 
“…slates had to be balanced awkwardly across the knees and 
cradled with one arm” (Davies, 2005: p.66) 
 
Introduction 
When discussing research into tablet computers, people occasionally ask “oh, what are 
they?” At first, I would tell people that tablet computers “are touchscreen devices, usually 
around the size of a thick sheet of paper. They almost all connect to the Internet and can 
be used for various work and leisure activities. Many use a stylus to recreate the sensation 
of writing with a pen or pencil; most can use fingertip input”. All of these descriptions are 
useful, but convey only a vague definition of this new media object. After many frustrating 
attempts to clarify what a tablet computer is, I found the simplest reply to be, “like the 
iPad”. Almost everybody has heard of that.  
The tablet computer is a culturally constructed object, and to define it requires due 
attention to its cultural meanings. That is why “like the iPad” is a useful quick definition. 
Those three words say nothing about the physical object, but they contain huge amounts of 
cultural meaning. These cultural meanings are the focus of this chapter. The tablet 
computer is treated as a physical, material object which embodies cultural meanings. It is 
these cultural meanings that allow the tablet to make sense as an object. Crucially, these 
meanings are contextual – they rely on a particular set of knowledges, beliefs and practices 
that are more or less common sense within a culture.  
It is not necessary to have expert knowledge of computer engineering to know that to 
move pictures on a tablet computer, you simply swipe your finger across the screen. 
Anybody who watches television probably knows that already – it is featured in advertising 
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for touchscreen devices such as tablets and mobile phones. For the tablet to ‘make sense’ 
as an object, this kind of cultural knowledge is required. Because it is common sense, this 
cultural knowledge is difficult to appreciate, difficult to see. It is probably most visible 
when absent. A good example in the case of tablet computers is found in German comedy 
sketch show Knaller Frauen, where a grey-bearded man unwittingly uses a tablet computer as 
a chopping board, proceeding to slide the chopped onions into a saucepan, and his tablet 
computer into the dishwasher, much to the horror of his daughter1. Part of the comedy in 
this sketch derives from how ludicrous it is for somebody not to have the necessary 
cultural knowledge to understand the object, and value it in the accepted way. Of course, 
his grey beard gives the game away – there is no place for old men amongst the perpetual 
novelty of technology. The point is that objects only ‘make sense’ when we are aware of 
the relevant cultural meanings and behave accordingly. It doesn’t make sense to use the 
object in other ways. Without the accepted cultural knowledge and values, the old man is 
presented as ridiculous; his actions shocking and hilarious. Examining how the object makes 
sense can therefore expose the cultural knowledge and values upon which it relies. In this 
way, it can be shown how meaning emerges from the interrelation of objects and their 
contexts.  
This links back to the problem of defining the tablet computer: it is clearly not enough 
to say “like an iPad”. The iPad is evidently a popular product: according to Apple, in the 
2011 financial year (October 2010 to September 2011), over 32 million iPads were sold2. In 
the financial year ending October 2014, the figure was over 67 million3. Yet, iPads are just 
one particularly well-marketed example of tablet computers. In fact, there are well over 40 
                                                 
1 From Series One of Knaller Frauen, found on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUCpOYdG8hM 
[Accessed 3rd May 2012]. 
2 http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/10/18Apple-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-Results.html [Accessed 30th 
April 2012]. 
3 http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/10/20Apple-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-Results.html [Accessed 26th 
November 2014]. 
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different makes and models of tablet computer available to buy in the UK today. A 
Wikipedia page comparing tablet computers lists 160 different consumer devices and a 
further 27 specialist devices4. To say that tablet computers are “like the iPad” is clearly 
doing a disservice to the many other manufacturers that produce tablets. Furthermore, the 
cultural and market dominance of the iPad applies to a particular cultural moment. The 
instability of such dominance is illustrated by Atkinson’s 2008 article subtitled ‘the rise and 
fall of the tablet computer’ that “traces the early development of pen computing, the 
appearance, proliferation, and disappearance of the tablet computer, and explores possible 
reasons for the demise of this particular class of product” (Atkinson, 2008: p.3). Two 
points can be drawn from this: firstly, the phrase ‘tablet computer’ referred to something 
other than the iPad at the time, highlighting the changes in terminology. Secondly, the fact 
that the tablet computer was ‘dead’ in 2008 appears almost comical when read from the 
perspective of even two years later. This is not to criticise Atkinson’s work, but to point 
out that the necessarily temporary and incomplete definitions given to such devices must 
be acknowledged without being seen as a barrier to critical research.  
More importantly, to describe tablet computers as ‘like an iPad’ is to ignore the 
experience of the millions of people who own and use tablet computers made by different 
manufacturers; using them in a variety of ways according to their own preferences, and 
their tablet’s particular capabilities. There are two ways of answering the question, “what is 
a tablet computer?” A dictionary definition describes the object, but it does not indicate 
much about what the object means to its users. For the users of these devices, the meaning 
of the object is something very complex indeed. Their tablet computer may mean ‘status’; it 
may mean ‘working from home’; it could mean ‘playing games on the train’. The case 
studies that form the main body of this thesis involve the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1, the 
                                                 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_tablet_computers [Accessed 6th April 2015]. 
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iPad Mini and the Google Nexus 7 being used in science laboratories. For some of the 
participants, this tablet means freedom to work outside of prescribed hours. For others, it 
means the unwanted task of learning how to use an unfamiliar technology. In each case, the 
meaning of the tablet computer is bound up in the local context, in which new 
technologies are being introduced to the workplace. The truth is that for any technological 
object, what it means is likely to be an intricate and personal combination of experiences, 
thoughts, feelings and ideas. In this thesis, I will draw on and develop the Foucauldian 
notion of discursive materiality to describe the way that the material characteristics of 
technological devices are not neutral and unambiguous, but are defined by particular 
discourses.  
Before addressing the case studies in subsequent chapters, this chapter answers the 
question “what is a tablet computer?” in detail by giving a genealogy of the tablet. The 
ethnographic approach taken in this thesis demands that I take account of the ways that I 
am creating the conditions for understanding this object. Research participants consistently 
treated me as a tablet computer expert. The fact that I was observing their work and 
interviewing them about tablets inevitably gave the impression that I was knowledgeable 
about tablets, and occasionally participants tried to draw on this imagined expertise by 
asking me what they should use their tablets for. While I never engaged with such 
questions directly, my own understanding of tablets is relevant to the way that the case 
studies were chosen and developed.  
The tablet computer that we see today has a long cultural heritage. This is not to say 
that it is the latest iteration of an evolving object called the tablet. The idea of a genealogy 
goes against the notion of linear history. The genealogy of the tablet begins from the 
present, and works through historical objects that today are associated with the tablet 
computer. While not aiming to produce a cultural genealogy on the scale of Foucault 
(1989), much of the methodology here is inspired by his archaeological technique, which 
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examines particular historical contexts, and asks what made certain kinds of knowledge 
possible in that moment (Foucault, 1989: p.35). In this regard, historical tablets will be 
examined, focusing on the relationship between these material objects and particular 
cultural meanings and types of knowledge. These objects are chosen because they resonate 
today when we speak about tablets. One example is the practice of calling the pen-like 
computer input device a ‘stylus’. The use of the word ‘stylus’ rather than ‘pen’, which is 
undoubtedly a more familiar object to current users of tablets, is one indication of the 
influence that these historical objects have on the current meaning of the tablet. Yet it must 
be remembered that the resonances that are observed in the current meaning of tablet do 
not come from history. The significance of these objects in our current meanings reflects a 
history constructed in the present.  
This chapter constructs the tablet computer as a material and symbolic object, by 
tracing its relationship to various historic objects. Firstly, references to historical objects are 
given to demonstrate their continuing cultural resonance in understandings of tablet 
computers. Secondly, different concepts associated with those objects are examined: the 
relationship between the symbolic and material in the stone tablets of the Ten 
Commandments; the notion of permanence and ephemerality as observed in clay writing 
tablets; and ideas of intellectual ownership and pedagogy in writing slates in schools. 
Finally, the way that this impacts upon our understandings of tablet computers is 
examined. Over the course of the chapter, the tablet computer will be described as a 
physical item with particular properties, incorporating various symbolic meanings with 
significant implications for how the object is understood.  
The Ten Commandments 
When I searched for the word ‘tablet’ on Google in 2012, the first result at the top of 
the page was an advertisement for the Apple iPad. Other than advertisements, the first 
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webpage result was for the website of the Tablet, a British Catholic weekly newspaper. The 
filters used by search engines to determine relevant results mean that no set of search 
results is definitive (Pariser, 2011). Nevertheless, the connection between tablet computers 
and religious publications seems instructive. Searching ‘tablet’ on Google in 2015, the Tablet 
website is still in a prominent fourth position, albeit now underneath website results for 
retailers Amazon.co.uk, Argos.co.uk and PCWorld.co.uk. Searching ‘tablet’ in 2015 using 
DuckDuckGo generates adverts for various tablet computers, above website results for 
Amazon.com, BestBuy.com, ConsumerReports.com and a website for Tablet Magazine: “a 
new read on Jewish life”. Although a new media device and religious publications might 
seem unrelated, the cultural connection between the two is surprisingly strong. The 
symbolic link between the iPad and the word of God handed down on stone tablets has 
not been lost in popular culture. Staff were “whipped up into an evangelical frenzy” during 
the opening of a new Apple store in Covent Garden, London in 2011 according to BBC 
programme Secrets of the Superbrands5. The front page of the Economist in January 2010, a few 
days after the launch of the iPad, featured a mock-biblical image of the late Steve Jobs, 
CEO of Apple, holding the new iPad aloft6. The biblical theme has also been extended to 
Jobs’s successor Tim Cook, who appears on the October 2014 cover of Management 
Today7 as a martyr being prayed for by a cherubic depiction of Jobs. In fact, pictures of 
Moses holding an iPad are so numerous on the Internet that the image has become cliché. 
The comparison is clear: the tablet computer, particularly the iPad, is seen as a powerful 
material object offered to the people by an authoritative figure.  
In this section, I argue that the tablet computer and the stone tablets of the Ten 
Commandments are material objects with significant symbolic meanings. The way that the 
                                                 
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13416598 [Accessed 19th April 2012]. 
6 http://www.economist.com/node/15393377 [Accessed 18th April 2012]. 
7 http://www.managementtoday.co.uk/news/1313403/apples-tim-cook-martyr-visionary/ [Accessed 7th 
April 2015]. 
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physical objects imbue these meanings is examined in terms of the religious practices 
associated with tablets. It is shown how, as objects, tablets only make sense in the context 
of particular cultural beliefs; and that the culture can only be experienced as normal when 
those objects are used in everyday life, perpetuating those beliefs.  
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, Moses receives stone tablets from God on Mount 
Sinai: 
And the Lord said unto Moses, Come up to me into the mount, and be there: and 
I will give thee tables of stone, and a law, and commandments which I have 
written; that thou mayest teach them (Exodus 24:12)8 
The stone tablets of the Ten Commandments are made by God, inscribed by God, 
and contain the written words and instructions of God. In one respect, they are symbolic 
objects which are powerful because they represent the covenant between God and the 
chosen people – an agreement that will see the Israelites overcome their enemies and 
inherit fertile land (Exodus 34:11). In this sense, the stone tablets do not hold any power in 
and of themselves; they represent the laws and commandments by which the Israelites will 
gain power (i.e. gain superior land, overcome enemies on Earth; spiritual salvation in 
heaven). At the same time, they are also material objects, inscribed with words that are a 
literal guide for Moses on how to live (Exodus 34: 10-26). The interplay between the 
tablets as both symbolic and material objects continues throughout.  
Despite being made of stone, the fragile materiality of the tablets is soon brought into 
play. When Moses descends Mount Sinai, he finds his people blaspheming in his absence. 
In a rage, he casts the tablets to the ground, where they break (Exodus 32:15-19). It may be 
argued that this is symbolic: Moses breaks the tablets in the same instance that he finds his 
people breaking the covenant. Yet their existence as material objects continues to be 
                                                 
8 Biblical quotes are taken from The King James bible throughout. [Bible (1954) Published as 'The Bible: The 
Authorized Version'. The British and Foreign Bible Society.]The Oxford English Dictionary notes that the 
word ‘table’ reflects the translation from various sources. In more recent translations of the Bible, ‘tablet’ is 
used.  
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crucial. Later, when God has forgiven Moses, he commands Moses to hew “two tables of 
stone like unto the first” (Exodus 34:1), which God will inscribe with the same words as 
before. It is not simply a case of reaffirming the agreement: the stone tablets are required to 
make this agreement stick. It is not enough to have an agreement, or to live by the rules 
and customs decreed by God: the authority of this holy pact requires that it is literally 
written in stone. There is something in the materiality of the stone tablets that is necessary 
to guarantee or confirm the covenant. The fact that the stone tablets are man-made, being 
remade by Moses, indicates that physically they are not holy objects in and of themselves. 
This implies that the tablets are only symbolically powerful: they represent the covenant 
which will ensure the spiritual and physical well-being of the Israelites. But if they were 
merely symbolic, why were they remade at all? The fact that the tablets were re-made 
suggests that their physical existence is required in some way to support the covenant. 
Again, the symbolic and the material interweave. It seems that the question of the stone 
tablets being either powerfully symbolic or powerful material objects is misleading; they are 
both.  
In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the stone tablets are physical objects that prove the 
existence of God. Moses could not inscribe stone, so these miraculously inscribed tablets 
are a physical link between humans and God. Note in the context of the Exodus story, the 
need for physical proof of God’s existence is perfectly reasonable. The Israelites do not 
even wait for Moses to come back down from Mount Sinai before they start worshipping 
golden idols (Exodus 32:8). They are not yet faithful in the sense of having unquestioning 
belief. The stone tablets, though, are physical proof of something miraculous, which in turn 
proves the existence of a divine being who can perform miracles. As strange as it sounds, 
though, as material objects that can prove that God exists, the tablets are not powerful. 
Proving that God exists is not the same as salvation. The Israelites will not benefit unless 
they live according to the covenant. The knowledge that God exists – which is the only 
15 
knowledge that the stone tablets as physical objects can offer – does not grant any power 
whatsoever. There is no suggestion that physically holding the tablets will make you 
powerful, or redeem you, or anything of the sort. Their power derives from what they 
symbolise: the covenant that promises those who obey it physical and spiritual well-being. 
So, the symbolic power of the objects is predicated on the belief in the existence of God, 
which relies on the physical stone tablets. As physical objects, the stone tablets prove the authority 
of God as a divine being. Symbolically, they represent the power of the covenant to ensure 
material prosperity and spiritual salvation. This power is nothing without the authority to 
back it up; and the authority is meaningless without the power it guarantees. Thus, the 
materiality and the symbolism of the tablets are interrelated. As symbolic objects the tablets 
are potentially powerful; but it is their materiality that allows them to be imbued with that 
symbolic power.  
As material objects, therefore, the stone tablets are central to an entire way of life. 
They signify the belief in God and the authority of the holy way of life as laid out in the 
covenant between God and Moses. This dictates not only how to live in practical terms, 
but also what to think, feel and believe. The tablets are one locus of the object/context 
relationship that allows the rules, regulations and accepted beliefs of entire societies to 
make sense. This interrelation means that if the nature of the object changes, so must the 
beliefs and practices. This is demonstrated in the differences in how the stone tablets are 
understood in different branches of Abrahamic religions, even though they all take the 
story of the stone commandments from the same historical source, in the Jewish Torah. 
Differences in how the tablets are materiality understood, in forms of Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, are related to differences in the beliefs and everyday practices of those religions. 
A more strongly material interpretation of the authority of the written word of God is 
present in the Islamic tradition. The tablets also appear in the Qur’an, which tells a similar 
story to the Judeo-Christian story of Moses at Mount Sinai. In this case, Musa receives 
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tablets from Allah inscribed with “instruction and explanation for all things” (7:145)9. Musa 
descends the mountain, and is angry to find his people sinning (7: 150). In this case, 
however, he merely ‘throws down’ the tablets (ibid.), with no suggestion that they break. 
Later, once his anger has subsided, he picks up the tablets once more “and in their 
inscription was guidance and mercy for those who are fearful of their Lord” (7:154). In this 
tradition, then, the tablets are made by God and inscribed with God’s words.  
As such, the stone tablets as material objects are both authoritative and powerful. Not 
only are they miraculous objects – proof of the existence of God – but they are also literally 
inscribed with instructions on how to live a holy life. The key to salvation is not left to the 
symbolic covenant: it is written down on the tablets themselves. In this case, the physical 
stone tablets are both authoritative and powerful. The word of God is not an abstract 
concept: it is literally written down, and Musa only finds peace when he reads the words. In 
the Islamic tradition, then, the stone tablets are powerful material objects.  
More importantly than the appearance of tablets in the story of Musa is the Qur’an 
itself. The Qur’an is said to exist in its perfect form in heaven (known as al-Lawh al-
Mahfuth), where it was written by Allah. It is said to have been recited to Muhammad in two 
stages. Some of the scripture was given to Muhammad when he met the prophet Musa 
during an ascent through heaven (32:23). The rest was sent down over the course of some 
months, divided into sections so that Muhammad could recite it to people over a 
prolonged period (17:106). The true Qur’an, though, remains in heaven preserved on a 
stone slate or tablet (85:21-2). Allah not only wrote the Qur’an, but also takes responsibility 
for its preservation in heaven (15:9). The Qur’an, then, is the ultimate material object. Its 
                                                 
9 The quotations I use are from the Saheeh International version of English meanings of the Qur’an. [Qur'an 
(2001) THE QUR'AN. English Meanings Revised & Edited by Saheeh International.. Riyadh: Abul-Qasim 
Publishing House.]There are obvious difficulties in quoting text from the Qur’an: primarily the belief that 
Arabic is sacred, so the Qur’an is untranslatable; also the linguistic problem of translating words between two 
languages whose grammar is so different. I give the Sura/Chapter and verse so that the text can be consulted 
in the Qur’an proper. 
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authority and power are complete: it was written by God, is preserved by God in heaven, 
and contains all possible knowledge (6:38). The Qur’an as Preserved Slate is the ultimate 
authority: it does not merely represent the word of God; it is the word of God.  
In Christianity, a change comes about in the New Testament, where the sanctity of the 
stone tablets is questioned. Paul writes that the teachings of Christ should be “[…] 
ministered by us, written not in ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of 
stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart” (II Corinthians 3:3). Paul goes on to ask, “But if the 
ministration of death, written and engraven in stones, was glorious […] how shall not the 
ministration of the spirit be rather glorious?” (II Corinthians 3: 7-8). Here, it is the 
symbolic, not the material, that takes precedence. The disciples reject the authority of the 
written word – in this case, the Jewish Torah – and proclaim the authority of their own 
teachings. The suggestion is that the word of God should be understood and acted upon as 
a matter of the soul, not as a set of written teachings. 
The different understandings of what the tablets mean in various branches of Islamic 
and Christian traditions show the interrelation between object and context. A particular 
understanding of the stone tablets dictates corresponding practices in everyday life. In 
Islamic traditions, the stone tablets are holy material objects, and the Qur’an is therefore 
treated as a holy object, and Arabic as a holy and untranslatable language. Other material 
objects can be imbued with great significance, as with the statues of leaders of Islamic 
countries – where anybody who attacks or defaces the statue will face the same punishment 
as if they had attacked the person. In some Christian interpretations, an attachment to 
material objects is treated as blasphemous, as this overemphasises the material, to the 
detriment of the symbolic.  
This section has shown how the material and symbolic aspects of the stone tablets are 
interrelated. Tablets were depicted as objects dependent on a system of cultural beliefs to 
render them meaningful. In turn, the tablets imbue everyday practices with meanings that 
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support the overall system of beliefs. The same questions of materiality and symbolism, 
and the relation of objects to contexts, are present in the tablet computer. Using a tablet 
computer requires knowledge and appreciation of technological practices which that be 
learned and adhered to. Although evidently different from the religious practices which 
require people to act in certain prescribed ways, the tablet computer demands particular 
behaviours of its users. Disco (2005: p.33) notes how personal digital assistants (PDAs), a 
proto-tablet computer, require the user to change their habits and behaviours to suit the 
device. The same applies to the tablet: set up to receive notifications of email, 
appointments, news stories, Tweets, Facebook messages and so on, the tablet requires the 
user to attend to these tasks. It does not make sense to own a tablet and not do these 
things. Note that the idea of it ‘making sense’ to use a tablet for certain prescribed tasks is 
heavily dependent on the discourses that dictate which tasks are seen as normal. It is not to 
say that the tablet can only be used in these ways; but as illustrated by the sketch of the 
elderly man using an iPad as a chopping board, culturally there are certainly ‘wrong’ ways to 
use a tablet. It does not make sense to use the tablet as a chopping board. Because of the 
expense of the device, the way that the tablet software encourages you to ‘share’ at every 
opportunity, and the fact that you typically have to set up a sharing account before you can 
use the tablet, it does not make sense to own a tablet and not make use of its email, social 
networking functions and other similar facilities. The user literally buys into the way of life 
that makes the tablet make sense. At the same time, the context in which the tablet is 
meaningful is upheld by those practices. Once you habitually use your tablet to check 
emails on the go, a culture in which instant response to emails is demanded becomes 
naturalised.  
This is one way of explaining why the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments are 
bound up in the present meaning of a tablet. Buying a tablet really does involve accepting 
particular beliefs, adopting a particular value system, and carrying out certain ritualistic 
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everyday practices. Of course this is not the case for every single tablet user, but the 
religious comparison persists in the imagery of Moses holding a tablet computer because it 
represents a common experience. With tablet computers, the object only makes sense 
within a particular context – the reward for buying into the everyday practices afforded by 
the tablet computer is the sense belonging to an exclusive community. In this case, a 
community founded on the sharing of status updates, photos, Tweets, interesting 
newspaper articles, digital game scores, and countless other tablet services. Equally, certain 
aspects of the context in which the object is found – for example, the expectation for 
people to reply immediately to emails – only make sense when the tablet or other similar 
objects are used in everyday life, exercising and perpetuating those beliefs.  
The following section looks at a different historical object that is often brought into 
play when talking about tablet computers. Clay tablets are examined in order to question 
the notion of permanence and transience in writing technology.  
Clay Tablets 
The previous section constructed the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments as 
symbolic and material objects to argue that object and context are interrelated, and rely on 
each other to be experienced as meaningful. This section focuses on the idea of 
permanence in relation to writing tablets, and how this affects our current understandings 
of tablet computers.  
The tablet computer is characterised by its touchscreen interface. It differs from the 
personal computer or the laptop because it does not have a physical keyboard. This allows 
the devices to be small enough to be usefully portable. To work without a keyboard, proto-
tablet computers such as PDAs like the Palm Pilot used a stylus to input individual 
handwritten letters in a small box on the touchscreen. The device recognised the stylus 
strokes and then digitised them so the letter appeared on the screen much like a PC. In 
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practice, however, this stylus handwriting input method rarely worked smoothly. Baron 
(2009: p.68) suggests that nineteenth century office clerks skilled in standardised 
handwriting script may have been able to use a PDA easily, but the individuality of 
handwriting today means that users effectively have to learn how to write in the accepted 
style. Consequently, a PDA does not really use ‘handwriting recognition’; it recognises a 
particular script which is likely very different from the user’s handwriting.  
Although the common input method for tablets is now a touchscreen QWERTY 
keyboard, the stylus remains an important object in how today’s tablets are understood. As 
the competition between the two main tablet producers shows, using a stylus is not simply 
about the best input method; it also represents a sense of loyalty and belonging to the 
brand. In a keynote speech to launch the original iPad in January 2010, Steve Jobs 
championed Apple’s touchscreen interface and taunted potential competitors with the line, 
“if you see a stylus, they blew it”. In February 2012, a Samsung advert10 during the 
Superbowl hit back, depicting Apple customers looking miserable in a queue. When a 
passer-by using a new Samsung Galaxy Note lets a man in the queue try the new device, 
the person in the Apple queue says, “It’s got a pen? This is awesome”. In a jibe at the 
Apple ‘fanboy’ culture, a woman in the queue looks impressed and says, “I don’t know 
what I believe in anymore”. Later, we see the Samsung device being used to take a photo of 
fans posing with a famous American Football player, who then autographs the picture on-
screen, using the stylus. Of course, this is intended to show the benefits of having a stylus 
input; playing on a feeling that handwriting is more personal than typing (Baron, 2009: 
p.69). But is having a digital autograph written with a stylus on a touchscreen comparable 
with a signature materially inscribed on a writing surface? Blanchette (2012) outlines the 
various abstractions that are necessary in efforts to create digital equivalents of written 
                                                 
10 http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/46/commercials#video=09000d5d826a0d3b [Accessed 10th May 2012]. 
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signatures, noting that the perceived purpose of written signatures becomes defined in the 
encoding of intended digital equivalents. Blanchette’s focus on legal evidence does not 
account for the emotional and cultural aspects of signatures in the form of autographs. 
Could the virtual autograph of the Football player be treasured in the same way an 
autograph in a physical medium might be? This section examines questions of permanence 
in relation to clay writing tablets, and how this notion is being challenged by tablet 
computers.  
The first clay tablets were used for accountancy in the fourth millennium BC, with 
pictograms used to represent the type and number of different assets such as land, labour 
and animals (Robson, 2009: p.67). Scribes wrote these details on both sides of “refined clay 
tablets, about the size of a credit card but around 1cm thick, incising the signs for the 
objects they were recording with a pointed stylus and impressing the numbers with a 
cylindrical one” (ibid.). Clay for writing had to be prepared in the same way as for pottery; 
it had to be sieved and strained to remove stones and impurities, and kneaded to remove 
air bubbles and increase its elasticity (Robson, 2009: p.70).  
The clear advantage of using clay tablets rather than relying on memory was that they 
offered a permanent and fixed storage medium. This is essential for keeping records of 
accounts. The contrast with the digitally-rendered virtual signature of a football star on a 
tablet computer is clear. The virtual inscription has no material substance (although clearly 
having a material effect, the light produced by pixels): the tablet uses pixel recognition to 
trace the movement of the stylus relative to fixed points on the screen. This pattern is then 
rendered on pixels, displaying the signature on the screen. An inscription on clay left a 
tangible imprint, laid into the very material of the document. If clay can be called a 
predecessor to paper, it was also a predecessor to ink: it formed the entire material 
existence of a written document. Robson (2009: p.69) argues that “in early Mesopotamia 
cuneiform literacy had been primarily a tool for controlling the ownership and rights to 
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assets and income”. We can speculate that ownership of clay tablets would therefore be a 
mark of a family or dynasty in control of assets and income. The on-going physical 
presence of these objects would therefore presumably be an important material support for 
the symbolic power they represented.  
As cuneiform writing became more complex, and developed from pictograms to 
marks representing word sounds, other types of documents could be created. The scribe 
could use cuneiform to commune with the gods, to create intellectual culture, and create 
legal documents (ibid.). Once cuneiform writing became a prestige medium in this way, the 
scribe came to be held in high honour (Roemer, 2009: p.88). Clay tablets were stored in 
archives or libraries with shelf markers corresponding to record systems (Robson, 2009: 
p.70). This represents a significant change in the purpose of clay writing. The earliest 
accounting tablets feature pictograms squeezed onto a surface in no particular order, 
suggesting that they were written to keep personal records, not intended for an audience 
(Baron, 2009: p.89). For the later tablets stored in libraries, however, readability must have 
been important, as the tablets would have been read by more than just the original scribe. 
The clay tablet would therefore be a permanent record of the scribe’s work which could be 
read by anybody with the required training in cuneiform script. 
Much of the materiality of clay writing tablets suggests that their main advantage was 
the permanent – or at least long-term – storage of information. The permanent and 
dependable physicality of clay was superior to the more fallible storage medium of human 
memory. There are aspects of clay tablets, however, which go against the sense of 
permanent storage of information. Despite the material object being well-suited to fixing 
information, other uses of clay tablets show that the flexibility of clay as a material could 
also be beneficial. Clay is rewriteable and reusable, as long as it has not been fired. When 
the information on a particular clay tablet stored in a library was out of date, the clay was 
soaked and recycled as new writing material, or used as building material (Robson, 2009: 
23 
pp.70-72). Cuneiform tablets were designed to be permanent as long as they were useful. 
Although in practice tablets were often recycled, their archival storage suggests that they 
were required at least to have the potential to be permanent in the sense of storing 
information indefinitely.  
Aside from matters of accountancy and law, which required a permanent storage 
medium to record transactions and prevent disputes, an interesting aspect of the 
permanence of clay tablets is found in the intellectual culture written in clay. Once 
cuneiform became a sign of prestige and was used for narrative texts of many kinds, literate 
knowledge was produced and maintained in scribal schools. Robson (2009: p.72) describes 
an archaeological discovery of one such school, in which clay tablets included “epic stories 
of legendary heroes like Gilgamesh and Lugulbanda, myths about gods and their deeds, 
hymns to gods, kings, and temples, debates, dialogues, and humorous stories about scribal 
students”. We might think that these stories were being committed to the permanent 
storage of clay in order to preserve them, but Robson disagrees; arguing that these stories 
were not written down to be read at a later date. Cuneiform writing was used as a means of 
improving the process of memorising aspects of the oral tradition. Clay tablets were used 
for writing but not reading: two processes we might regard today as fundamentally linked. 
“There is no early Mesopotamian evidence of reading for pleasure, or even creating or 
using tablets as reference works: the intellectual tradition was almost entirely composed of 
knowledge internalized through repeated copying, recitation, and memorization” (Robson, 
2009: p.73).  
Clay tablets make us rethink the notion of permanence in relation to writing devices. 
Although the medium is well-suited to providing permanent storage of written 
information, the storage aspect may well have been incidental to much of the writing that 
actually took place. Clay tablets did store written information, but it does not always follow 
that they were used for this purpose. Robson suggests that it was only during the Iron Age 
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in the later second millennium BC that writing media including cuneiform tablets “began to 
reflect concerns with textual stability” (2009: p.81). Until that time, the “intellectual 
tradition was predominantly one of oral transmission, with repeated copying for 
memorization, in which tablets functioned essentially as ephemera (ibid.). In other words, 
although the material practice of clay inscription did inherently store information, it does 
not necessarily follow that clay writing was concerned with preservation, storage or 
endowing written information with permanence.  
If clay writing tablets offer us a mixture of permanence and ephemerality, how do they 
compare with tablet computers? In many ways, the two objects appear to be opposites. The 
act of writing on clay tablets involves a permanent, material process, using a reed stylus to 
inscribe signs and symbols into a pliant medium. Although the medium creates physical 
storage of readable symbols, it is not intended to store information. It is intended to aid 
and improve memory: the information is stored in the mind of the scribe. As Freud 
comments in his note on the mystic writing pad (Freud, 1925), as long as writing and 
storage of information are achieved by the same process, physical devices will only be able 
to support one process or the other. Thus, the clay tablet is infinitely re-writeable 
(presuming we can keep recycling the clay), but stores no information. A clay tablet can 
store information by being baked, but this prevents any further writing. The tablet 
computer, though, can achieve what the mystic writing pad and the clay tablet cannot: it 
can infinitely write and infinitely store. Writing on a tablet computer leaves no physical 
trace: the stylus neither scores nor paints the surface. The surface is therefore infinitely re-
writeable, and the act of writing is an ephemeral process: no physical storage of the 
symbols occurs. Storage is achieved in a separate and – given enough local or cloud-based 
storage in computer memory – theoretically infinite format. In fact, the efficacy of 
computer storage media presents the converse problem that it is very difficult to erase or 
delete information once it has been stored. Kirschenbaum (2012) outlines the USA 
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Department of Defense strategy for ‘sanitising’ or removing data stored on computer hard 
drives:  
The options range from simple overwrites (recording random or arbitrary bits on 
top of existing information) to various levels of degaussing (using magnetic fields 
to neutralize the polarity of the magnetic media, thereby sanitising it), to Option 
M, available for all optical and magnetic media: ‘Destroy – Disintegrate, 
incinerate, pulverize, shred, or smelt’ (Kirschenbaum, 2012: pp.25-26).  
As well as illustrating the persistence of computer storage, this vivid image of 
destruction highlights the inescapable materiality of storage, even that which appears 
ephemeral.  
If clay tablets can be described as ‘ephemera’ because they do not store information, 
then how should we think of tablet computers, which can store potentially infinite 
information? Interestingly, tablet computers may be just as ephemeral as clay tablets in this 
regard. Although local storage – i.e. information stored digitally on the physical hard drive 
inside the computer – means that tablets do physically ‘contain’ information, much of the 
information that tablet computers use is stored in cloud-based systems. The phrase ‘cloud 
computing’ refers to data and processes that the user accesses locally, but which are run 
and stored on servers at remote locations which could be anywhere in the world. To give 
an example of what this means in practice, we can recall the football star signing an 
autograph for a fan on a tablet computer. The football star uses the stylus to sign and does 
not leave a physical signature; no mark is left on the screen. The computer generates a 
piece of digital information that can render the movements of the stylus visually on a 
screen to represent the signature. In the case of cloud computing, that piece of digital 
information is sent over the Internet to a server elsewhere in the world, where it is 
recorded. The information is never ‘known’ to the computer itself. The tablet computer is 
only involved at the precise moment that the stylus is touching the screen. To access the 
photo, the fan retrieves the information from the remote server. The tablet computer may 
never have anything to do with that signed photograph other than receiving and 
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transmitting a digital code in the second that it takes for an autograph to be signed. In fact, 
given its complete separation of writing and storage, the tablet computer could be said to 
be more ephemeral than the clay writing tablet in this regard. 
A final point on ephemerality and permanence comes when we consider the life of a 
tablet computer in comparison to a clay writing tablet. The earliest clay tablets are 6000 
years old, and we are able to read and understand what they say. This requires expert 
knowledge and perhaps some educated guesswork, but nevertheless the medium is robust 
enough to exist for thousands of years and still deliver readable stored information. The 
speed with which computer technology changes means that storage media become obsolete 
in decades rather than millennia. The iPad went through three models in its first two years. 
The clay writing tablet was a prestige medium for around 2000 years. As will be seen in 
later chapters, the notion of permanence and ephemerality is remarkably important to users 
of tablet computers. The complexities of writing and storage on tablets complicate the 
relationship that users have with their tablets, in particular the ways in which they trust the 
technology to look after their information. This is often expressed in terms of location, 
with users who do not trust the immaterial and ephemeral writing processes asking where 
their information is.  
This section has explored ways in which the material properties of tablets affect our 
understanding of writing. In the following section, I will turn this problematic on its head, 
examining how pedagogic discourses can affect our understanding of the material 
properties of tablets. Specifically, I will ask how different classroom objects come to be 
accepted as suitable and normal at particular times, but rejected as unsuitable or even 
harmful at other times. The rise, fall, and re-emergence of tablets in the classroom is taken 
as evidence that discourses affect how we understand material objects.  
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Pedagogy 
In March 2012, a Wired magazine article featured Russian entrepreneur Alex 
Shustorovich’s plans to place his proprietary tablet computer in every school in Russia. His 
aim is that children will use the tablets “to learn, do their homework, revise for exams and 
– soon – order lunch from the school cafeteria” (Silver, 2012). The double-page spread that 
opens the article juxtaposes a photograph of Mr Shustorovich in a classroom of children 
holding their tablet computers aloft, alongside an image of a traditional slate tablet. Other 
examples of tablets being adopted in educational contexts appear in the press fairly 
regularly11. The article is absolutely clear about the power that this system could give to 
Shustorovich: “E-OK will make Shustorovich hugely influential. If the scheme scales 
across the country, he will control the platform that will increasingly be the way Russian 
children study and prepare for exams – as well as buy and consume music, games and 
movies” (Silver, 2012). More than this, the tablets are also planned to be used in tracking 
health data of children, with “a range of children's statistics, from chronic conditions such 
as epilepsy rates to simple weight and blood-pressure measurements – all of which go in 
the E-OK system, to be accessed only by the [Government health] ministry and the 
student's doctor” (Silver, 2012). This example shows how classroom objects are chosen not 
simply because of their suitability for teaching and learning activities. A much wider range 
of social factors must be taken into consideration if we are to understand the role of the 
material objects of the classroom.  
As material objects, there are some striking similarities between the writing slate and 
the tablet computer. Writing about mid nineteenth century Australia, Davies notes, “Prior 
                                                 
11 http://www.pattayamail.com/business/ict-ministry-contracts-to-buy-chinese-tablets-for-thai-students-
12665 [Accessed 29th May 2012]; http://www.metro.co.uk/news/880698-ipad-for-every-pupil-at-penzance-
school-a-waste-of-300-000 [Accessed 29th May 2012]; http://www.metro.co.uk/news/881256-will-turning-
to-tablet-computers-to-educate-pupils-kill-handwriting [Accessed 29th May 2012]; 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2045896/What-financial-crisis-Essex-secondary-school-gives-1-
200-pupils-free-iPad-2s.html [Accessed 29th May 2012]  
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to the advent of school desks with built-in table tops, slates had to be balanced awkwardly 
across the knees and cradled with one arm” (2005: p.66). Users of tablet computers will no 
doubt be familiar with this awkward and often painful stance. Davies also notes that 
“Smaller pocket slates were also available by the later nineteenth century, measuring 3 x 5 
inches” (2005: p.64) – evoking the current development of smaller tablet computers known 
as ‘notes’, or ‘phablets’; a portmanteau of phone and tablet. Shustorovich’s tablets are 
particularly indicative of the link to old slate tablets as they include a stylus; reminiscent of 
the slate pencil. It is interesting to trace the rise, fall and re-emergence of slate-like objects. 
What makes them normal, accepted classroom objects at one time, and unsuitable and 
excluded at another?  
The choice of objects in the classroom cannot be explained simply by the preferred 
teaching methods of the day. As well as teaching and learning practices, ostensibly external 
social factors can be identified as influences for the material culture of the classroom. 
Using the example of slate tablets in schools, I argue for an expanded understanding of 
‘pedagogy’ to allow us to articulate the many factors that dictate which objects are seen as 
suitable classroom materials at a particular time. In the case of slate tablets in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these factors include discipline and hygiene. Expanding 
the concept of pedagogy to include any factor that influences the choice of material objects 
in the classroom gives the concept a critical power. An analysis of how this expanded 
pedagogy dictates the material culture of the classroom allows us to identify the 
relationship between classroom objects and social control. Without this critical aspect, a 
narrow pedagogy explains the appearance of new classroom objects simply as a natural 
progression in which the latest and most suitable teaching and learning objects are 
inevitably brought into the classroom. These issues will be addressed by examining the use 
of slate in the classroom in the nineteenth century, the replacement of slate by paper in the 
twentieth century, and finally the recent re-emergence of slate-like classroom objects: tablet 
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computers. By examining the internal logic by which these devices lose and gain reputation 
as worthy classroom objects, I make a connection between classroom objects and social 
discourses. Firstly, I examine what we might call the orthodox explanation for the rise and 
fall of slates as classroom objects: the explanation that states that classroom objects are 
accepted or rejected simply due to how well they carry out the favoured teaching and 
learning practices of the day. Then, I argue that ‘expanded pedagogy’ allows us to critically 
analyse this process, by observing a wider variety of factors; in this case, discipline and 
hygiene.  
Slate is “a fine-grained argillaceous (clayey) rock with frequent mica and quartz 
inclusions, which splits or cleaves readily into thin slabs” (Davies, 2005: p.63). Slate pencils 
were made of a softer slate, so that when scored across the surface of the slate they would 
leave a white mark on the dark background (Davies, 2005: p.64). The material 
characteristics of writing slates means they are particularly suitable for writing but not 
recording. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rote learning was regarded 
as the most effective learning method in Britain, Ireland, Australia and elsewhere 
(Coleman, 1998, Davies, 2005, Lawn, 2005). Slates are well-suited to an educational system 
that requires repetition of facts. Thus, slates were seen as a perfectly suitable, even obvious, 
classroom object at the time.  
In late Victorian England, the importance of mechanical knowledge for the increasing 
number of workers in industry meant that school education began to move towards the 
‘object lesson’ as the primary method of elementary teaching (Lawn, 2005: p.146). Object 
lessons (Lawn, 2005, Wylie, 2012) were premised on the idea that students could only 
‘know’ objects by direct experience of them, so for example the hardness of glass can only 
be known by touching it (Lawn, 2005: p.151). The intimate learning practices of the object 
lesson represented an understanding of knowledge as personal, gained through an 
individual’s experience. During the period that the object lesson was introduced, the use of 
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the slate began to decline. According to the narrow pedagogical interpretation, this was 
because the material properties of slates no longer suited the teaching and learning 
requirements of the day.  
Wylie (2012: p.260) argues that the rise of the blackboard as a classroom object can be 
explained by its suitability for preferred teaching and learning practices. She explains the 
decision in 1844 in England to provide state funding for blackboards in terms of teaching 
and learning practices: rote learning is combined with the notion of the teacher as an 
exemplar, with the further advantage of saving time by reducing individual instruction 
(Wylie, 2012: p.261). The pedagogical practice of copying a perfect example also extended 
to teacher training itself, with teaching manuals designed on the principle of imitation so 
that teachers were taught by the same method as their students (Wylie, 2012: p.270). 
McGregor observes the relationship between material objects and teaching and learning 
practices in the storage spaces in schools, which house discarded objects representing 
discarded pedagogies (McGregor, 2004: p.356).  
According to the narrow definition of pedagogy, the recent re-emergence of slate-like 
objects in the form of tablets can be explained by the material characteristics of tablet 
computers, which suit current pedagogical requirements. The material properties of tablet 
computers combine the best of both pencil-and-paper and slates. As noted earlier, unlike 
Freud’s Mystic Writing Pad (Freud, 1925), the tablet computer allows both infinite 
rewriting and infinite recording – it fulfils the function of slate and of paper. This flexibility 
of tablet computers matches the currently favoured pedagogical approach which promotes 
flexible accommodation of different learning styles, and regards good teaching as that 
which allows for different ways of learning. In this way, the introduction of tablet 
computers to the classroom appears to be ‘common sense’.  
In a limited understanding of pedagogy, the use, decline and reintroduction of slates 
or tablets as a classroom object can be explained simply by the extent to which these 
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objects’ material properties suit the preferred teaching and learning practices of the time. 
The question of economy is often raised in conjunction with the introduction of new 
classroom objects. Accounts of the emergence of new classroom technologies such as slate, 
paper and indeed tablet computers often mention that the replacement of old technology 
coincided with a new cheapness of the replacement technology (Warren, 1810, Davies, 
2005, Lawn, 2005, Silver, 2012). This contributes to a feeling that there is a natural 
progression, whereby new technologies come along at just the right time – that it is 
inevitable that new classroom objects naturally fulfil the teaching and learning 
requirements, and it is just a matter of time before they are cheap enough to be used on a 
large scale. I argue that this idea is misleading if not simply incorrect. The move to replace 
slates with paper in Britain, Ireland and Australia, for example, occurred towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, even though mass-produced paper was still generally more 
expensive than slate well into the twentieth century (Davies, 2005: p.64, Lawn and 
Grosvenor, 2005: p.11). All of which goes to show that we should rethink the ‘common 
sense’ perspective that new classroom objects simply fit with the preferred teaching and 
learning practices of the time and become popular when they become cheap enough. The 
remainder of this section argues that a much more complex understanding can be gained if 
we expand the concept of pedagogy to include the influences of discipline and hygiene on 
the choice of slates.  
The relationship between school discipline and social control has been dealt with 
elsewhere by canonical texts (for example: Althusser, 1971, Foucault, 1977). Material 
objects in the classroom mediate power relations between students and teachers, which are 
reiterated later in life in a multitude of other hierarchies of power. Using expanded 
pedagogy, the suitability of slates as classroom objects can be explained in terms of their 
disciplinary function. Lawn and Grosvenor give the example of a slate cleaning drill, which 
“involved sponges, a yardstick, a shallow tin, a cupboard and a series of movements by the 
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teacher and child. A simple system constructed for a critical purpose, it had to maintain 
discipline, establish routine and be effective” (2005: p.13). Along with desks, which 
physically restrain students and demarcate the classroom space (Martínez, 2005), slates 
were mediators of power relations. In some schools, slates were only used for elementary 
teaching, although they continued to be used for arithmetic by older pupils (Davies, 2005: 
p.66). The symbolism of learning objects is made clear by an autobiographical source 
writing about his school experience in Ireland in the 1870s: “'When I was ten years of age I 
was in the second book […] but until I passed into the third book I would not be looked 
upon as a scholar'“ (Coleman, 1998: p.192). The use of slates for different exercises was 
thus a marker of a student’s status. The slate did not only mediate cultural power relations 
between students and teachers: an autobiographical source speaking about schooldays in 
Ireland in the late nineteenth century mentions how a teacher, so flustered by the presence 
of a school board inspector, had to ask for help with some figures on the slate (Coleman, 
1998: p.189). In this case, the slate becomes a mediating object of the teacher’s inferiority 
to the inspector. The slate-cleaning drill and the association of slates with elementary learning 
are two examples of how the slate tablet was a useful object for the expanded pedagogic 
function of the establishment of hierarchies of power and the practice of discipline.  
The decline of slate can also be explained in terms of its disciplinary function. As well 
as mediating hierarchies and power relations, slates could be used to mediate resistance to 
those hierarchies: sometimes violently so. Coleman’s collection of autobiographical 
accounts of schooldays in Ireland 1850-1922 abounds with violent stories of pupils 
throwing slates at teachers, in one case even heating a slate in the fire before picking it up 
with a glove and handing it to the teacher (1998: p.187; pp198-9). Considering this 
potential of slates to embody resistance to pedagogically-favoured hierarchies, it is easy to 
imagine teachers favouring a move to paper, which still symbolically mediated the power 
relation between themselves and students, but did not carry the material risks of the slate. 
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Because it seems ‘natural’ to want to remove potentially harmful objects, the change from 
slate to paper also appears a natural one. Yet it only appears natural by fitting in with this 
accepted pedagogic discourse. Of course, it is more than likely that the rhetoric of ‘safety’ 
would be focused on making the classroom safer for children.  
As well as discipline, hygiene played an important discursive role in the replacement of 
slate by paper. Although the work of microbiologist Louis Pasteur and renowned physician 
Robert Koch might seem unrelated to the choice of teaching materials, Davies (2005: p.66) 
cites their work and the wider public health movement of the time as a primary factor in 
the removal of slates from classrooms: “As pupils so often neglected to bring a cloth with 
which to clean their slates, the easiest method was to spit on the surface and wipe it with a 
sleeve”(2005: p.66). Today it is common to observe a similar process being employed to 
remove fingerprints from phone and tablet screens. In the late nineteenth century 
classroom, because slates were communal, this practice promoted the spread of disease. In 
a context in which the prevention of disease is seen as common sense, it also seems 
common sense to remove slates from the classroom. The internal logic of pedagogy is 
expressed in the choice of material objects of learning. Interestingly, Davies also notes 
(2005: p.66) how some school authorities in Australia worried that the brightness of paper 
could negatively affect children’s eyesight. We can speculate that the discourse of germ 
prevention was more powerful than that of optical health, leading to slates being removed 
and paper becoming commonplace. The relevant dominance of these discourses affects the 
perception of the material properties of these objects. Rather than slate being thought of as 
(healthily) un-shiny, it was thought of as (unhealthily) germ-ridden.  
Using expanded pedagogy, an examination of slates revealed the importance of the 
discourses of hygiene and discipline in the choice of classroom objects. Similarly, an 
expanded pedagogy allows us to use the emergence of digital technologies such as tablet 
computers today, to critique the social discourses that operate to make these objects 
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suitable. In tablet computers, the discourse of ‘hi-tech’ can be identified. Using tablet 
computers in educational contexts today instils a familiarity with new technologies which it 
is believed will prove useful in the increasingly-technological world of work. In this 
context, ‘hi-tech’ tablet computers are suitable classroom objects; fitting into a cultural 
discourse that associates new technologies with progress. Further to this, the idea that 
tablet computers can replace text books and printing fits with a discourse of paper 
reduction, playing on both economic and environmental factors which are regarded as 
increasingly important. The fact that slate-like objects are re-emerging as suitable classroom 
objects today indicates a different hierarchy of discourses.  
This section has shown how the discourses which operate in a particular space, in this 
case the classroom, affect choices regarding the use of objects in that space. In the final 
section, I examine mobile productivity devices including the tablet computer, asking how 
the everyday use of these objects affects our understanding of space. Specifically, I argue 
that the everyday use of these technologies forces us to reconsider how we understand the 
workplace.  
Personal Productivity 
In this section I describe tablet computers as the latest in a category of objects that I 
call ‘mobile productivity devices’, including Filofaxes and Personal Digital Assistants. I 
argue that the everyday use of these objects allows a specifically work-related concept, 
productivity, to become fluid; being transferred into non-work contexts. This is observed 
in the notion of ‘personal productivity’, which describes a general way of operating in 
which the whole of a person’s life is judged in terms of productivity. Two implications of 
this technologically-mediated ubiquitous productivity are examined. Firstly, how this affects 
our understanding of work (and non-work) and specifically the workplace. Secondly, how this 
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new understanding of the workplace forces us to reconsider how we might understand or 
critique resistance to dominant discourses.  
Tablet computers can be described as mobile productive devices because they are 
designed to be carried everywhere, and contain both information related to a person’s work 
and also to a person’s domestic and everyday life. Shopping lists sit alongside task lists, and 
leisure activities are noted down in the same schedule as work activities. In conflating 
information about work and home, these objects mark a shift in which the notion of 
productivity moves out of the workplace and becomes a universally-valued concept. The 
iPad marks what Jordan describes as computing ‘after the desktop’: no longer based on the 
work/home distinction; and the replacement of the desktop metaphor of user interfaces in 
favour of apps and cloud computing (2015: p.155). These two features of ‘after the 
desktop’ computing are clear in the structure of app stores. A search in 2012 for “personal 
productivity” in the Google Play Store – the digital shop for apps, books and videos for 
tablet computers and other mobile devices running the Android operating system – returns 
around 100 digital book results, including “Personal Productivity Secrets: Do What You Never 
Thought Possible with Your Time and Attention”, “Lifehacker: The Guide to Working Smarter, Faster, 
and Better“, “Ready For Anything: 52 Productivity Principles for Work and Life”, and the somewhat 
outlandishly titled “Careergonomics: A Practical Guide for Mastering Personal Development and 
Employment Success in the 21st Century”. The same search returns at least 1000 apps, including 
one named simply “Personal Productivity”, which costs £0.93 and promises tablet users 
that, “These Hidden Techniques Will Literally Elevate You Up The Ladder Of Success By 
Helping You Achieve Much More In Less Time!” The importance of personal productivity 
to users of tablet technology is made clear by the categories into which the Play Store 
divides its apps: alongside ‘Books and Reference’, ‘Media and Video’, ‘Music and Audio’, 
there is a whole category devoted to apps for ‘Productivity’. Kluitenberg identifies the 
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“promise of efficiency in a variety of daily tasks” as that feature of ‘the app universe’ “that 
holds millions of people under its spell” (2015: p.103).  
As a material object that is carried around on one’s person and promises to improve 
personal productivity, the tablet computer has a cultural heritage of a few decades. 
Although invented in 1910 and branded in 1921 (McMurdo, 1989), the object that I refer 
to here when I say ‘Filofax’ – a mobile device for personal productivity – has its cultural 
origins in the early 1980s when it was a marker of ‘yuppie’ culture. A satirical obituary in 
Time Magazine in April 199112 in the USA stated that ‘Yuppie’ was born in 1983 and died 
in 1991. Sales of Filofaxes reflect this rise and fall: from £47,000 in 1978, Filofax’s UK 
turnover peaked in 1987 at £12.9 million (McMurdo, 1989: p.362). It is for this reason that 
I choose the Filofax of the 1980s as a cultural origin for the tablet computer as an object of 
personal productivity: this period marks a cultural change in which, as I argue below, the 
understanding of productivity alters.  
In the late 1980s, electronic mobile personal productivity devices began to appear, 
such as the Psion Organiser and later the Palm Pilot. Although these devices were 
competitors to paper-based systems, there was some integration, as with Filofaxes that 
could hold a Psion Organiser (McMurdo, 1989: p.363). According to the internal logic of 
these objects, the combination of paper-based Filofax and electronic PDA offered the best 
of both worlds, with the advantages of paper as a writing medium complemented by 
electronic data storage. The combination of the easy input of pen-on-paper with electronic 
data storage systems is portrayed as a naturally advantageous concept, expressed through a 
series of increasingly optimal technological solutions. In fact, Baron (writing in just 2009) 
predicts that tablet computers might finally ‘solve this problem’: 
Perhaps more promising in the technological convergence of longhand and 
digitization are developments such as the digital pen, which records hand 
                                                 
12 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972695-1,00.html [Accessed 11th June 2012] 
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movements for later downloading to a PC, and the new tablet computers. Like 
PDAs, tablet PCs still require users to learn a proprietary script, but unlike the 
PDA, writers generate streams of continuous prose, entire words and sentences, 
across the full, touch-sensitive computer screen, just as they would on paper, 
instead of tracing individual letters in the small window allotted to them on the 
Palm Pilot. (Baron, 2009: p.69) 
Tablet computers are the latest in a series of objects that could be categorised as 
‘mobile productivity devices’. I use the word ‘series’ here to reflect the manner in which 
each of these devices is seen to offer an increasingly ideal solution to the ‘problem’ of 
combining work and home life in a productive fashion, rather than to reflect a natural 
progression or evolution of one single device. Having their origin in the enterprise culture 
of the 1980s, these devices promote the idea of the entrepreneur. Distinct from a 
businessman or professional – who works for a company – being an entrepreneur is a way 
of life. Where an office worker leaves their files on the office computer or on their desk, an 
entrepreneur needs them at hand 24 hours a day: a Filofax, PDA or tablet computer 
delivers this. The assumption built into mobile productivity devices that a person is only as 
productive as the data they command leads McMurdo to argue that the Filofax “may 
represent one milestone of an information society in which information work is a general, 
rather than a specialized activity” (McMurdo, 1989: p.362). Where professionals are 
productive at work, entrepreneurs are productive. Having information constantly to hand in a 
mobile productivity device is an example of the symbolic or ritualistic performance of 
being productive: whether the information is useful or not, having that information is the 
mark of a productive, i.e. successful, person (Liu, 2004: pp.153-154). The notion of 
‘personal productivity’ is crucial in understanding how objects such as tablet computers 
mediate this conflation of work and home, and how this in turn means we must rethink 
concepts such as ‘the workplace’.  
Mobile productivity devices, which conflate work and non-work activities under one 
universal logic of productivity, lead to a way of life in which everything is undertaken in 
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what is effectively a work mode. As we saw with the tablet computer apps, this concept has 
been commodified under the title ‘personal productivity’. The idea of personal 
productivity, sometimes called ‘lifehacking’ (Potts, 2010), is that productivity is not a 
feature of ‘good working practices’: it is a general characteristic of a successful individual. It 
implies that every activity in one’s life, including non-work activities, should be undertaken 
in a productive manner. As a philosophy, personal productivity takes a commercially-
situated principle and applies it in all-encompassing manner to a person’s entire life. It is 
the root of the kind of comments overheard on a Monday morning at work: “I didn’t do 
anything productive all weekend”. Whether this is said with a tone of pride and satisfaction 
or guilt and anxiety matters not: either way, it indicates that productivity is being used as a 
valuative judgement for everyday life outside of work.  
Filofaxes, PDAs and tablet computers embody the logic of personal productivity: they 
are designed to help you to be productive, rather than simply to complete work productively. 
These technologies not only contain business contact information and work schedules, but 
also shopping lists, personal addresses and phone numbers and so on. They remove the 
distinction between work and non-work, instead rationalising all everyday activities in terms 
of productivity. In other words, productivity becomes ‘natural’ – the accepted, expected 
way of doing things. These mobile devices are the locus of a productive lifestyle, in which 
one’s entire life is undertaken productively: as though it were work. The normalisation of 
productivity means, however, that it becomes disassociated from work: it is just seen as 
normal. Of course, the representation of a way of operating as normal or natural is 
evidence that a particular discourse is in force (Lefebvre, 2004: p.38-9). Productivity as a 
desirable and marketable personal characteristic is a result of this discourse, where to be 
productive is a general cultural imperative, seen as an advantageous principle in everyday 
life. This is the basis upon which ‘brain training’ apps and games are promoted. Mobile 
brain training games allow the user to act productively at times and in spaces which would 
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otherwise be unproductive. Bassett argues that these games operate in an era in which 
identity is understood and constructed “in terms of a work on the self” (Bassett, 2009: 
p.58).  
If personal productivity means that ‘work’ permeates everyday life, then this raises the 
question of how to define the workplace. The increasingly widespread use of technologies 
such as Filofaxes, PDAs and tablet computers forces us to reconceive of the workplace as 
both spatially and temporally unbound. As a point of comparison, we might consider the 
word ‘workplace’ itself. The spatial imagery of this word defines ‘work’ as not only an 
activity, but also the place in which that activity occurs. In this way, work is seen to ‘belong’ 
in certain spaces. In a Western industrial or post-industrial context, the idea of the 
workplace rests on the notion that work occurs in a physically distinct and separate place. 
Whether a factory or an office, the idea is that work is physically located in a demarcated 
space, and this space is defined by the work that goes on within. This can be observed in 
the way that ‘the office’ is used to label a room in the house where (paid) work is 
undertaken.  
Mobile productive technologies, however, have a different effect on the way we think 
about the workspace. Their material properties in combination with the notion of 
productivity as a universal cultural imperative means that the workspace becomes much 
more fluid. Bassett (2009) identifies mobile gaming practices as reorderings of space as 
personal, noting the tensions that arise when gaming in spaces otherwise designated as 
public such as cafés or trains. Fuchs argues that both time and space are crucial for 
understanding labour, in his discussion understood in Marxist terms of value production 
(Fuchs, 2014: p.6). Rather than merely extend the space of work, these technologies 
completely eliminate traditional spatial and temporal definitions of work. Because their 
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material properties are such that they allow work to be done almost anywhere13 (or at least 
this idea is part of the imaginary upon which they function), they can facilitate a kind of 
ubiquitous working. Where the industrial and post-industrial workplace used to be set 
within the limits of a physical space (or an extended or proxy-space such as a home office), 
and bound by the temporal convention of a nine-to-five routine, mobile technologies such 
as tablet computers have removed these restrictions. This is a characteristic of immaterial 
labour as defined by Lazzarato who notes that “with the economy of immaterial labour, 
‘leisure time’ and ‘work time’ are increasingly fused, making life inseparable from work” 
(cited in Coté and Pybus, 2007: p.98). Gregg (2011: pp.7-9) notes that this sense of work 
being done ‘outside’ of the traditional workplace is not new: it is not caused by, or even 
necessarily simultaneous with, the rise of mobile technologies of productivity. The change 
that I wish to highlight here is the way in which this kind of work is understood. 
Specifically, I am interested in how discourses about mobile technologies might mean that 
this kind of work becomes normalised, expected, and devalued. Qiu et al. (2014: p.567) 
argue that the “impasse in attempts to theorize so-called ‘immaterial’ labour stems from a 
largely Western notion of separate public and private spheres for labour, which removed 
waged labour from the home, and feminized many aspects of reproductive and domestic 
labour in the process.” The concern with personal productivity is not that it codifies new 
types of work as non-work, disenfranchising new groups in familiar ways, but that it 
removes this distinction altogether. If personal productivity means that the everyday 
activities are undertaken as though they were work, and mobile productive technologies 
mean that traditional work can be carried out anywhere, then it becomes increasingly 
difficult to define work or designate a specific workplace for activities completed using 
                                                 
13 Although electronic tablets and other mobile communications technologies require a phone or wireless 
Internet signal to work, limiting their claims of working ‘anywhere’, the Filofax is an example of a mobile 
technology of personal productivity which could legitimately make such a claim.  
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tablet computers. These concerns are historically situated in a post-industrial revolution 
Western context. In contrast, the lack of distinction between home and work, or work and 
leisure, would not be analytically problematic in discussions of agrarian societies where 
people labour continuously and live on land which is their ‘workplace’. 
With a changed understanding of work comes an equivalent change in how we 
conceive of its opposite, whether that be home, time off, leisure, or free time etc. When 
using tablets and other mobile productive technologies, activities of both work and non-
work are bound up within a productive mode of operating. When work emails and 
personal emails are all delivered to the same tablet computer, accessed anywhere, the 
distinction between work and non-work becomes harder to make. And if a person is used 
to checking their personal emails at home, then the logic of personal productivity would 
have it that it is quite reasonable to begin checking one’s work emails at home too. The 
phenomenon is explored by Gregg in the pertinently titled Work’s Intimacy (Gregg, 2011). 
Checking one’s work email at home becomes standard, even expected, yet remains 
unremunerated because it is not seen as work. If evidently work-based activities cease to be 
seen as work, and are routinely carried out in one’s free time, then this forces us to ask how 
we can usefully distinguish between work and free time.  
Adorno condemned the division in late Capitalism between work and leisure (1991). 
He argued that free time had become a parody of itself, as it was not ‘free’ at all: it was used 
to regenerate the energy expended in labour so that workers would be refreshed and ready 
to work again (1991: pp.187-189). Adorno’s critique of free time in late Capitalism relied on 
a distinction between work and non-work, with free time “shackled to its opposite” 
(Adorno, 1991: p.187). Still, in Adorno’s critique, there is such a thing as free time. His 
argument operates on the basis of there being a space of freedom that is unfairly occupied 
by Capitalism. Examinations of technologies of personal productivity must address this 
issue. If everyday life is dictated by a productive imperative, then it is questionable whether 
42 
we can conceive of a space outside of work. If free time for Adorno represented a space 
that was theoretically external to – but unfairly co-opted by – Capitalism, then personal 
productivity represents a complete integration of work into free time. Where Adorno wrote 
that “unfreedom is gradually annexing ‘free time’, and the majority of unfree people are as 
unaware of this process as they are of the unfreedom itself” (1991: p.188), we are 
confronted today by a situation in which people are not just aware of the encroachment of 
work into leisure; they actively favour it. ‘Being productive’ is a positive phrase. In 
understanding the role of new technologies in everyday life, therefore, new forms of 
critique are required which are capable of dealing with this new understanding of the 
workplace.  
It should be noted that Adorno writes of a genuine productivity – “the ability to bring 
forth something that was not already there” (1991: p.193). A similar distinction is made by 
Thomas Osborne who distinguishes between “contemporary ‘creativity’ and what he terms 
(following Deleuze) as ‘inventiveness’” (cited in Bassett, 2009: p.50). It is clear that for 
Adorno this genuine productivity can only occur outside of, or beyond, Capitalism: 
“Productive free time is only possible for people who have outgrown their tutelage, not for 
those who under conditions of heteronomy, have become heteronomous for themselves” 
(1991: p.194). For Adorno, resistance to the dominant ideology of productivity is to be 
found in spaces that evade it; spaces that are not determined by Capitalism. One possible 
instance of this is given by Rancière, who argues that making use of the night is a form of 
resistance. He gives the example of nineteenth century worker-philosophers and “worker-
poets [who] are performing politics by reusing the nights that are meant for proletarian sleep, 
by making themselves at home in a medium that is not theirs (poetry, philosophy), and 
dreaming of a life that they weren’t born to” (Highmore, 2011: p.120, italics added). The 
extent to which tablets might offer a means of performing counter-hegemonic action will 
be addressed in later chapters.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given an exposition of the term ‘the tablet computer’, while at 
the same time arguing that any definition of a material object is always insufficient. The 
definition of an object is determined by the discourses that surround it: in fact, the 
definition is a site of contestation between those discourses. As such, it is impossible to say 
what a tablet computer is – or more accurately such a definition will never be neutral. It is 
perfectly possible, however, to define ways in which using a tablet computer makes sense. To 
say how an object makes sense has a critical agency: understanding how people use objects 
in their everyday life reveals the logics and cultural imperatives that make particular uses 
and meanings of an object ‘natural’. As this chapter has shown, using an object in a way 
that makes sense involves social power relations that go far beyond the perceived limits of 
the context in which the object is used. The following chapter will give an overview of 
academic literature that has addressed similar issues, framing the work of this thesis within 
the disciplines of media and cultural studies and science and technology studies.   
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Chapter 2. Developing a conceptual framework to analyse the 
use of tablets in different contexts 
 
[…] the constitutions of objects and subjects, risk and certainty, failure and 
success, and other aspects of object-centred sociality in contemporary sites of 
technoscientific practice is contingent, enacted within culturally and historically 
specific fields of persons and things. Within those fields, the multiplicity of 
objects affords ever ramifying, but always equivocal, opportunities for 
organizational, personal and technological reproduction and transformation 
(Suchman, 2005: p.395). 
 
Introduction  
This thesis examines the tablet computer within contemporary sites of technoscientific 
practice. I argue that a consideration of the way that material objects are defined in any 
given situation is an essential lens for research and analysis into technological practices. 
Jordan identifies the iPad as a “battleground”: a place where “conflicts occur and the 
political stakes of information address our lives directly in moments of subjection and 
struggles for liberation” (2015: p.143). In this thesis I take the battle for definition of the 
tablet computer as a key focus. The way that the tablet is defined expresses a great deal 
about the desires for technology held by those doing the defining. It says a great deal about 
the definers and how they express their subject positions. It also says much about the 
situation in which they are using the tablet – in this thesis usually a research laboratory – 
and the power relations that operate therein.  
My approach entails two concurrent contentions. The first is that this work of 
definition occurs through many different types of everyday practices. It can be explicit, 
observed in people’s discussions about what the tablet is for, or in the declarations and 
pronouncements of those in defined positions of power who dictate what the tablet is to 
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be used for. It is often implicit, achieved in embodied actions that place the tablet at the 
centre or periphery of a particular situation, or in discussions of people’s roles within a 
research project, which in turn imply a certain role for the tablet. This demanded an 
ethnographic approach where I as a researcher could observe scientists using tablets at 
close-quarters and for extended periods of time. It is only with this very close engagement 
with tablet users that the subtle, everyday practices that go into defining a new 
technological object can be observed. In each case, the specific, local conditions and 
context are fundamental to the analysis. At the same time, secondly, the work of this thesis 
can apply more broadly to understandings of how technoscientific objects factor in the 
production of scientific knowledge, in the creation and maintenance of social relations and 
in the way that people enact different subject positions. The everyday practices that I 
discuss are not unique to each ethnography; rather I argue that they can be read as situated 
instantiations of practices that are developed in response to a more general context.  
This is different from saying that I can generalise based on my findings in each 
ethnography. Rather, the discursive work that goes into defining the tablet within specific 
contexts itself has implications and effects beyond those specific contexts. The specific and 
the general are two sides of the same coin. This thesis therefore requires a conceptual 
framework that can account for both the specific everyday practices that are the primary 
focus of the ethnographic research as well as the more general arguments that apply across 
the ethnographies to create a coherent and sustained argument about the role of tablets. In 
this chapter, I develop two key concepts that bring these two levels of analysis together. 
‘Affordance ambiguity’ describes the material nature of the tablet and accounts for the way 
that it offers a range of uses that can only be enacted in specific instances of use. The 
‘tablet imaginary’ describes the cultural values, meanings and understandings that are drawn 
on to define the tablet and are simultaneously constructed in that work of definition.  
46 
Methodology 
This thesis is situated at the intersection of Media and Cultural Studies (MCS) and 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). Researching tablet computers in science labs, this 
seems a natural intellectual home for this work. But it was not obvious from the outset. 
Working at an intersection of two fields brings tremendous rewards: a wider range of 
theoretical tools to draw on, a diversity of perspectives that can be brought to bear on the 
research and the possibility of using conceptual framings that sometimes complement, 
sometimes critique one another in productive ways. Some of the links between MCS and 
STS have been made previously in academic literature. Others need to be outlined to show 
how and why particular connections can be made. Before outlining the two key concepts 
‘affordance ambiguity’ and the ‘tablet imaginary’, I trace the intellectual path that my 
research has taken, highlighting key themes that I draw upon throughout the thesis.  
The Ethnographic Method 
Firstly, a key area of overlap between MCS and STS has been in methodological 
approach and perspective. My primary research methods in this thesis are participant 
observations and interviews, in the ethnographic tradition. Fundamental to the way that the 
research is presented throughout the thesis, is the idea of representation.  
Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1979) is an influence on the current research as 
it is an early example of lab ethnography, where, as stated in the title of chapter two, ‘an 
anthropologist enters the laboratory’. More than this, Laboratory Life discusses lab work as 
the construction of a scientific, positivistic account of reality. In their account, lab 
equipment “thoroughly constitutes” the substances studied, and the objects of study 
(chemicals, reactions, structures and so on) would not exist without the equipment creating 
them (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: pp.64-5). Often, the phenomena studied in the lab are 
only inscriptions: a graph representing a chemical reaction observed by a machine is 
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understood as a discrete, objective fact, but the reaction only occurred because it was set 
up to produce the graph. The book traces the construction of scientific facts in detail, 
critiquing the boundary between representation and reality. At the same time as offering 
this critique, the approach offers a problem for the ethnographic method. If the scientists 
are merely constructing representations, then what is the anthropologist doing? I will 
shortly return to this question in a discussion of academic literature that specifically 
addresses such problems in the ethnographic method.  
The concept of representation, and critiques of the line between representation and 
reality, have also been fundamental to media studies. To take one example, Stuart Hall 
(2009b) argues that the representation is constitutive of social and political life: 
My own view is that events, relations, structures do have conditions of existence 
and real effects, outside the sphere of the discursive; but that only within the 
discursive, and subject to its specific conditions, limits and modalities, do they 
have or can they be constructed within meaning. Thus, while not wanting to 
expand the territorial claims of the discursive infinitely, how things are 
represented and the ‘machineries’ and regimes of representation in a culture do 
play a constitutive, and not merely a reflexive, after-the-event, role. This gives 
questions of culture and ideology, and the scenarios of representation – 
subjectivity, identity, politics – a formative, not merely an expressive, place in the 
constitution of social and political life” (2009b: p.271, emphasis in original) 
The construction of particular representations should therefore be the site of media 
studies research. Hammersley (1992) addresses the question of realism in ethnography, 
arguing that ethnographers are committed in some sense to the idea of an external reality 
that they are examining, and at the same time to the idea that people (ethnographers 
included) construct the social world (Hammersley, 1992: Chapter three). Taking all of the 
above on board, my position in conducting the ethnographic research for this thesis 
follows the approach suggested by Hammersley, in line with the research traditions in both 
MCS and STS: 
The aim of social research is to represent reality, but this is not to say that its 
function is to reproduce it (that is, to represent it ‘in its own terms’). Rather, 
representation must always be from some point of view which makes some 
features of the phenomena represented relevant and others irrelevant. Thus, there 
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can be multiple, non-contradictory and valid descriptions and explanations of the 
same phenomenon. (Hammersley, 1992: p.51) 
Similarly, Angela McRobbie “was keen to stress the ‘partiality’ of ethnographic 
writings, encouraging us to understand representations as interpretations rather than pure 
mirror images” (Moores, 1993: p.63). The positionality of the researcher is essential in 
understanding ethnographic research. Coffey (1999: p.5) emphasises how ethnographers 
help to construct the situations that become their data, and encourages reflexivity in 
methods and analysis to account for this. The influence of the ethnographer on the 
research and its presentation is vividly signified by Ben-Ari (1995) devoting an entire 
chapter to the study of the acknowledgements sections that precede publications.  
In each chapter that presents ethnographic research, I give some details about the 
location, the participants and the context of that particular case study. In this introductory 
section, I will briefly give some more general points about my own position in relation to 
the research participants, my use of an authorial voice to construct an account of what took 
place at each research site, and the ethics and responsibilities of respecting and trying to 
remain faithful to all participants’ accounts, while also aiming to offer my own 
interpretation of events.  
I entered the laboratory sites as a non-scientist, and directly asked participants to 
explain their work and daily routines to me as somebody unfamiliar with them. In terms of 
the work being done at each site, this positioned me as an outsider and in some sense 
subordinate, as I was not part of the community of expert knowledge and practice. 
Conversely, participants often treated me as an expert in tablet computers, for example 
asking me for advice on what tablet to buy or what apps to download. I was honest about 
my level of knowledge of tablets, and the fact that I was interested in working practices, 
rather than necessarily in tablets themselves. Working with scientists in labs meant that the 
idea of conducting research was both an area of common ground and a point of difference. 
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I was sometimes asked, ‘what do you want to find out’, and participants seemed bemused 
that I could not give a clear, positivistic, response. In general, however, the fact that I was 
there ‘to do research’ was something that participants were satisfied with and took for 
granted.  
The way that I report the findings of the ethnographic case studies focuses on key 
participants in each case. But there are other voices and influences that cannot be 
transcribed. The hegemony of an institution plays a role in the adoption of tablets, and this 
is not easily expressed through interview responses. The way that participants acted 
differently around certain colleagues, perhaps giving a more even-handed response to a 
question, choosing not to speak at all, is not easily reflected in direct reporting. I do my 
best to honestly and respectfully reflect the experience of key participants, while also trying 
to account for circumstantial explanations for the events I report. 
In using an authorial voice that alternates between quoting comments and discussing 
actions of participants ‘directly’, and sometimes giving a somewhat detached or 
disembodied interpretation, I aim to reflect the complexity of the case studies. Where I give 
detached accounts of what has taken place, my aim is to highlight the interpretation of 
events that I judge to animate the case study most significantly. Similarly, there are 
moments where I essentially disagree with participants’ accounts of what is taking place 
and why. This is the result of the temporalities of the research, where in some cases I 
visited labs every few weeks, over a period of many months. Different reasons or 
motivations for the same phenomenon are given at different times and in different 
circumstances. In my analysis, reflecting on the ethnography as a whole, I try to judge 
which reason is most significant, and most relevant to my research questions and interests.  
Pseudonyms are always given, for names and places, in order to provide anonymity for 
participants. This was part of the standard practice and ethical considerations of the 
research. More than this, however, it reflects the sense in which this research is ultimately 
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my version of events, rather than that of the participants. To give one example, in one case, 
a participant requested to be named in any published research. Ellen (1984: p.151) points 
out that such requests can be read as demands for control over the veracity of the account. 
In my case, the participant reported that they were proud of their work and wanted their 
name to be included in public accounts of what took place in their laboratory over the time 
that I visited. Although I had to deny the participant’s request on the grounds that it would 
compromise the anonymity of other participants, Ellen’s point about ownership of the 
account also holds true. What follows is my “own construction of other people’s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to” (Geertz, 1973, p.9; cited in 
Moores, 1993: p.62). My account emphasises what I believe to be the most important 
questions about the way that tablets are defined, the implications of those definitions in 
terms of subjectivity and power, and the promise of technology. 
Media and Communications, Science and Technology 
In the broadest terms, this research is situated between or across two main bodies of 
literature: Science and Technology Studies and Media and Communications Studies. There 
is much overlap between these two fields and the great benefits of incorporating the two 
research traditions has been outlined by Gillespie and colleagues (Gillespie et al., 2014). In 
their words:  
“We believe a productive plateau has been reached, wherein distinct intellectual 
trajectories originating from disparate fields have gathered around a common 
purpose: to understand media technologies as complex, sociomaterial 
phenomena” (Gillespie et al., 2014: p.1).  
 
A key marker in this shared trajectory is Silverstone’s work on media technologies and 
the idea of double articulation. Silverstone and Hirsch argue that media technologies are 
social as well as material objects, and that their social and material aspects are 
fundamentally linked and inseparable. They use the term double articulation  
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“to refer to the ways in which information and communication technologies, 
uniquely, are the means (the media) whereby public and private meanings are 
mutually negotiated; as well as being the products themselves, through 
consumption, of such negotiations of meaning” (Silverstone et al., 1992: p.28) 
This double articulation makes media objects distinct amongst other domestic objects. 
In conjunction with the idea that media technologies are both social and material, 
Silverstone’s writing on domestication gives an account of consumption that focuses on 
the ways that users/audiences make media technologies meaningful. And rather than 
focusing their analysis solely at the literal point of consumption, Silverstone and Hirsch 
argue that the study of consumption is something more. They treat consumption “as an 
extension and embodiment of the persisting need of modern society to sustain itself; and as 
structured by and through the abiding inequalities of class, status and power of that same 
society” (Silverstone et al., 1992: p.5), thus politicising any analysis of consumption.  
The double articulation of media technologies can be made clear in thinking about 
consumption. The materiality of media objects imposes itself on consumption through a 
device’s design and engineering, which determines or encourages particular uses. This 
materiality is not simply given, however: “Technology is produced in environments and 
contexts, as a result of the actions and decisions, interests and visions, of men and women 
at work in organizations and institutions of complex and shifting politics and economics” 
(Silverstone et al., 1992: p.3). The material form of a media technology emerges “as a result 
of complexes of actions and objects, politics and cultures” (ibid.). The material objects carry 
“both the mark of their social production and their capacity to reproduce the social and 
political values of the society that produced them” (ibid.). In this analysis, the material is 
social, and the social is material.  
Silverstone’s work has been influential and has found parallels in both media and 
cultural studies and science and technology studies traditions. Cockburn (1992) draws on 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) traditions, 
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acknowledging the ways that each can be used within feminist critiques of technology. 
While SCOT and ANT each open up the social relations behind and prior to technology 
use, Cockburn also argues that these perspectives are aimed at explaining technological and 
social change, while for feminists it is more important to explain continuity (Cockburn, 
1992: p.42) and the unchanging nature of gender and other social relations. I argue that this 
literature can be used to consider questions of technological and social fixity and stability 
(or appearances thereof), a point I take up in the course of chapter three.  
One example of shared ground between media and cultural studies and science and 
technology studies is in the concept of interpretative flexibility. In Pinch and Bijker’s 
empirical study (Pinch and Bijker, 1987), the development of a particular bicycle was 
characterised by rhetorical moves by different social groups, leading to a design which 
made sense to all those working on it. The fact that the design made sense was not due to 
there being one materially-determined correct design, rather the interpretative flexibility of 
both the material object and the design problem allowed members of the group to define 
the design problem and the desired material object in certain ways, for particular social 
reasons.  
While the domain in question is very different, this shares many parallels with 
Silverstone’s account of the domestication of technological objects. In the appropriation 
(Silverstone et al., 1992: p.21) of an object, it leaves the world of the commodity and gains 
meanings within the household, in the process of consumption. For Silverstone, this is true 
of objects and texts (hence the double articulation), and, importantly, “the meanings 
ascribed to both objects and mediated texts and services within the household are not 
those necessarily ascribed to them in the public sphere” (Silverstone et al., 1992: p.22). The 
idea of interpretative flexibility has parallels in other areas of media and cultural studies, 
especially in audience and reception theories. Hall’s encoding/decoding model argues that 
media texts are polysemic, and that producers and consumers of text are engaged in 
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constant encoding and decoding of texts in order to generate meaning. Hall argues further 
that there are ideological forces that determine or constrain the range of available meanings 
in any given text: 
“Polysemy must not, however, be confused with pluralism. Connotative codes are 
not equal among themselves. Any society/culture tends, with varying degrees of 
closure, to impose its classifications of the social and cultural and political world” 
(Hall, 2009a: p.34) 
As with the interpretative flexibility that was exploited by those working on the design 
of the bicycle for Pinch and Bijker, different social groups have different stakes, and 
different levels of influence, on the meaning of the text.  
In a further argument for the social shaping of technology, Mackenzie and Wajcman 
argue that: 
A technological system like an electric light and power network is never merely 
technical; its real-world functioning has technical, economic, organizational, 
political, and even cultural aspects (1985: pp.17-18) 
They argue (ibid.) that the economic aspect is most obviously important, and write that 
“Economic Shaping is Social Shaping” (1985: p.21, emphasis added), arguing that 
“Estimating costs and profits is part of what Law (1987) calls heterogeneous engineeering: 
engineering ‘social’ as well as ‘technical’ phenomena; constructing an environment in which 
favoured projects can be seen as viable.” (ibid.) 
Most interesting in terms of the current thesis is their account of how the materiality 
of an object like a tablet computer, as well as its history as a consumer device, impacts on 
the way that it is adopted and used. The heterogenous engineering of a tablet computer in 
this case might include shaping the consumer electronics economic environment, such that 
particular material characteristics of a touchscreen tablet are necessary component of a 
viable tablet product.  
They write that the material objects that ‘precede’ (in popular accounts) a new 
technology, as well as the technology’s “intrinsic properties” (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 
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1985: p.34), help to determine the way that the object is adopted. This is also shaped by the 
object’s cultural and social history: in the case of tablet computers, a history in which 
tablets are positioned in a genealogy including clay tablets, Filofaxes, mobile phones and 
laptops (see Chapter One in this thesis). The (market or popular) success of a new 
technology is “not determined by their intrinsic characteristics alone, but also by their 
histories of adoption” (ibid.). The cultural history of an object shapes how its intrinsic 
material characteristics are understood.  
Summing up the many factors which must be taken into consideration in their 
account, MacKenzie and Wajcman write that technologies “typically emerge, or fail to 
emerge, from processes in which no one set of human actors plays a dominant role, and in 
which the role of a recalcitrant material world cannot be ignored.” (Mackenzie and 
Wajcman, 1985: p.28). As such, this thesis considers the materiality of tablets as being 
determined by the social context and situation in which the tablet is adopted and used, and 
the particular history given to an object by each user. This is a further justification for the 
ethnographic approach discussed above, in which the specificities of every case study are 
incredibly important in understanding how and why the tablet was adopted as it was in 
each case.  
The importance of focusing on the context of adoption returns us to domestication. 
Given that Silverstone’s work often focused on television and the domestic sphere as the 
key media forms of the time, Livingstone (Livingstone, 2007) discusses the status of 
Silverstone’s work, especially the idea of double articulation, in more recent studies of new 
media. Treating media as both material objects and symbolic texts requires research that 
reflects this view, and Livingstone points out that “doubly articulated research has proved 
surprisingly difficult” (Livingstone, 2007: p.18). Livingstone argues that new media might 
offer more direct analysis, as users’ interactions with media texts are overt, occurring 
“through selecting, clicking, scrolling and typing” and thus immediately available to the 
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researcher in ways that TV audience’s interactions are not (Livingstone, 2007: p.20). Where 
Livingstone was cautiously optimistic, the idea of doubly articulated research has been 
approached more critically by the ‘social life of methods’ approach developed by Ruppert, 
Law Savage (Ruppert et al., 2013), which takes a further turn by arguing that research into 
new media (which also occurs through selecting, clicking, scrolling and typing) constitutes a 
further layer of articulation that must be accounted for by researchers.  
The history of the common ground between media and cultural studies and science 
and technology studies has manifested more recently in research that is sensitive to the 
material resistances of specific media technologies, while also asserting the agency of users. 
Hine’s (Hine, 2008) ethnographic study of biologists using new ICTs argues that the 
database form has contributed to changes in the everyday practices of biological taxonomy, 
helping to spawn a new field, ‘systematics’. Hine argues that “ICTs have an interpretative 
flexibility such that we can expect differences between disciplines in the way that ICTs are 
interpreted and the visions through which their possibilities are enacted” (Hine, 2008: 
p.256). While the use of databases has been central to changes in the daily practices and the 
status of biological sciences, Hine’s ethnographic study demonstrates that these changes are 
always written through the context of the specific social setting in which the technology is 
used.  
The use of tablets is studied in context, focusing on the use of tablets rather than 
exclusively on either the users or the object itself. This is more a conceptual focus than a 
methodological one; the use of tablets in context can only be achieved in practice by 
studying the users and the object. In this regard, I follow Livingstone’s assertion that “the 
study of media, communication, and information technologies should always address the 
activities of users in context. Only then can we uncover the social shaping and social 
consequences of the digital” (Livingstone, 2014: p.241). This interest in users does not 
abandon a study of the material object, instead it defines the material as discursively 
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constructed. As Suchman (2005: p.381) writes, “if our project is to understand objects-in-
action, the material resistances of objects are inseparable from the arrangements through 
which they materialize in practice.” This argument can be taken slightly further, since the 
material is discursively constructed and understood. As Brunton and Coleman state: 
We assert the value of getting closer to the metal, and understanding in depth the 
technical architectures and processes that underlie online phenomena, but also 
assert that this dive into hardware is not a simple revelation of some true, 
foundational reality. When we peel back that deepest layer of materiality, we find 
people and practices underneath. (Brunton and Coleman, 2014: p.77) 
The discursive construction of the material is in essence the underlying focus of the 
ethnographic research in this thesis: the discursive construction of the tablet computer in 
the science laboratory context. I maintain this focus on the present, emergent construction 
of the object. While studies that ‘get closer to the metal’ are important, they must be 
complemented by research that seeks to understand the material at the point of use (the 
point of use understood classically as consumption). The idea of consumption as a site at 
which technologies and users ‘meet’, thus recognising “consumers as agents in the shaping 
of technologies” (O'Riordan, 2010: p.13), has a long history in science and technology 
studies approaches to publics and cultural studies approaches to domestication (ibid.).  
I understand tablets as complex sociomaterial phenomena, using ideas such as 
affordance ambiguity to consider their materiality, and at the same time emphasising the 
discursive construction of the material through the concept of the tablet imaginary. This 
approach rejects the idea of an explicit commitment to either technological determinism or 
social constructivism. As Sterne provocatively warns: “Even today, dissertations on 
communication technology still commonly take a moment to rehearse the terms of debate 
between determinism and constructivism as they were laid out in this period and before. 
It’s a hard habit to break” (2014: p.123). Rather than ‘rehearse the debate’, I follow Sterne’s 
terms, in an approach that: 
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Methodologically presupposes the irreducibly political character of the 
constructive operation, [assumes] that power relations preexist the constructivist 
scenario, and [assumes] that any analysis is always situated and positioned (which 
is not to say that ideas are simply reducible to biography). [Such approaches] 
begin from the presumption that differential power relations animate any context 
before they arrive on the scene to analyze it, and they are motivated (often 
implicitly) by a normative framework that challenges those axes of difference at 
their very base (Sterne, 2014: p.125). 
On this basis, drawing on previous research and methodologies from media and 
communication studies and science and technology studies, participants’ uses of tablets are 
framed as active, productive processes whereby they create the object that they use. In 
certain respects this draws on SCOT tradition (Bijker et al., 1987b) that extends the analysis 
of specific technologies beyond an examination of the technology itself and focuses instead 
on the wider social context. Key concepts from this tradition, in particular the ideas of 
‘closure’ and ‘interpretative flexibility’, are discussed in the course of chapter three. The key 
difference in my approach is that I treat the production (or consumption – see below) of 
tablets as an on-going and open-ended process. Where SCOT research aims to 
demonstrate the messy social processes that lead to fixity and stabilisation of a 
technological object, I aim to show an inherent instability and ambiguity in the definition of 
tablets as they are used.  
The Material Object 
Understanding the materiality of the tablet object is a central concern of the thesis as a 
whole. The way that this materiality is constructed, the extent to which this enables, 
encourages or prevents particular uses and the effects that the understanding of its 
materiality have on power relations are key questions in this thesis. Suchman uses the term 
‘affiliative objects’ to discuss “the ways in which objects are not innocent but fraught with 
significance for the relations that they materialize” (Suchman, 2005: p.379). I adopt this 
concept to understand how the connections enacted by associating oneself with a particular 
object, defined in a certain way, also generate relations beyond the user and object. This is 
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particularly relevant in chapter six when the tablet is a site of negotiation around expertise, 
with neuroscience researchers explicitly performing their non-affiliation with the tablet.  
Knorr-Cetina (1997) argued for a more complex understanding of computing 
technologies, proposing that computers should be thought of as epistemic things rather 
than simple commodities: 
Computers and computer programs are typical examples; they appear on the 
market in continually changing ‘updates’ (progressively debugged issues of the 
same product) and ‘versions’ (items marked for their differences to earlier 
varieties). These objects are both present (ready-to-be-used) and absent (subject to 
further research), the ‘same’ and yet not the same. In sum, technologies of this 
kind must be included in the category of epistemic things. (1997: p.10) 
This might suggest that tablets could be treated as epistemic things. But the casual 
implementation by participants in this research, along with the tablet’s status as a consumer 
device, means that this is not a suitable category. Knorr-Cetina goes on to propose a new 
category of object, knowledge objects: 
The two major categories of objects familiar to social scientists and dominant in 
social life are those discussed before: commodities and instruments. The study of 
expertise in science and elsewhere brings into focus a third category, that of a 
knowledge object. The deﬁning characteristic of this kind of object, from a 
theoretical point of view, is its changing, unfolding character - or its lack of 
‘objectivity’ and completeness of being, and its non-identity with itself. The lack 
of completeness of being is crucial: objects of knowledge in many ﬁelds have 
material instantiations, but they must simultaneously be conceived of as unfolding 
structures of absences: as things that continually ‘explode’ and ‘mutate’ into 
something else, and that are as much deﬁned by what they are not (but will, at 
some point, have become) than by what they are. They must also be conceived of 
as textual or signifying objects; most objects of knowledge produce, and are 
translated into, all manners of signs. Their special capacity as texts (and the 
problems of readability of the texts) raises questions I cannot go into here, but the 
phenomenon should be noted. Finally, knowledge objects exist simultaneously in 
a variety of forms, a point which becomes important in regard to their binding 
role for collectives. To foreground once more the temporal volatility and 
unfolding ontology of these objects, it is this which accommodates so well the 
structure of wanting, and binds experts to knowledge things. (1997: pp.14-15) 
This quotation brings together many aspects of tablet computers and outlines the fluid 
ontology and emergent definition of the tablet as conceived in this thesis. The importance 
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of how the tablet is conceived and defined, as a material object and at the same time 
recognising that this materiality is not obvious and not stable, is key to my treatment of 
tablets. I draw on the ideas of knowledge objects and affiliative objects in the development 
of affordance ambiguity, one of two key conceptual framings that I use in this thesis. 
Productive Consumption 
Where SCOT analyses tend to focus on the development of technologies in the design 
phase, my focus is on consumption. The idea that users contribute to the innovation 
process is not new: von Hippel (1976) argued (in an article entitled the dominance of users) for 
‘recognition of the dominant role of users in the scientific instrument innovation process’. 
Yet my interest is not in users coming up with ideas for technologies that are subsequently 
designed on the basis of user ideas; ‘turned into’ scientific instruments. As I argue 
throughout, I focus on the consumption of tablets because I contend that the use of tablets 
is itself productive. In this regard, I owe much to cultural studies research that confers a 
great deal of agency onto the consumer or user, such as the idea of productive 
consumption. As de Certeau famously writes: 
To a rationalized, expansionist and at the same time centralized, clamorous, and 
spectacular production corresponds another production, called ‘consumption’. 
The latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere, silently and 
almost invisibly, because it does not manifest itself through its own products, but 
rather through its ways of using the products imposed by a dominant economic 
order (de Certeau, 1988: pp.xii-xiii).  
Users engage in the latter form of production (called ‘consumption’) and therefore 
play an active role in the construction of the tablet computer object. de Certeau’s concern 
with the dominant economic order is taken up in the following discussion about my other 
key concept in this chapter, the ‘tablet imaginary’.  
In arguing for users’ fundamental agency in this process, I depart slightly from the 
SCOT literature. Hughes, for example, argues that components of technological systems 
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are socially constructed because artefacts are made and designed by social groups: “Because 
they are invented and developed by systems builders and their associates” (Hughes, 1987: 
p.46). While I agree with this analysis, my emphasis is on the users of technologies rather 
than the systems builders or those who design and manufacture the tablet devices. In a 
more culturally-oriented study, Balsamo also focuses on designers, arguing that “Designers 
work the scene of technological emergence: they hack the present to create the conditions 
of the future” (Balsamo, 2011: p.6). Balsamo’s understandably celebratory account of 
design is as follows: “Through the practices of designing, cultural beliefs are materially 
reproduced, identities are established, and social relations are codified. Culture is both a 
resource for, and an outcome of, the designing process” (Balsamo, 2011: p.11). Again, I 
agree with this analysis but would extend this to argue that culture, in Balsamo’s 
conception (I will use the concept ‘tablet imaginary’ as roughly equivalent to ‘culture’ here) 
is also a resource for, and an outcome of, the consumption process. Indeed, thinking of 
‘productive consumption’ is in some sense pre-empted by Balsamo’s own rejection of the 
distinction between amateur and professional (Balsamo, 2011: p.3). In this case, 
‘professional’ tablet and app designers are engaged in the same articulatory work as 
‘amateur’ tablet users.  
There are significant overlaps in this respect of work at the intersection of STS and 
media studies. As Lievrouw points out, in both STS and media and communications 
studies frameworks, “the stabilization or standardization of material objects [is used] as a 
key mechanism for explaining their influence” (Lievrouw, 2014: p.32): to focus on design 
or consumption reflects the choice of case study and emphasis rather than a distinct 
methodological or conceptual commitment.  
The Specific and Generic Technological Split 
The focus on use, the idea of productive consumption and the insistence on a finely-
grained ethnographic approach do not preclude analysis at larger scale. The tablet 
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computer is a specific technology that expresses a more general technological logic. The 
characteristics of this general logic can be inferred from specific instances of technology 
use. I argue that technology is inherently split into specific and generic forms. Specific 
technologies are actual devices that we use, they have certain capabilities, they carry 
particular cultural meanings, they have advantages and they have flaws. The generic side of 
the split is the abstract idea of technology. Without a context of use, technology can be 
seen as perfect; having the transformative potential to improve our lives in countless ways. 
Generic technology, considered in the abstract, appears to be neutral, devoid of the politics 
and meanings that are often evident in embodied, situated uses. Of course, this appearance 
of neutrality is itself an ideological construction.  
This split is inherent in a technological rationality that guides our understanding not 
only of technological objects but of technology’s role in society in general. The notion of a 
split between generic and specific has been elaborated elsewhere, although not in these 
terms. In Ellul (1964) the specific machines and in particular the specific methods that we 
adopt in society add up to a general technique. Postman (1993) proposes three taxonomies, 
in each of which the use of specific technologies are treated as manifestations of the 
general technological order: tool-bearing, technocracy and technopoly. Marcuse (1982) 
distinguishes between “technics proper (that is, the technical apparatus of industry, 
transportation, communication)”, in my terms ‘ specifics’, and “Technology, as a mode of 
production, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances which characterize the 
machine age [which] is thus at the same time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or 
changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns, 
an instrument for control and domination” (Marcuse, 1982: p.138), or technology in 
general. Borgmann (1987) argues that “Technology becomes most concrete and evident in 
(technological) devices, in objects such as television sets, central heating plants, 
automobiles, and the like. Devices therefore represent clear and accessible cases of the 
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pattern or paradigm of modern technology” (1987: p.3). Although each of these authors 
makes their own particular arguments about technology, they share a theoretical 
conceptualisation that incorporates a split between generic technology as a more or less 
overarching social structure and specific technologies as instances of that structure.  
On a scale more comparable to the current examination of tablet computers, 
Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley express this idea in terms of multiple biographies of 
objects: “the individual object (my computer), the product (the Olivetti M24), the generic 
technology (computers)” (1992: p.18). Bell and Dourish (2007) give this split a teleological 
inflection in their idea of a ‘proximate future’, which can be read as an idea of a reachable 
perfection in computing design (general) that is aimed towards in the material design of 
current technologies (specific). Dourish and Bell (2011: chapter two) argue that Mark 
Weiser’s (1991) article “The Computer for the 21st Century” set a rhetorical tone of progress in 
ubiquitous computing “toward a proximate (and inevitable) technological future” (2011: 
p.23). The idea of a ‘proximate future’ incorporates a split between generic and specific that 
operates in terms of a well-defined conception of perfection: where specific technologies 
are fallible and generic technology (in a proximate future that may or may not be 
achievable) is perfect. Tablet computers are particularly instructive in thinking about this 
split, as the relationship between the material device (generic) and its apps (specific) can 
recursively manifest the split at the level of a single device. I will discuss this in more detail 
in chapter four when discussing perfection in the ethnographic case study of the Lab.  
Expertise 
A key way in which the definition of tablets operates is in the expression of users’ and 
others’ subjectivities. Discussions of tablets, what they were for, why certain people could 
or should use them, were often used to comment on the nature of scientific expertise. 
Users’ definitions of the tablet helped to construct the object (and therefore the user) as an 
object of scientific expertise in chapter five and as merely technical expertise in chapter six. 
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Expertise features in the thesis as a part of users’ subjectivities expressed in embodied 
practices involving tablet computers. Academic literature on expertise often treats it as an 
issue of public policy. A typical framing of this debate is found in the introduction to 
Exploring Expertise: 
We live in an age where the number and range of specialist fields of knowledge is 
burgeoning, and where ‘experts’ from these fields are called on to solve problems 
and advise in ever more areas of social and economic life. (Faulkner et al., 1998: 
p.1) 
Turner uses a rhetorical question to frame the debate, asking “Why would patrons, 
especially democratic governments, pay for something, namely science, that they didn’t 
understand and could not easily assess the value of?” (Turner, 2014: p.1). Expertise does 
not factor in this thesis at the level of public policy; instead I analyse the role of expertise in 
the practice of science based on ethnographic study, following Lynch’s (2007) suggestion 
that expertise should be studied in practice rather than in the abstract. In the case described 
in chapter five, for example, the scientists’ use of tablets expressed their expertise in using – 
specifically in testing – technoscientific objects. My aim in this chapter is not to understand 
expertise in an abstract sense. Nor is it to give an account of expertise in the specific case in 
question. Rather, by giving an account of expertise as it was defined and deployed as 
related to tablet computers in particular cases, I examine the way that tablets are 
understood as expert or non-expert objects, arguing that the materiality of the tablet offers 
both possibilities simultaneously.  
In the ethnography presented in chapter six, the tablet functioned as a shibboleth 
representing the difference between scientific expertise and non-scientific expertise. I draw 
on recent and on-going debates within STS on the nature of expertise. Expertise 
sometimes looms large and generates focused debates such as that initiated by Collins and 
Evans (2002) that was used as a way to map the territory of STS. Such moments of intense 
academic debate are situated within broader considerations of expertise. After discussing 
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Collins and Evans’ (2002) proposed ‘third wave’ and how they used expertise as their own 
shibboleth in defining the future shape and limits of STS, I will turn to a broader 
consideration of expertise, particularly as it has been theorised within feminism.  
Collins and Evans’ proposed ‘third wave’ of science studies (Collins and Evans, 2002) 
aims to better define expertise in order to solve ‘the problem of extension’ or the idea that 
STS has demystified scientific knowledge to such an extent that we can no longer take the 
expert status of scientists for granted. Since the publication of that article in 2002 there has 
been much debate and discussion about Collins and Evans’ programmatic history and 
prescribed future for science studies. The sometimes circular and self-referential nature of 
this debate is reflected in the fact that the articles that I cite in this discussion are all taken 
from Social Studies of Science, which published the original article and has become the 
location of subsequent debate. While the history of this debate is important, recent 
commentary (Coopmans and Button, 2014, Lynch, 2014) offers an opportunity to cut 
through the discussion. Before doing so, I will address some of the criticisms of Collins 
and Evans’ (2002) article.  
Jasanoff (2003) observes that their reading of the relevant science studies literature 
forms a “misleading characterization” (p.391) of the field, which she argues is more diverse 
than they suggest and features work that seems already to fulfil their requirements for a 
new ‘Third Wave’ approach. Rip (2003) argues that the key question in this area should ask 
how the framing of public debates about science and technology reinforces definitions of 
established and acknowledged scientific experts, rather than the inclusion of other types of 
expertise in these already framed debates. Wynne questions the efficacy of Collins and 
Evans’ approach in terms of its ability to affect public science policy in real-world cases, 
saying that the legitimacy problem that Collins and Evans identify is caused by “the 
undemocratic imposition of assumed meanings on the issue, and on the public, through the 
institutional scientific culture” (Wynne, 2003: p.412). All these authors (Jasanoff, Rip, 
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Wynne) object to Collins and Evans’ attempts to set the academic trajectory for science 
studies and all note the irony in the fact that their critical responses perpetuate this. Certain 
terms from Collins and Evans have nevertheless remained instructive in STS, notably their 
distinction between contributory and interactional expertise. I use these terms as the basis 
of a critical framework in which to analyse the interdisciplinary expertise in the case study. I 
move away from these two terms but find them a useful base from which to develop my 
arguments about the performativity of expertise.  
More recently, Coopmans and Button (2014) have criticised Collins and Evans’ use of 
analysts’ categories based on an abstract model of expertise, arguing for a more grounded 
approach that uses actors’ categories taken from empirical research of scientific practices as 
the basis for developing a normative theory of expertise. Collins and Evans (2014) rebut 
this criticism, arguing that the distinction between actors’ and analysts’ categories cannot be 
maintained. Treading a line between the two perspectives, the distinction is useful as it 
encourages the researcher to consider their own role in the construction of a case study. 
The arguments that I make about expertise are made on the basis of ethnographic research, 
but the categories such as ‘tablet expert’ and ‘scientific expert’ that I discuss only exist as 
categories within the context of my work. For the scientists involved, they were never 
categories in the sense of being consciously constructed and recognised as ways to 
differentiate between things. As an analyst (to use the terms from Coopmans and Button), 
I inferred these categories from the actions and practices of the actors. These categories are 
derived from observations of practice and useful for the analyst, without claiming them to 
be representative of the actors’ own experiences.  
More pertinently in terms of the approach that I take in this thesis, Coopmans and 
Button also argue that, in setting the terms of the debate as they have done, Collins and 
Evans:  
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present a stark choice between ‘relational’ approaches to expertise, which they say 
help pinpoint how expert status is negotiated but not what substantive expertise 
consists of, and their own ‘realist/substantive’ sociology of expertise built around 
a theoretically derived classification scheme that defines, at different levels, the 
various knowledges and abilities people draw on when they make judgements 
(Coopmans and Button, 2014: p.767). 
Coopmans and Button reject this ‘stark choice’ by arguing that it is in the everyday 
practices of actors, “that expertise is claimed and demonstrated, and made relevant as a 
description of some human activities, and consequently, it is at this level of consideration 
that the substantiation or the refutation of expertise resides” (Coopmans and Button, 2014: 
p.767). 
Making a parallel point, Lynch suggests that “proponents and critics alike frequently 
misunderstand attribution theories as arguments against the reality of the phenomena in 
question” (Lynch, 2014: p.795). In a subtle redefinition of the ‘reality’ of expertise, the 
definition of which is of course the centre of the whole debate, Lynch argues that “we can 
observe that attributions or denials of expertise have real consequences, regardless of how 
they are made or justified” (Lynch, 2014: p.768). This point opens the debate out and sets it 
within a wider literature on expertise, particularly within feminism. Using the terminology 
of ‘skilling’ and ‘deskilling’, Karpf (1987: p.163) argues that “there is nothing intrinsic about 
skill: it is a category to be contested and negotiated”. The designation of a given type of 
work as skilled is often constituted along the lines of gender. McNeil argues that women’s 
skills tend to be ‘naturalized’ and thus excluded from the realm of expertise (McNeil, 1998). 
Professions, institutions and various types of discipline all play key roles in the ideological 
policing of what counts as expertise (McNeil, 1998).  
Liff (1987) points out that while gender is a defining factor in the designation of types 
of work as skilled, expert or not, the problem of expertise is “not just a women’s problem” 
(McNeil, 1987b). Insights from feminist critiques of work, skill and expertise have shown 
broadly that expertise is not inherent, not neutral: it is ideological. And this is the most 
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important critique of the abstract types of analysis of expertise exemplified by Collins and 
Evans. Fleck suggests that expertise be thought of as “a 'trialectic' with three elements in 
continual tension: namely, knowledge, the substantive content of expertise; tradeability, its 
economic value and social utility; and power, which has an overall legitimating and defining 
role” (Fleck, 1998: p.168). Abstract accounts of expertise may present useful ways to think 
about the substantive content of expertise, but are not well-suited to capturing the power 
relationships that define and are defined by categories such as ‘expertise’ and ‘scientist’. 
Lynch argues that “For all their pleasures and advantages, scholarly analyses, and even 
reflexive inventories of ‘ordinary’ usage, are likely to miss the surprising moves generated in 
lively occasions of interaction” (2007: p.161). Feminist critiques have shown that 
imbalances of social power that lead to exclusion from categories like ‘expert’ are 
necessarily opaque if not invisible, themselves bound up in the ways that terms like ‘expert’ 
are used. I pursue an analysis of expertise that focuses on the ways in which the definition 
and designation of expertise has real consequences for scientists’ understandings of their 
own expertise, the expertise of a tablet computer programmer, and the status, role and 
definition of the tablet as an object.  
Neutrality  
The idea that tablets were neutral was expressed by many different participants 
throughout all of the ethnographies. I critique this perception of neutrality in each chapter, 
not only highlighting ways in which the tablet is not neutral, but also discussing the effects 
that thinking of the tablet as neutral has on the construction of the object. It is not 
unexpected that many participants thought of the app as a neutral technology. As Feenberg 
argues, the instrumental view of technology is the most widely accepted: 
It is based on the commonsense idea that technologies are ‘tools’ standing ready 
to serve the purposes of their users. Technology is deemed ‘neutral’, without 
valuative content of its own (Feenberg, 2002: p.5). 
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Considering this perception of neutrality using the more specific example of software, 
as opposed to technology in general, Fuller argues that software “is seen as a tool, 
something that you do something with. It is neutral, grey, or optimistically blue” (Fuller, 
2008b: p.3). Fuller also goes on to say that software studies demands inventive engagement 
rather than distant critique. This perceived neutrality is contested by writing in software 
studies. Following Chun (2008), Bassett warns against the abstraction of both code and 
software becoming a fetish “beguilingly implying a return to essential building blocks, to 
things unfreighted by ideology” (Bassett, 2013: p.208), arguing that gender politics can be 
abstracted away from view by this fetishisation. Fuller argues that “[software’s] ostensive 
neutrality can be taken as its ideological layer, as deserving of critique as any such myth” 
(Fuller, 2008b: p.3). Indeed, in direct contradiction and critique of this perceived neutrality, 
it is not difficult to find academic work that describes and discusses the cultural values 
bound up in software. Fuller’s edited collection abounds with illustrations of this point. 
Montfort uses the example of a software practice called ‘naming obfuscation’ to argue that 
“everything about a programmer’s task is not automatic, value-neutral, and disconnected 
from the meanings of words in the world” (Montfort, 2008). While it is relatively easy to 
demonstrate the non-neutrality of technologies, the important work comes in 
understanding how neutrality operates, how it is used to justify certain practices and 
exclude others. I address this issue in each chapter, with particular focus in chapters four 
and six.  
Affordance Ambiguity 
A key concept that has informed research into human and technology interaction in 
many academic fields is the idea of ‘affordances’ (Gibson, 1986: chapter 8). Of particular 
interest is the way that affordances have been used as a materialist corrective to the social 
constructivist approaches in STS in general and SCOT in particular (see: Lievrouw, 2014 
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pp.48-51). While Hutchby (2001) argues that the concept of affordances provides a middle 
ground between determinism and constructivism, my take on affordances is different.  
The idea of affordances has been used to understand the relationship between users 
and objects. We might say that a fire affords warmth, a chair affords sitting, a television 
affords watching programmes. The term appears frequently in tech journalism. A 
techradar.com review of the Samsung Galaxy Tab 8.914 stated that “it affords just a bit more 
mobility and just the right screen size for books.” A Wired.co.uk review of the iPad Mini15 
claimed “The extra inch the iPad Mini affords its user [is] really taken advantage of, and it 
makes a big difference.” There are countless examples of the concept of affordances being 
used as an equivalent to advantages. It rarely gets used to describe something negative. 
When the same techradar.com review went on to state that the tablet’s screen was poor – 
“But the movie Captain America proved to be a stumbling point for the 8.9-inch tab. The 
intro segment was washed out and gray” – it did not say that the tablet afforded 
unsatisfactory watching of films. Yet the concept of affordances as developed by Gibson 
(1986) accounts for any property of an object that emerges in the interaction with a 
particular user. A chair affords sitting; it also affords stubbing your toe.  
The way that affordances has been adopted to mean a useful function or property of a 
device can be traced to the concept’s development in terms of design and human-computer 
interaction, especially by Donald Norman. In The Design of Everyday Things, Norman 
encourages designers to make the ‘actual’ affordances of an object match the ‘perceived’ 
affordances: “With doors that push, the designer must provide signals that naturally 
indicate where to push” (Norman, 2002: p.4). If a door that needs to be pulled looks like it 
should be pushed, then Norman argues that this is badly designed: he writes that “the user 
                                                 
14 http://www.techradar.com/reviews/pc-mac/tablets/samsung-galaxy-tab-8-9-1037035/review/9 [Accessed 
4th February 2015]. 
15 http://www.wired.co.uk/reviews/tablets/2012-11/ipad-mini-review [Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
70 
needs help” (Norman, 2002: p.8). It is clear to see how this understanding of affordances 
emphasises the advantageous properties of an object. The idea is that successfully designing 
affordances into objects will encourage or allow users to use the object correctly. The idea 
of a correct use of an object, however, is evidently not neutral. Bloomfield and colleagues 
point out that research in disability studies highlights how the “‘affordances’ of, say, a chair, 
a post-box or a cigarette are not reducible to their material constitution but are inextricably 
bound with specific, historically variable, ways of life” (Bloomfield et al., 2010: p.428). 
Norman’s phrase ‘the user needs help’ assumes a particular user, with particular knowledge 
and ability.  
Norman’s use of affordances undoubtedly helps to improve the design of everyday 
things. But this understanding of affordances loses something significant that was present 
in Gibson’s original conception of the term. For Gibson, affordances emerge in specific 
instances of use and are relative to the object and the user. This emergence, this relativity, is 
essential. To illustrate why this is so, I would like to use the example of the Myth of the 
Paperless Office (Sellen and Harper, 2002), a book that I actually think provides an excellent 
account of the pitfalls of adopting new technologies. Sellen and Harper’s book examines 
adoption of paper replacement technologies and assesses the problems that are 
encountered in this process. They summarise their use of affordances as follows: “The 
physical properties of paper make many actions not possible and many activities not 
achievable. We can then compare and contrast these affordances of paper with those of 
existing digital devices” (2002, p.18). Physical properties and affordances are taken to be 
one and the same thing. This understanding of affordances gives focused research and 
analysis that is very clear, very useful, but also totally instrumental. Sellen and Harper write 
that: 
[…] organizations need to change their thinking in order to move effectively 
toward the future. Rather than pursuing the ideal of the paperless office, they 
should work toward a future in which paper and electronic document tools work 
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in concert and in which organizational processes make the most of both worlds. 
(2002, p.22) 
This perspective, based on affordances, gives an insightful and useful account of paper 
and digital technologies. But it is also a totally instrumental account. The benefits of 
knowledge work and capitalism are assumed and unstated. ‘Moving effectively toward the 
future’ is stated as though it were a clear, neutral, common sense idea. The best affordances 
of paper can be combined with the best affordances of tablets or other technologies to give 
an unbeatable office of the future. Their book could work as a guidebook for the successful 
adoption of paper replacement technologies in offices – it is undeniably useful for this aim. 
This approach to affordances gives clarity for design. But it also depoliticises. Rather than 
using affordances to try to capture the ‘best’ use of a device, we might think about what 
‘best’ is, who decides, who is enabled and who is prevented from using the device in this 
‘best’ way and why. I use affordance ambiguity as a way to open up these questions.  
Returning to Gibson’s initial emphasis on the relationship between user and object (in 
his terms, animal and environment), the strength of the concept lies in its insistence on 
emergent meaning. Gibson’s affordances take shape in an entangled relationship between 
user and object: the term affordance “Implies the complementarity of the animal and the 
environment” (Gibson, 1986: p.127). Rather than using the concept to analyse ways in 
which technologies are useful (or not) in given situations, I turn the lens around and 
analyse the subject positions assumed or constructed by understandings of affordances. 
The entangled relationship between user and object means that “built into every affordance 
is a particular sort of user” (Bruni et al., 2013: p.60). As Suchman argued in her discussion 
of improvements to the Xerox 8200 photocopier: “All of these enhancements implied as 
well a greatly elaborated ‘user interface’, including not only aspects of industrial design, the 
lay-out of the machine’s control panel and its instructions for use, but the actions required 
of the user herself” (Suchman, 2005: p.384). Defining the affordances of an object entails 
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defining its user, their role and their capabilities. This evidently involves certain normative 
assumptions about what might be thought of as normal uses of any given object.  
This thesis is concerned not in the technology of tablets and their objective usefulness 
in a given situation (even if there can be such an objective judgement). My interest is in the 
way that users conceive of affordances and the subject position that they correspondingly 
construct. For example when two participants in chapter five discussed the tablet as an 
inventory management tool, this perceived affordance casted them as scientists who engage in 
inventory management. This subject position has particular implications in the laboratory 
context, where inventory management may be thought of as a task appropriate to a 
technician rather than a researcher – a distinction that has ramifications in terms of cultural 
and economic capital, as a researcher is likely to garner more respect within the laboratory 
(from other researchers at least!) and almost certain to receive higher remuneration than a 
technician. Reading affordances ‘backwards’ to get to the subject is part of the method of 
analysing the management of failure (a concept that I discuss shortly).  
An affordance for Gibson is something that (imposing my own terms now) a 
particular object offers to a particular user: a relative characteristic rather than an abstract 
physical property (Gibson, 1986: p.127). An affordance is fundamentally a material 
property that emerges in the relationship between user and object, specific to that 
relationship. Yet despite its relativistic nature, the affordance is also clear-cut and reliable. A 
horizontal, flat, extended and rigid surface will always afford sitting to animals that sit. 
Although the affordance only ‘appears’ in an encounter between animal and environment, 
the same affordance is reliably repeatable in subsequent encounters. Gibson’s argument 
that “Terrestrial surfaces, of course, are also climb-on-able or fall-off-able or get-
underneath-able or bump-into-able relative to the animal” (1986: p.128) allows for objects 
to be used in different ways. While a single object offers different affordances to different 
users, to a single user the affordance does not change: “An affordance is an invariant 
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combination of variables [i.e. properties or qualities]” (Gibson, 1986: p.134) – this is 
essential to our learning about the environment and the reason that we recognise a chair 
when we see one. This is the limitation of the concept of affordances when applied to 
technological objects such as tablets and their users. The tablet computer has no such 
invariant qualities.  
A tablet computer is a phenomenally blank object. It does not offer an obvious tactile 
encounter, it has no handles or buttons that suggest and afford a clear, unambiguous 
interaction. The tablet is not evidently a screen and therefore does not obviously afford 
viewing. The blankness of the object is part of the aesthetic that characterises Apple 
products. Yet even in adverts and other representations of tablets, this blankness is 
interrupted slightly by a line superimposed across the middle of the screen, suggesting that 
on its own the object is somehow too blank. This blankness is the basis of the joke in the 
chopping board sketch, discussed in chapter one. The affordances of the tablet as a 
computing device are so obscure that the grandfather only perceives the tablet as a flat, 
rigid surface, that he then – quite reasonably – uses to chop onions. As such, the tablet 
computer is characterised by ‘affordance ambiguity’. Each distinct use of the same tablet 
computer can be entirely different for the same user. The concept of affordance ambiguity 
is key to understanding the emergent definition of tablets as material objects. Affordances 
of tablet computers and other app-based new media devices are never simply given by the 
material characteristics of the object but are always emergent. This emergence is distinct 
from the sense of emergence that Gibson uses, which relates to his claim that qualities of 
objects are not abstract physical properties, rather they emerge in the process of human 
perception of the environment. Emergence refers to the on-going work that users 
undertake to understand the function of the tablet. It is this process that allows ‘radically 
situated and correspondingly multiple’ (Suchman, 2005: p.394) objects to be experienced as 
simple commodities (Borgmann, 1987).  
74 
The ambiguous affordances of the tablet can allow users to adopt an inquisitive 
approach to the object. Rather than find out what the tablet is for, users can be encouraged 
to always find out what else it is for. Certain types of users may experiment indefinitely, 
installing new apps on a daily basis to instigate new affordances in the device. These users 
treat their use of the object as a kind of ‘permanent beta’ in which they perpetually test the 
device. Beta testing is used extensively in software, essentially as a form of quality control. 
Before full public release, a version of the software is made available to a (usually limited) 
public audience who use it as though it were the finished product. Any bugs or faults that 
are found are reported and repaired and the final product is then released. A consumer 
commodity such as a tablet computer is typically expected to be free of bugs – to work 
properly. The perpetual redefinition of the tablet computer by users is much more 
evocative of a form of testing than of simple consumption.  
The level of experimentation depends on the individual user, which brings the 
question of subjectivity into play once more. Ongoing experimentation with the 
affordances of the tablet constructs the user as a capable tester of the device. Using only 
the pre-installed apps on the tablet constructs the user as a disinterested, incapable or 
otherwise unwilling tester of the technology: a position developed alongside intersecting 
subject positions such as technophobe, anti-Apple, naysayer and so on. Thinking about the 
use of tablet as a ‘permanent beta’ complements the earlier argument for treating 
consumption as a type of production. Treating tablet users as beta testers casts them as 
involved in both design and consumption. Affordance ambiguity can be used as a lens for 
the researcher to identify ways in which the subjectivity of a user is expressed in the degree 
to which they test or experiment with the tablet.  
To understand this, it is necessary to address the context in which tablets are used. I 
will therefore now change the focus from the object and its materiality to the discursive 
construction and definition of the object. I propose the concept of the ‘tablet imaginary’ to 
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account for the way that the material device is conceived and ‘held together’ as a unified 
object in any given case.  
Tablet Imaginary 
The phrase the ‘tablet imaginary’ accounts for ideas and meanings related to the tablet 
that participants draw on and develop. This tablet imaginary is the discursive world in 
which the tablet is defined. It includes media treatments of tablets, marketing discourses, 
colleagues’ understandings and comments and cues taken from the tablet itself such as 
recommendations of useful apps.  
Taken as a whole, this tablet imaginary acts as a repository of ideas about the tablet 
that users draw from and contribute to. The tablet imaginary accounts for the ways in 
which meanings are created in the use of new technologies. I identify these meanings in 
different ways according to the specifics of each ethnographic case. The definition of 
successful or failed use of tablets is one common way in which the imaginary is expressed. 
The tablet imaginary accounts for the meaning of the device in a given case study and also 
connects these otherwise distinct meanings.  
The idea that the material object is discursively constructed is central to the tablet 
imaginary. The term ‘imaginary’ intentionally highlights the constructed nature of the 
object. Rather than a material object with objectively identifiable material features, the 
tablet is regarded as an object in use that is emergently defined and understood. The tablet 
imaginary is a set of ideas and meanings about tablet computers that is formative of 
particular uses of tablets and is at the same time formed by such uses.  
Instead of considering the tablet in terms of affordances granted by its materiality, I 
seek to understand the materiality of tablets through the discursive construction of its 
affordances. In other words, the tablet is a material object that is understood through the 
lens of the tablet imaginary: a culturally-derived set of meanings that constrains but does 
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not determine the user’s understanding of the object. The tablet imaginary is by definition 
fluid and emergent. It is the discursive world in which the tablet computer is used and 
made to make sense.  
Part of the work of each chapter is to trace the tablet imaginary as it operates for the 
ethnographic participants. It is necessarily informed ideas about tablet computers that I 
bring to bear on the research (for instance in the form of the genealogy that makes up the 
first chapter) and that I exchanged, shared and developed with users during the research 
process.  
Although any discursive world is inexhaustible, my aim is to outline its key aspects in 
each case study. In theory it would be possible to map the entire tablet imaginary for a 
single case. In practice, this is impossible for two reasons: firstly because elements of the 
imaginary may never be expressed by participants or identified by the researcher; secondly 
because a map is a static object and the imaginary is emergent. The attempt to map the 
tablet imaginary in a given case can be thought of as a ‘conjunctural analysis’ (Hall and 
Massey, 2010, Balsamo, 2011) – an assessment of the meaning of a technological object at a 
particular point in time. The imaginary traced in the following chapters may well have 
significant overlaps with other cases of people using tablets. It may indeed have significant 
overlaps with imaginaries relating to smartphones or other new media devices. The more 
similar the case, the more likely there will be significant overlaps. As I hope to show by 
using the concept of the tablet imaginary, there are many culturally-derived shared 
meanings that inform individual understandings of tablets, but these understandings are 
always expressed in particular uses. It is reasonable to expect that generalisations about uses 
of tablets would be broadly applicable, with the caveat that this is only demonstrable with 
further ethnographic research. The concept is therefore at the same time rather limiting, 
referring only to the case study in question, and vastly expansive, referring to attitudes to 
technology in general.  
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The tablet imaginary may best be understood as the set of meanings, ideas and 
practices that contribute to the definition of the object by a user in a given context. A 
user’s definition of the tablet at any given time is informed by expectations of the object’s 
role and function and at the same time by their actual uses. The crucial point is that the 
tablet is defined in use. In each use, at each moment, the object is therefore defined 
differently. This emergent definition links to the concept of the permanent beta and 
affordance ambiguity.  
The tablet imaginary provides a framework for understanding what ‘working properly’ 
means for any user. Yet I argue that tablets have an ontological indeterminacy that means 
there is no straightforward sense of what it means for a tablet to work properly. The tablet 
has no predictable affordances that identify it as working or not. The assemblage of 
operating system, app, user and context is so radically flexible and unpredictable that the 
tablet develops a fluid ontology. Partly these characteristics might be indicative of the form 
of contemporary technoscientific objects, perhaps challenging more broadly the concept of 
what an object is.  
While this is grounded theory in the sense that its definition and content is dependent 
on empirical research, I draw from previous work that has discussed and analysed the role 
of imaginaries in various ways. Michael discusses discourses such as ‘surveillance society’ or 
‘virtual society’ and argues that “As accounts of (near-)future society, they 'perform' in 
various ways” (2006: p.102). These ideas are not mere predictions or aspirations about the 
future; they impact upon current understandings and practices related to technologies. 
Woolgar (2002) argues that we must take such discourses into account if we are to 
understand the adoption of any given technology. Indeed, he does not separate the 
technology from the discourse, saying of these discourses that “Their constitutive function 
makes them part of the phenomenon to be understood” (2002: p.8). Following this, I 
endeavour to outline participants’ use of tablets by analysing not only their expectations 
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and actual uses, but how these expectations and uses relate to wider social discourses. The 
idea that users make sense of technologies based on an idea of the future is expressed by 
Bell and Dourish in terms of the ‘proximate future’, an analytical concept that they use to 
account for the development of framing narratives in ubiquitous computing or ‘ubicomp’. 
They give three ‘framing points’ that summarise the idea of proximate future: 
First, the centrality of ubicomp's proximate future continually places its 
achievements out of reach, while at the same time blinding us to current practice 
[…] Second, the framing of ubicomp as something yet to be achieved allows 
researchers and technologists to absolve themselves of responsibilities for the 
present” […] Third, the seamlessly interconnected world of future scenarios is at 
best a misleading vision and at worst a downright dangerous one. (2011: p.22) 
Of most importance to the current discussion is their first point; the idea that current 
practice is ‘bound to’ a projected future that is perpetually out of reach. In a similar vein, 
Marcus argues that “[people] are constantly trying to understand the present by borrowing 
from a cautiously imagined emergent future, filled with volatility, and uncertainty, but in 
which faith in practices of technoscience become even more complexly and interestingly 
constructed in new locations of doing science” (1995: p.4).  
The importance of faith in the practices of technoscience is evident in each 
ethnography, where participants regularly disavow the idea of tablets not being useful by 
engaging with their affordance ambiguity, the fluid definition always offering an escape 
route from failure. The idea of failure, and how this is managed, is expressed differently in 
each chapter. In chapter four, failure is denied; in chapter five it is suspended and in 
chapter six it is deferred. Managing failure is one way in which faith in technoscientific 
objects is expressed. The faith that users thereby demonstrate is directly related to the 
tablet imaginary and the interesting temporality that it exhibits. As an idea of the future 
constructed in the present, the tablet imaginary allows users to suspend judgement over 
their technological devices: never ‘it does not work’, but always ‘it does not work yet’. The 
analysis of failure is fundamental to the Social Construction of Technology tradition: 
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“failures should, Pinch and Bijker believe, be of as much interest to historians and 
sociologists of technology as the success stories” (Bijker et al., 1987a: p.14). More recently, 
Anne Balsamo (2011), in her discussion of the process of technological design, gives special 
attention to the tenth of her ‘ten lessons of technocultural innovation’, which states that 
‘failure is productive’. She explains her perspective as follows: “I regard this insight from 
the vantage point of someone who still believes that everyday culture is a zone of struggle 
and contestation, where failure is but one name for the texture of that struggle” (Balsamo, 
2011: p.25). Failure and success are two paradigms that connect in the tablet imaginary. 
Relating this to the earlier discussion of affordance ambiguity, the perceived success or 
failure of the tablet in a given instance is an expression of the ‘best’ way to use the tablet. 
Every success story masks an alternative interpretation. Success and failure are not neutral 
concepts: whether the tablet fails or succeeds we can ask on whose terms and to what ends 
this evaluation is made.  
When a given use of the tablet – as a scientific instrument, a paper replacement, a 
piece of unremarkable background tech – succeeds or fails, this understanding draws on 
particular elements of the tablet imaginary. The work that users perform in defining the 
tablet is part of a struggle to establish their preferred understandings of the tablet – for 
example as efficient – as normal, unquestioned, accepted. At the same time as it draws on 
the tablet imaginary, by the same process this work contributes to the imaginary by 
embodying and substantiating it.  
Conclusion 
Affordance ambiguity and the tablet imaginary are concepts that I use to bring 
together technological practices within and beyond the laboratory. The local, contextual 
practices discussed in this thesis are at the same time part of a more general picture. This is 
not to say that these observations can be directly generalised. But neither is it to say that each 
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case is unique and has no bearing on any other. Suchman, citing Mol and Law (2002), puts 
it like this: 
This is a radically contextual view, in which objects and their positions are 
inseparable, subjects are always located, and subjects and objects mutually 
implicate each other. […]Methodologically, it means that the value of a case such 
as that offered here lies not in its instantiation of a general theory but in its 
suggestions for further—comparative and contrastive—investigation. Cases, like 
objects, are multiple, afﬁliative and subject to mutual interferences as well as 
partial connections. (Suchman 2005, pp.394-395) 
I aim in this thesis to show how affordance ambiguity and the tablet imaginary can 
work as concepts to make connections between local, contextual practices that occur 
separately. This chapter has given an abstract outline of the two concepts, showing their 
intellectual foundations and how they connect to a wider literature. While this is essential, 
the concepts – and this thesis – rely on a commitment to analysing the actual practices of 
tablet users. The following ethnographic chapters should therefore give the clearest picture 
of how these concepts can be used in the analysis of the everyday use of technoscientific 
objects.   
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Chapter 3. Tablets as Scientific Instruments 
 
“Capture Data Your Way!” (Website slogan for Irisnote laboratory management 
app) 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the role of laboratory objects and argue that tablets have 
specific characteristics that differentiate them from other lab objects. I draw on historical 
accounts of scientific instruments (Van Helden, 1983, Galison, 1997, Golinski, 1998) to 
argue that the use of tablets brings particular meanings to the laboratory context. Focusing 
on laboratory management applications (lab management apps, or LMAs), I argue that 
tablets affect how scientific phenomena are produced, and discuss the consequences of this 
for everyday lab practices. Developing Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) analysis of laboratory 
objects, I propose that we should consider tablet computers as objects of ‘reified practice’.  
Thinking about the materiality of tablets as digital objects raises further questions 
when considering tablets as instruments in the lab context. To underpin this discussion, I 
draw on a range of literature that examines digital objects in various ways: I outline the key 
approaches here. ‘The social life of methods’, developed by Ruppert et al. (2013), is 
concerned with the implications of digital technologies being used in social science research 
and asks how methods can become objects of inquiry (Savage, 2013). They extend the 
concept of ‘methods’ beyond academia and treat everyday processes as methods. Their 
insight can be applied to the ‘method’ of using LMAs. I examine the social and cultural 
structures – and the social relations – that are constructed by LMA methods. Langlois and 
Elmer (2013), while mainly discussing corporate social media, offer some insights about 
digital objects more generally. They give three aspects that describe the multifaceted nature 
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of digital objects: semantic, networked and phatic. The Facebook ‘like’ button, for example, 
is a textual multimedia element on a user interface and also a software element that 
functions as part of ranking algorithms (Langlois and Elmer, 2013). Their concern is with 
the ways that digital objects both construct and are constructed by social processes. This is 
useful as a way to think about ‘what is available to the researcher’ (Langlois and Elmer, 
2013: p.11) and how digital objects such as LMAs can be approached.  
The main body of this thesis is built around four research-based chapters, three of 
which are based on ethnographic research in science laboratories. The current chapter, 
which precedes the ethnographies, asks whether the tablet computer can be considered a 
scientific instrument and examines the implications of this question. This is not based on 
ethnographic research but instead draws on an analysis of advertising and marketing 
material for laboratory-specific apps. Although I am committed to the ethnographic 
approach that seeks rich understandings of situated practices, I also agree with Galison that 
the “meaning of instruments should include not only what we say about them but the often 
unspoken patterns of their functional location with respect to other machines, patterns of 
exchange, use, and coordination” (1997: p.51). Some of these aspects can be examined 
outside of the laboratory context. The current chapter therefore looks at how tablets are 
discussed as belonging in labs, the role that they are assigned and the construction of their 
relationship to other laboratory objects.  
The theoretical framework that underpins this thesis is based on an understanding of 
material objects as situated in specific contexts of use. I focus on the meanings that emerge 
in uses of material objects, insisting on this emergent notion of meaning. As such, I would 
like to make two points about my approach in this chapter which takes an abstract 
examination of tablets as scientific instruments. Firstly, I examine the construction of 
scientific instruments as being neutral objects in order to critique that understanding. To 
ask whether tablets are (or can be) scientific instruments demands an analysis of what 
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scientific instruments are, what they represent in the lab and what assumptions are made in 
naming an object an instrument. I follow the construction of neutrality in the marketing of 
LMAs to open up these questions.  
Secondly, the aim of this approach is not to argue strongly either way, for example 
that tablets indeed are scientific instruments. The aim is to examine the conditions in which 
a tablet is treated as such. This chapter analyses what tablet and app makers say a tablet will 
bring to a laboratory. This is done with open eyes and a healthy disregard for advertisers’ 
accounts of what their product will do. While tablets may indeed bring efficiency to the lab, 
this aspect of tablets can only be manifested by users in practice. Whether advertising or 
any other discourse influences such efficient uses of tablets can only be judged in 
ethnographies in specific labs. As Galison comments on instruments, these “knowledge-
producing machines acquire meaning through their use within the physical laboratory” 
(1997: p.51). In the conclusion of this chapter, I draw on Barad (2003) to insist on 
performativity and the emergent nature of relationships between users and objects. The 
authors discussed above all share a concern with digital objects, and Barad’s account shows 
us that these concerns only count when the objects are being used by people in specific 
situations. This is best illustrated in the subsequent chapters based on ethnographic 
research. The juxtaposition of this chapter before the ethnographic chapters is intended to 
highlight the distance between the promise of technology and the reality of its implication, 
to show how the construction of a material object is emergent and can only be read in the 
context of its use.  
Tablets as scientific instruments. A genealogical approach.  
Laboratory science is characterised by the use of a wide variety of scientific 
instruments: 
Since the seventeenth century, when natural knowledge was first systematically 
pursued through experiments, scientific research has been conducted in a 
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purpose-built world of specially manufactured instruments. By instruments are 
meant the material tools the human investigator uses to disclose, probe, isolate, 
measure, represent, or otherwise bring to attention the objects of investigation. 
(Golinski, 1998: p.133) 
Tablet computers are not purpose-built for use in the sciences. By Golinksi’s 
definition, then, tablets are not scientific instruments. Van Helden gives a wider-ranging 
definition by detailing a set of assumptions with which we associate scientific instruments: 
[By] scientific instrument, we mean a device used by scientists to investigate nature 
qualitatively or quantitatively. We tacitly assume that: (1) there is a proper, even 
essential, place for such devices in the study of nature since the human senses 
alone are too limited for most scientific investigations; (2) the results or readings 
obtained with them are usually beyond question; (3) scientific instruments are 
based on undisputed scientific principles, such as the law of the lever; (4) newer 
instruments are more accurate, powerful, or convenient than older ones, the 
limiting factor usually being the state of the art in contemporary technology. (Van 
Helden, 1983: p.49) 
Even according to Van Helden’s more accommodating definition, tablets are not 
scientific instruments. Lab management apps do not collect data (point 2 in Van Helden 
quotation above) and are not based on scientific principles (point 3 in Van Helden 
quotation above). Yet Van Helden’s historical study of scientific instruments allows us to 
use a less static definition and allow for tablets to be considered potential instruments. By 
taking a genealogical perspective, we can observe changes and trends in what is considered 
a scientific instrument at any given historical moment. Every familiar laboratory instrument 
such as the microscope had to fight to be considered a legitimate tool for the production of 
scientific knowledge. Instruments do not enter the laboratory already accepted. The 
laboratory is, initially at least, a proving ground for instruments.  
Van Helden’s argument concerns the way that we classify instruments. His 
historically-situated definition lists four assumptions that characterise instruments today. 
He adds that these modern assumptions were not always applied to instruments, only 
becoming accepted as the use of certain instruments became commonplace (Van Helden, 
1983: p.49). It is important to clarify here that Van Helden’s list of assumptions is 
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retrospective: it is created in response to a given set of accepted objects such as 
microscopes, thermometers and so on. The assumptions describe a set of objects that we 
now call ‘scientific instruments’. Because it is retrospective, it is inflexible and does not 
cater for new objects. The point of making this clarification is to argue that instruments 
define their category, not the other way around. Specifically, if any object becomes 
accepted as an instrument, then the category ‘scientific instrument’ and its implicit 
assumptions will be altered to include its particular characteristics. Against this apparent 
inflexibility, then, we can use the logic of an historical classification of instruments to argue 
that tablet computers, although not considered instruments today, may be considered 
instruments in future. If this were to happen, then a future scholar outlining accepted 
assumptions about instruments would include assumptions that incorporated the 
characteristics of tablet computers. This is all a more detailed way to argue that judging 
tablet computers against a set of classifications derived from observing current lab objects 
is not a useful approach. But this does not mean that we must postpone an analysis of 
tablets as instruments indefinitely. Instead, it points the way to a more useful approach to 
answering this question. If tablet computers are not scientific instruments (as currently 
considered), then what function do they have in the lab? If they are not instruments, what 
are they? 
Latour and Woolgar’s landmark study Laboratory Life (1979) discussed the laboratory as 
a “material setting” containing a series of material objects that constitute the kinds of facts 
that the lab can produce (1979: p.66). They argue (1979: pp.64-66) that a laboratory is a 
place that contains a specific set of objects. The collection of objects in this laboratory for 
example (Figure 1) could only exist in a laboratory that analyses macromolecules such as 
DNA. The gel electrophoresis apparatus defines this space as a genetics laboratory. The 
objects assembled in that lab space combine to produce phenomena that are pertinent to 
genetics research. In other words, the space is only called a genetics laboratory because of 
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the set of objects that exist therein. And the set of objects defines the science that can be 
done in the lab: 
The central importance of the material arrangement is that none of the 
phenomena ‘about which’ participants talk could exist without it. […]It is not 
simply that phenomena depend on certain material instrumentation; rather, the 
phenomena are thoroughly constituted by the material setting of the laboratory (Latour 
and Woolgar, 1979: p.64, emphasis in original) 
There are similarities here with Van Helden’s classification of scientific instruments. 
The material objects are taken to be the fundamental defining factors. If in future, 
phenomena accepted as pertinent to bioscience research could be produced by tablet 
computers (or any other given object), then the presence or absence of tablet computers in 
a lab would contribute to the lab being considered a bioscience lab or not.  
Figure 1 – Gel electrophoresis apparatus. Photo by the author. 
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For Latour and Woolgar (1979), the laboratory is defined by the collection of objects 
that it contains. And this does not only include the objects that we would call ‘scientific 
instruments’; the whole material setting of the lab contributes to the production of 
scientific phenomena. This conception inevitably runs into a logical problem when it 
comes to attributing influence to different objects. If the whole material setting of the lab 
contributes to the production of scientific phenomena, then how is it possible to 
differentiate between different lab objects? A problem that is absolutely relevant to the 
current question of tablets being regarded as scientific instruments. Latour and Woolgar 
deal with this problem with a memorable quote: 
“Obviously, however, not all pieces of equipment condition the existence of 
phenomena and the production of papers in the same way. Taking away the trash 
can, for example, would be unlikely to harm the main research process; similarly, 
withdrawal of the automatic pipette would not prevent pipetting by hand, even 
though this takes longer. By contrast, if the gamma counter breaks down, it is 
difficult to measure amounts of radioactivity by mere sight! (1979: p.64) 
The quote makes it clear that while all lab objects are equal, some are more equal than 
others. To differentiate between lab objects such as the gamma counter, that affect the 
production of phenomena, from those that merely facilitate it, such as the trash can, Latour 
and Woolgar use Bachelard’s concept ‘reified theory’. This concept refers to the fact that 
instruments are built upon scientific principles that were once novel, that went through a 
rigorous testing process involving both theoretical debates and experimental 
demonstrations, and finally were accepted as factual by the scientific community. Theory 
that has been accepted is then used to build new instruments, in other words the theory is 
reified, and used in the production of further scientific facts. This phrase conveys the idea 
that instruments embody previously debated scientific theory. It is a sign of acceptance by 
the scientific community for a theory to be used in the development of new scientific 
phenomena, in the process of establishing new theories. It can be seen as a mark of total 
acceptance of a theory when instruments based on it are commonplace in laboratories. 
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Theories developed in very specific domains of an individual discipline come to be 
deployed as instruments in a variety of ostensibly unrelated fields: “Every move in the 
laboratory thus relies in some way on other scientific fields” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 
p.66). Theories of refraction, diffraction and reflection of light, for example, can be said to 
be accepted as factual by the scientific community because they are the theories upon 
which microscopes are based. Those theories, reified in optical microscopes used in all 
kinds of scientific laboratories, are part of ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 1996): used to create 
new phenomena with the aim of developing new theories, which may eventually be reified 
in new instruments (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: p.66).  
In order to avoid their ‘material setting’ account of lab objects ascribing equal 
influence to both trash cans and gamma counters, Latour and Woolgar differentiate 
between two types of laboratory objects: those water and gas pipes that are a general 
condition for producing scientific phenomena (1979: p.64), and those objects that affect 
the precise type of scientific phenomena that can be produced, in other words instruments. 
This distinction is a useful starting point for the analysis of tablets as instruments, but it 
requires some additional theorisation. Maintaining this distinction for the time being, I will 
develop this analysis by making an argument about those laboratory objects that reify 
theory, the scientific instruments, emphasising an idea that is in some ways implicit in 
Latour and Woolgar’s argument. Latour and Woolgar use the idea of reified theory to 
account for the fact that a wide variety of instruments, with origins in many different 
scientific fields, are all found together in one laboratory and combine to produce 
phenomena totally specific to one particular field. They point out that “The inscription 
devices, skills, and machines which are now current have often featured in the past 
literature of another field” (1979: p.66). The strength of ‘reified theory’ as a concept is that it 
demonstrates how scientific practice is limited by instruments. The fact that instruments 
reify theory, that they embody theory established in other disciplines and eventually 
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accepted elsewhere, means that phenomena produced in the lab can be accepted. It is this 
positive sense of ‘limitation’ that needs emphasis: using instruments limits scientists to 
producing only those phenomena that will be accepted by the wider scientific community. 
Galison discusses this using the term ‘constraints’: “theoretical (and experimental) 
constraints play a constructive role as well as a restrictive role. Because constraints restrict 
moves, they shape the theorist's positive research program - giving a problem-domain 
form, structure, and direction” (1997: pp.16-17). A result produced using new, untested or 
untrusted equipment will be treated correspondingly as untrustworthy: a concept that will 
be relevant throughout the discussion of LMAs. A result produced using an instrument 
that reifies universally accepted theories will be accepted as factual.  
Latour and Woolgar describe two types of laboratory object: instruments that affect 
the types of phenomena that the lab produces, and other objects that merely facilitate but 
do not affect the scientific process. By this definition, tablet computers would fit into the 
latter category of objects, alongside the trash can and so on. They do not embody any 
established theory or produce phenomena that can be accepted as factual results. However, 
a recent type of laboratory-specific tablet app unsettles this dichotomy and requires a more 
complex account of the material setting of the laboratory.  
The promise of efficiency. Improving practices without changing them 
Laboratory management apps (LMAs) such as LabGuru, colwiz and Quartzy promise to 
improve laboratory efficiency by offering a digital workflow and data management system 
so that a lab’s entire working process is conducted within the digital space of the lab 
management app. Electronic Lab Notebook (ELN) apps such as eCat, LabArchives and 
Irisnote promise to digitise and automate laboratory data recording methods so that each lab 
member can instantly access any other lab member’s results. I have chosen to treat ELNs 
and lab management apps as one group of digital objects that I will refer to as LMAs. 
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Although comprising two categories and dozens of different products, the common feature 
that used to define them as a single group is that they incorporate digital spaces in which 
data is shared between lab members. As a point of comparison, the Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) systems fulfil a similar role and promise in commercial enterprises:  
ERP systems are (mostly off the shelf) software packages designed to integrate 
physical production systems with all major business functions. An ERP system 
consists of a number of different modules that mediate the performance and 
documentation of various business functions (such as finance, sales, inventory 
management, or human resource management). (Knox et al., 2007: p.26) 
LMAs are similar to enterprise resource planning systems insofar as they are ‘off the 
shelf’ products that can be integrated to working practices as they are, or customised to suit 
the specific needs of a given lab. These products are promoted on the basis of an 
assumption that instant access to a colleague’s data means instant understanding of that 
data. They therefore require all users to follow a standardised (or standardising) format 
when recording experimental data. As an indication of the type of service that these 
products offer, lab management app LabGuru’s website states: 
INTEGRATE YOUR DATA WITH LABGURU 
Your experiments generate vast amounts of data in various formats - from gel 
images to graphs. Your research relies on publications and protocols, materials and 
results. Labguru puts it all together. 
 Define research goals and monitor progress, anytime, anywhere 
 Never again lose data or knowledge 
 Enhance collaboration in your lab – Mentor your team, share ideas, and 
publish faster 
 Push your grant funds further16 
Lab management apps are a new kind of laboratory object that do not fit into Latour 
and Woolgar’s dichotomy that distinguishes simply between scientific instruments and 
everything else. As outlined above, they argue that the material setting of the lab 
                                                 
16 http://www.labguru.com/ [Accessed 7th August 2013]. 
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‘thoroughly constitutes’ the phenomena being studied (1979: p.64). A lab’s results can be 
trusted because they have been produced by a material setting that combines two different 
types of laboratory object. Firstly, objects such as water pipes that are neutral and have no 
valuative content; secondly, scientific instruments that consist of well-defined, recognised 
and accepted content as they reify established scientific theory. The trustworthiness of the 
results is thus built on a combination of two opposite understandings of objects. Results 
produced in the material setting that includes water pipes, trash cans and automatic pipettes 
can be trusted because these objects have no influence on the phenomena. Results 
produced in the material setting that includes gamma ray counters and microscopes can be 
trusted because they have a specific and well-defined influence on the phenomena.  
Lab management apps are a new type of laboratory object because they promise to 
exhibit both characteristics. They promise to be neutral, or transparent, that is to have no 
impact upon the results or phenomena produced. Yet they also promise to improve the 
research process, indicating that they do affect the production of phenomena in the lab. 
The table below (Table 1) shows some ways in which to differentiate between these three 
types of laboratory object. I have placed LMAs between the two categories of objects 
defined by Latour and Woolgar, not to suggest that this forms a rigid tripartite system of 
classification, but to allow clearer comparison.  
The table below (Table 1) shows a number of ways in which tablets and lab 
management apps differ from both facilitating objects and scientific instruments. I would 
like to focus on points four and five in Table 1: the idea that tablets are theory-neutral just 
like water pipes, but are able to affect the production of specific phenomena. LMAs feature 
characteristics of both facilitating objects and scientific instruments. Apps perform discrete, 
specific tasks. Lab management apps are no different: they are designed to improve specific 
laboratory functions, most commonly the recording of experimental data. The commercial 
success of these apps is built upon a paradoxical promise that I outline in more detail in the 
92 
following chapter as the myth that ‘digital technology can replace tools without changing 
processes’.  
Table 1. Types of Lab Object 
Objects that facilitate  Lab management apps Scientific Instruments 
Requires no special expertise 
to use 
Requires computing 
expertise to use 
Requires scientific expertise 
to use 
Institution pays for, maintains 
and controls 
Individual may pay for, 
maintain and control. Lab 
head may do so. Maybe a 
combination 
Lab Head pays for from 
research budget  
Fixed location in the lab Portable: can be moved 
throughout the lab and also 
removed each day by the 
individual 
Often fixed location in the 
lab, but can be moved 
Not based on any theory that 
is involved in the production 
of phenomena – has no 
impact on results 
Not based on scientific 
theory. But promises to 
have impact on results i.e. 
improve the process of 
creating phenomena 
Reifies scientific theory to 
produce new phenomena – 
determines results 
Trustworthy because based on 
engineering or other technical 
skills (today not regarded as 
scientific) 
Trustworthy because 
theory-neutral 
Trustworthy because based 
on established scientific 
principles 
Allow any phenomena to be 
produced 
Allow any phenomena to 
be produced. But improves 
production of specific 
phenomena 
Determine the types of 
phenomena that can be 
produced 
 
Lab management apps promise to improve research processes without changing them. 
The paradoxical claim to improve processes without changing them is crucial when we consider 
the role of different laboratory objects. The defining characteristic of a scientific instrument 
is that it affects the kind of phenomena that can be produced, because it reifies established 
scientific theory. As described above, this affects the research process by limiting 
experimental results to only those that will be accepted by the scientific community. 
Imagine for a moment that a laboratory management app claimed to improve research by 
fundamentally changing the research process. In such a circumstance, the apps would not be 
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trustworthy. Their trustworthiness comes from being (or claiming to be) value-neutral. In 
the case of LMAs, they are trusted because they do not affect research processes; they 
merely improve them by making them more efficient. As such, they must claim only to 
facilitate the research process. Claiming to do any more than that would make them 
untrustworthy and would destroy the scientific validity of the research. The reason for this 
again concerns the limiting function of instruments described above. LMAs reify new 
modes of working – rather than scientific theory – and are therefore linked to productivity.  
Latour and Woolgar argue that because scientific instruments reify established theory, 
it is practically impossible to challenge scientific results (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: pp.242-
243). Challenging an instrumental result equates to challenging the theory that the 
instrument reifies. But the time, cost and effort of disputing theories that are so well-
established that they have been reified in instruments means that there is a point at which 
they become unchallengeable. It would mean challenging the validity not only of the result 
at stake, but every single other result that has been produced using the same instrument as 
well as the entire historical literature that led to the underlying theory being accepted. 
Referring to facts as ‘stable inscriptions’, Ruppert et al. sum this idea up:  
[…] if some of those inscriptions have become more or less stable, difficult to 
undo or immutable, then this is because of the scale of investment (literal and 
metaphorical) that has gone into making them up. It has become too ‘expensive’ 
to undo them (Ruppert et al., 2013: p.31). 
This lends scientific phenomena the solid and immovable status of ‘factual’ and means 
that using instruments limits the lab to producing only acceptable types of phenomena. A 
result produced using any non-instrument object that affected the research process, on the 
other hand, would not have this weight of historical science to support it and would 
therefore be extremely fragile. This is not an abstract situation. In 2006 a protein 
crystallographer Geoffrey Chang had to retract five papers due to a mathematical error in 
some software code used in the production of his results, with Chang commenting, “I’ve 
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been devastated” (Miller, 2006). This shows the extent to which non-instrument objects 
involved in the production of phenomena cause those phenomena to be fragile, thus the 
requirement for any non-instrument lab objects to depict itself as neutral. This all goes to 
explain why lab management apps claim to improve research processes without changing them. 
It is for this reason that I argue that lab management apps are theory-neutral. To put it 
very simply: scientists will not use untested tools in place of instruments. Whether a lab 
management app or a revolutionary type of apparatus, no laboratory object that determines 
the types of lab phenomena that can be produced will be adopted by scientists without it 
being subjected to the rigour of scientific testing. No results produced using any such new 
tool would be publishable (or if published would be ‘weak’ like Geoffrey Chang’s), so no 
experiments using such techniques would be pursued. While there is room of course for 
new techniques to be introduced to scientific practice – particularly in the course of 
‘revolutions’ as outlined by Kuhn (1996) – in general the material setting of the laboratory 
demands that objects either be theory-neutral like water pipes, or entirely theory-laden like 
instruments.  
Lab management apps introduce something different to the material setting of the lab. 
These apps are theory-neutral, but value-laden. I propose that these lab objects should be 
categorised as ‘reified practice’, as their specific materiality limits scientific practices by 
encouraging users to conduct their work according to cultural values. These cultural values 
do not affect the type of phenomena that are produced, but they can affect how phenomena 
are produced in the lab. The values that these laboratory apps imbue vary slightly from 
product to product, but a common feature is an emphasis on efficiency and data 
management. A critical analysis of these products reveals how they associate ‘good 
research’ with ‘efficient data management’. At this juncture, we can begin to make links 
between the specific characteristics of lab data management apps and digital culture more 
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broadly. By analysing the promises and logics of these apps, we can make visible the 
promises and logics of digital technology more generally.  
Dealing firstly with the idea of efficiency, in one sense, the promise of increased 
efficiency or productivity simply represents the limit of what these products are logically 
able to offer. As outlined above, they cannot offer to change processes, only to improve 
them: increased efficiency is therefore all they can provide.  
Table 2. Promise of Efficiency 
Product Promise of efficiency17 
LabGuru Enhance collaboration in your lab – Mentor your team, 
share ideas, and publish faster  
 
ColWiz Sign up to simplify and speed up your research process 
eCat How does the eCat electronic lab notebook help your lab 
become more productive?  
iPad ELN [In list of reasons to use iPad ELN:] 4. I think that 
scientific information in general is not sufficiently well-
organized and that this greatly interferes with the progress 
of science. 
 
Sciency ELN Enhance workflow productivity 
 
Irisnote Obviate the inefficient, unregulated and potentially 
insecure use of external thumb-drives, email, drop-box or 
other methods of sharing files between and communicating 
among colleagues or collaborators. 
 
While the table above (Table 2) shows a general trend in which these apps promise to 
make lab research processes more efficient, analysing the detail of these claims reveals 
something more interesting. Almost exclusively, the claim that an app will increase 
efficiency in the lab is based solely on the fact that the app is digital. Rather than explaining 
why or how a digital system is more efficient than a paper-based system, the superior 
                                                 
17 Taken from product websites accessed 8th August 2013 (emphasis in originals). 
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efficiency of digital systems is assumed. This is most clearly visible in product descriptions 
that simply mention the ‘digitalness’ of the system, as though this on its own confers 
efficiency on a process. The table below (Table 3) shows a few examples where the idea 
that the digital is inherently more efficient is more clearly – though still implicitly – stated.  
Table 3. Explanation of Efficiency 
Product Explanation of efficiency18 
LabGuru Streamline Paper Writing: Rather than searching through 
spreadsheets, piles of papers images and data on multiple 
machines, Labguru lets you keep all aspects of your 
research organized in 1-place, making it easier to gather 
and understand your data when it comes time to writing 
papers. 
 
Scilligence ELN 
 
All experimental records are captured electronically and 
searchable by chemical structures and keywords. 
 
Irisnote Capture data your way! Text, handwriting recognition, 
voice dictation, drag-n-drop, email directly into irisnote, 
digital pen (4Q13) 
 
LabandMe You can take full advantage of the mobility afforded by an 
iPad to eliminate paper based workflows between the lab 
bench and your office, saving you documentation time and 
lets you capture results with increased accuracy. 
iPad ELN 5. I am used to working with a paper notebook and I 
am not attracted by the prospect of using a software 
system instead. First, you don’t need to give up your 
paper notebook completely – it can still be useful for quick 
recordings at the bench or it may be required for 
protecting your documentation. Second, science is a 
serious business with important consequences – get your 
priorities straight. 
 
Of particular note in the above table (Table 3) are Irisnote, which stresses the 
superiority of digital inputs even in terms of pens and handwriting, and iPad ELN, which 
                                                 
18 Taken from product websites accessed 8th August 2013 (emphasis in originals). 
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accuses scientists who do not want to give up paper for software of being wilfully difficult 
and holding back science: “science is a serious business with important consequences – get 
your priorities straight”.  
These examples show that, despite these products being theory-neutral, they embody a 
particular view of scientific research that values efficiency. And a very particular kind of 
efficiency. Efficiency here is related strongly to productivity, evidenced by research output, 
measured by the speed with which a research paper is published. These products are value-
laden because they assume that the most efficient lab processes are necessarily the most 
desirable. This view may well correspond to many researchers and lab heads, who agree 
that they want to “push their grant funds further” (LabGuru website 2013). But the idea 
that the digitalness of LMAs will create efficiency is only implied, never explained. 
Sutherland associates networked digital media with a more general “culture that fetishizes 
eﬃciency, ﬂexibility, and, above all, speed, driven by the unchallenged assumption that a 
continuous increase in the productive capacity of labour is not only synonymous with 
progress, but is also necessary for continued prosperity” (2013: p.7). The idea of efficiency 
is presented as common sense and embodied in the practices encouraged by LMAs. 
Whether or not efficiency (defined by rate of publication) is a universally desirable 
characteristic, lab management apps assume that it is, in turn encouraging those using it to 
adopt working practices based on that assumption. It is in this sense that lab management 
apps are reified practice. Reified practice entails the ideological prioritisation of a cultural 
value, in this case efficiency, into scientific research practices. The non-neutrality of 
instruments that I imply here intersects with the ideology of software as neutral, examined 
in Fuller (2008b) and in more detail in the discussion of the London Group in chapter six 
of this thesis.  
Instruments limit scientific practice by reifying previous scientific knowledge and 
therefore only allowing phenomena that will be accepted by the wider scientific community 
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to be produced. Lab management apps have an equivalent but distinct limiting effect based 
on cultural values rather than scientific theory. Lab management apps limit scientific 
practices by encouraging efficient processes and discouraging processes that take a long 
time to complete or are perceived as wasteful of the lab’s resources including time, money 
and equipment. This limiting effect does not alter the nature of phenomena produced. As 
explained previously, these apps cannot intervene in the production of phenomena because 
they do not reify theory, so can only produce ‘weak’ knowledge that does not have the 
support of previously debated scientific theory. The limiting effect does alter the everyday 
lab experience by encouraging efficient processes in preference to inefficient processes (or 
tablet-based methods as opposed to paper-based methods, with an assumption that this 
will entail increased efficiency), and by changing the way that lab members share data.  
In the final sections of this chapter, I examine the ‘merely’ technical aspects of apps, 
outlining how this has an instrumental effect on their everyday use. My approach is to 
examine the logic of the system as expressed in the user interface. This position aims to 
bridge the gap between the explicit and implicit; the visible and invisible values of lab 
management apps. Rather than analysing the underlying code, I analyse the material 
instantiation of code as it is enacted by the user. As Parikka argues (2013: p.6), users 
experience digital objects by developing an understanding of how to interact with the code 
and algorithms of those objects, regardless of the fact that most users have no interest in or 
knowledge of digital algorithmic techniques. It is in the logic of the system at user-interface 
level that the implicit values of the digital object are substantiated.  
Cultural values are embedded within digital objects in ways that are not visible to the 
user. Langlois and Elmer argue that because such aspects of digital objects are “only 
partially visible at user-interface level, it is important to maintain the long-standing critical 
position whereby the analysis is not only about what is visible, but also about what remains 
invisible – and thus unquestioned and accepted as the norm” (Langlois and Elmer, 2013: 
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p.13). Savage (2013: p.17) notes that implicit values embedded in objects can have as much 
of an instrumental effect as explicit values and that a critical analysis can displace but never 
remove the implicit. In the case of LMAs, it is in the normalisation of efficiency as a 
desirable characteristic of research practices – in the way that lab management apps 
stabilise and fix the value of efficiency – that ideology can be seen to be at work. In this 
context, a critical analysis would ask whose interests are constructed as normal? Is (this 
particular form of) efficiency a desirable adjunct to existing values of scientific practice? Or, 
what happens to scientific practice when non-scientific objects (or non-instrument objects) 
like tablet computers introduce cultural values like efficiency into the lab? I take up these 
questions in response to ethnographic material in the following three research chapters. 
For now, I will look at the logic of LMAs and the implication of their promise of efficiency 
for lab community practices.  
It is only when we consider the primary way in which lab management apps promise 
to increase efficiency, through data-sharing, that the real impact of the way that these apps 
reify practice becomes clear. Cultural values “are tied up with the processing and 
organization of flows of digital data and things” (Savage, 2013: 10) and that specific types 
of social relationships are produced in the creation, transfer and organisation of digital data. 
The value of efficiency affects the way in which social relations in the lab are formed based 
on an idea of community established through data-sharing processes.  
Communities of Data 
Laboratory management apps promise to increase efficiency by streamlining, digitising 
and simplifying data recording processes. The app serves as a centralised data management 
service, so that all data is recorded within the app. One promised advantage of this is that 
data can be shared infinitely with other lab members and members of labs in other 
institutions not geographically connected. In a paper-based lab, each lab member has a 
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laboratory notebook or ‘lab book’. As is discussed in more detail in chapter four about ‘the 
Lab’, a lab book is used in academia and industry to keep a precise record of the activities 
taking place in the lab on a daily basis. This record serves two functions: scientifically, it 
acts as a record of past experiments that can be referenced in future; bureaucratically, it acts 
as a record of lab activities including what was done and who did it, so that responsibility 
and intellectual property rights can be assigned. In principle, any lab member could read 
another’s lab book to find out what they had been working on, how they had gained their 
results, what processes and instruments they had been using. Data recorded in the lab book 
should therefore be easily understandable by anybody with the relevant scientific expertise. 
This has practical advantages: for instance if a lab member permanently leaves the lab, then 
their replacement can continue their work by referring to the departed lab member’s lab 
book. In the course of routine everyday lab work, a lab member may read another’s lab 
book while the latter is at lunch, for example, rather than waiting for them to return to ask 
which protocol they used in a given experiment.  
Lab management apps create a digital space in which all lab members’ data are 
recorded together. Although data continue to be linked to the individual user who recorded 
them, the aim of this centralised approach is to have a shared pool of data that is accessible 
by everybody in the same way. Each lab user would access their own data in the exact same 
way that they would access another lab member’s data: through the lab management app. 
At the same time, the apps encourage or require standardised ways of recording lab data. 
As outlined above, a lab book should record data in a universally understandable manner, 
which in practice varies from lab to lab and is often dictated by each lab head’s personal 
preferences. The lab management app places new and greater significance on 
standardisation of data recording, however, because external lab members can also have 
access to the data. In addition to each lab group having its own standard recording method, 
a lab management app calls for standardisation across labs and between institutions. 
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Idiosyncrasies of data recording that were useful in paper lab books become problematic in 
lab management apps.  
In this situation, the common feature around which standards can be agreed is the lab 
management app itself. Rather than being determined by a researcher, the lab management 
app’s default settings could become an objective benchmark against which standards are 
defined. Knox et al. (2007) discuss exactly this problem using the comparable example, 
mentioned earlier, of Enterprise Resource Planning systems. ERPs are based on templates 
that claim to represent industry best practice, and Knox et al. found that commercial 
enterprises therefore consider it “difficult, risky and expensive” to customise ERPs, with 
the consequence that “organisations are therefore required to reengineer their business 
processes in order to conform to those presupposed by this template” (Knox et al., 2007: 
p.26). Cramer and Fuller make the more general point that interfaces, “like any language or 
instrument still impose and enhance particular workflows, thought modes, and modes of 
interaction upon or in combination with human users” (Cramer and Fuller, 2008: p.151). 
The ideological implication of this point is emphasised by Gillespie who points out that, by 
using algorithm and computational processes to standardise processes, “the perceptual or 
interpretative habits of some users are taken to be universal, contemporary habits are 
imagined to be timeless, particular computational goals are assumed to be self-evident” 
(Gillespie, 2014: p.174) . The design logic of LMAs demands that users across different 
labs and institutions undertake their research in a standardised manner. This constrains the 
ways in which work is likely to be carried out, as certain uses are constructed as normal and 
others as deviating from the standard.  
Laboratory management apps frame this standardisation in terms of efficiency. No 
longer will lab heads waste time searching through junior lab members’ lab books to work 
out just how they came up with a result. No longer will collaborating scientists within or 
between labs have to discuss the processes involved in gaining a result or share the 
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technical knowledge learned when no results were produced. All this information will be 
present within the lab management app, with no differentiation between one’s own data 
and any other lab member’s data. With these elements of human interaction made 
redundant, there will be more time to spend doing the research. The lab will be more 
efficient because more research time means that more papers can be published more 
quickly. A critical analysis of the logic of LMA systems demonstrates that the pursuit of 
efficiency, in other words, is manifested in an attempt to eradicate human interaction.  
Each lab member accesses the data they need via the app, adds new data to the data 
pool via the app and uses the app’s own system of hierarchies or metadata-tagging to 
inscribe relationships between data. The only structure or systemic logic that differentiates 
data is that of the lab management app itself. The result is that each individual lab member 
interacts only with the lab management app (Figure 2).  
 
The logic of the lab management app, structured around the value of efficiency, treats 
human interaction as unnecessary, even harmful, for a lab’s research output. The resulting 
Figure 2 - Depiction of flows of information between users and the LMA 
103 
system creates what I call ‘communities of data’, in which users interact only insofar as they 
add data to the app for others to use and in turn use data from the app that others have 
added. This specific way that data are shared has specific consequences for the way that 
users are constructed as related to each other, the research project and the institution(s) 
involved.  
Ruppert et al. (2013) develop Foucault’s concept of the dispositif to account for the 
various aspects of digital devices more generally: material, institutional and behavioural 
elements that are all simultaneously in play when digital objects are used (2013: p.30). They 
add that “such cascades are simultaneously embedded in and shaped by social worlds, and 
can in turn become agents that act in and shape those worlds” (Ruppert et al., 2013: p.30). 
Their concern with the social life of methods – which I extend to include LMA methods – 
is that they are not neutral ‘data-gathering’ processes, but agents that shape the social world 
that, for sociology, is the object of study. ‘Communities of data’ refers to the specific ways 
that LMAs construct social relations.  
The community of data consists of exchanges of information ‘between’ individuals 
without human interaction. Data are only exchanged between an individual and the lab 
management app. One reason that I call this a ‘community’ is because this is the language 
and imagery used by the products. In contradiction to the logic that demonises human 
interaction, these apps are sold on the basis of improving the research community within 
the lab, as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Promise of Community 
Product Claim to improve lab community19 
LabGuru Enhance Collaboration In Your Lab – Mentor Your Team 
and Share Ideas. Meaningfully communicate with your 
team - even when not in the same room - regarding 
                                                 
19 Taken from product websites accessed 8th August 2013. 
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specific plans, projects, and results. 
Irisnote Optimize collaboration within your team, and with others! 
Create dynamic groups so members can share their 
research work 
Sciency Improved Communications: 
Cross-team collaboration, discussions, and data sharing 
colwiz Connect & Build Your Network. Connect with other 
researchers with similar interests. 
Work with Others. Use secure spaces for your 
collaboration projects, discussions & shared materials. 
Organise Events. Schedule group meetings & research 
trips in a click of a mouse. 
 
Laboratories consist of a number of lab members who work under an overarching 
research aim or narrative defined by the lab head. Each member’s work is a discrete 
contribution to the overall research. In practice, lab members may indeed experience the 
app in terms of community. The use of the app within the lab may map onto the existing 
lab community, the practices of data recording made to fit alongside existing verbal, non-
verbal, digital and analogue communications practices in the lab. Yet in terms of actual 
exchange of information, the only interaction is between a user and the app. The word 
‘community’ is also used in this phrase because it encompasses the idea that interaction 
does take place in a certain sense. Exchange of data between users does occur, but only in a 
way that is totally mediated by the app, with interaction between users’ data rather than 
between users.  
In a simple example, user A (see Figure 2) might enter data referring to a negative 
experimental result which means that user D’s experiments are questioned. Other data, 
perhaps from an unrelated experiment, entered by user D based on the questionable result 
would also be questioned. In addition this would affect user D’s immediate research 
trajectory as they may have to repeat previous work or conduct a new range of 
experiments. User A’s research trajectory may be affected in turn, as may those of users B, 
C and E. This process clearly resembles interaction between the users. In terms of everyday 
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experience within the lab, it will most likely be experienced as interaction between the two 
lab members: user A’s data has affected user D’s work. Yet the only interaction that 
actually occurs is between an individual user and the app. This idea could be clarified when 
we consider a system in which there is only one user. The single user’s experience is exactly 
the same as if there were other collaborators as described above. The individual user adds 
data to the app, takes data from the app, and adjusts their experiments in response to this. 
As far as the user is concerned, the other lab members need not exist. As Ruppert et al. 
state about digital transactions more generally – they give the example of the movement of 
items through logistics networks – “transactional ‘doers’ may be people, but in and of itself 
this has no special significance” (Ruppert et al., 2013: p.36). Once inscribed within the app, 
the data’s origin ceases to have relevance. Its origin is obscured by the standardisation of 
recording. Once data has been entered, there is no difference between a user’s ‘own data’ 
and data entered by anybody else. This is the basis of LabGuru’s promise to “ensure 
knowledge continuity”20 and prevent data being lost and research efforts wasted when a lab 
member leaves. Communities of data formed by LMAs are a perfect example of the fact 
that “data generated by digital devices allow non-individualist and non-humanist accounts 
of the social, where the play of fluid and dynamic transactions is the focus of attention” 
(Ruppert et al., 2013: p.35).  
The significance of the digital object is only revealed when an analysis of the cultural 
values imbued in lab management apps is considered in conjunction with an analysis of 
their technical structure. Where a cultural analysis of the discourses and values associated 
with the object can reveal something about ideologies that are brought into play in the use 
of the object, a technical analysis of the digital object’s structure reveals how those values 
are manifested. Combining these two forms of analysis reveals a fuller and more useful 
                                                 
20 LabGuru website http://www.labguru.com/features/product-overview [Accessed 3rd September 2013]. 
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picture of the impact of specific objects on practices. The obscure and counterintuitive 
materiality of digital objects can discourage analysis of their structure: the user can forget 
that their structure affects practices as much as the values they carry. A combined analysis 
of the technical and cultural specificity of the lab management app as a digital object 
reveals that the app encourages ‘efficient’ everyday laboratory practices (efficiency 
measured by rate of publication), manifested in a substantial devaluation of human 
interaction. The specific impact of lab management apps is due equally to the cultural 
influence of the value of efficiency and to the logical or systemic influence of the technical 
structure of the digital object.  
This analysis explains why lab management apps are different from the two categories 
identified by Latour and Woolgar: objects that facilitate (such as water pipes) and 
instruments. Where those two types of objects are differentiated by the way that they affect 
the production of phenomena (facilitating objects do not affect the types of phenomena 
produced; instruments do), lab management apps affect how the phenomena are produced 
and affect relationships between lab members. They are value-laden but theory-neutral; an 
altogether different type of laboratory object that does not fit within Latour and Woolgar’s 
system of differentiation. They affect how phenomena are produced by encouraging 
practices that are deemed efficient, in other words practices that produce publishable 
results as quickly and cheaply as possible. They affect relationships within the lab by casting 
human interaction as inefficient and thus contrary to scientific progress. In order to capture 
their specific effect on lab practices, I describe LMAs as objects of ‘reified practice’.  
These objects are not unique in bringing cultural values to the lab. Cultural values will 
always exist in the lab as in any other given context. Every lab member has their own idea 
of what types of processes are normal, preferred or unwanted in the lab. The types of 
values that are most respected in any given lab are related to social hierarchies, with the 
most senior lab members such as lab heads having the greatest influence on this. A lab 
107 
head who believes that daily lab meetings where all members discuss on-going research are 
of utmost importance will confer these values onto everyday lab processes. A lab head who 
believes that maximising the reach of the research budget is important will confer these 
values onto everyday lab processes. Each lab member will respond to this environment in 
their own way, negotiating the requirement to fit into the research culture of the lab with 
their own beliefs and ability to exercise those beliefs. A new undergraduate project student 
present in the lab for a few weeks may be more likely to adopt the practices of the lab 
without question than a new postdoc who has worked in labs for several years and has the 
knowledge and confidence to impose their preferred values on lab practice. In this regard, 
lab management apps are not doing anything novel by introducing cultural values to the 
lab. What is novel, though, is the way that they fix, normalise and obscure those values. A 
lab member can question how and why the lab head focuses on efficiency in the lab. It is 
much more difficult to question how and why an app does so.  
Tablets running lab management apps are not scientific instruments. But neither are 
they background objects that merely facilitate research. They affect scientific practice by 
affecting how phenomena are produced, though not what types of phenomena are produced. 
By manifesting cultural values in the lab, they limit scientific practice in a way that is 
equivalent but distinct from the limiting effect of scientific instruments. This limitation may 
either benefit or detract from scientific research, but its impact is obscured by the 
technology of lab management apps that embed cultural values within scientific processes. 
This effect of lab management apps is only revealed in a combined analysis of the cultural 
and technical aspects of the technology. The way that the cultural value of efficiency is 
invisibly manifested in these apps can inform our understanding of how cultural values are 
embodied by other digital objects in other contexts.  
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Conclusion. The importance of context 
Tablets and apps are objects with particular material properties that constrain certain 
uses and encourage others. I have examined the discursive construction of tablets as 
laboratory objects that ‘bring’ efficiency to the lab, and challenged the portrayal of 
efficiency as a neutral value. In adopting the language of the marketing discourse as a 
means of critiquing that discourse, tablets have been treated in a technologically determinist 
way, for example in the idea that they are efficient. While I do believe that tablets can be 
involved in efficient lab practices (as will be discussed in chapter five), I do not assign 
agency to tablets. Following Barad, and in line with Galison’s claim, stated earlier, that 
instruments “acquire meaning through their use within the physical laboratory” (1997: 
p.51), I argue that it is only in use that any cultural value such as efficiency can be 
manifested.  
Tablets have no agency of their own. Barad’s agential realism defines agency as 
something that emerges in intra-actions between users and objects (though her relational 
ontology also makes it difficult to use such terms as user and object), rather than something 
that is a property of a person or thing – a humanistic position that she rejects. The terms 
user and object are useful because these or equivalent terms are used in marketing material 
and by participants in the ethnographies discussed in later chapters. While these terms 
allow for simplicity of expression, my focus remains relational. In thinking about tablets in 
laboratories, I am interested in how uses of tablets at the same time implicitly draw on 
cultural values (in this chapter, efficiency is a particular focus), and performatively 
construct certain types of social relations and values. There is an ethical aspect to this 
approach that demands that we acknowledge and remain “accountable for the role ‘we’ 
play in the intertwined practices of knowing and becoming” (2003: p.812). To say that 
tablets are efficient is to ignore the active processes by which tablets are constructed as 
efficient and efficiency is constructed as neutral or obviously beneficial. Against the 
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abstract understanding of instruments or apparatuses as neutral devices, Barad offers this 
definition: 
Apparatuses are not inscription devices, scientiﬁc instruments set in place before 
the action happens, or machines that mediate the dialectic of resistance and 
accommodation. They are neither neutral probes of the natural world nor 
structures that deterministically impose some particular outcome. […] apparatuses 
are not mere static arrangements in the world, but rather apparatuses are dynamic 
(re)conﬁgurings of the world, speciﬁc agential practices/intra-
actions/performances through which speciﬁc exclusionary boundaries are 
enacted. (Barad, 2003: p.816) 
I began this chapter by asking whether tablets can be considered scientific 
instruments. Taking performativity of scientific practices seriously, the simplest answer to 
this is ‘yes, if they are treated as such’. Of course, this answer then opens up further 
questions about the implications of treating tablets in this way; for example, what 
exclusionary boundaries are enacted in the processes of using tablets as instruments or 
other types of object in the lab? The following three chapters respond to these further 
questions by examining ethnographic research into tablets being used in labs. Each chapter 
examines the way that the tablet is constructed as a particular type of object – whether 
designated an instrument or something else – and, most importantly, the role that this 
construction plays in the development of scientific (and other) subjectivities within and 
beyond the laboratory.  
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Chapter 4. Perfection: The adoption of tablet computers in a 
large science laboratory 
 
“You don’t have to load paper before you can write on it” (Tammy, 
research participant) 
 
Description of Fieldwork 
The content of this chapter is drawn from fieldwork carried out between November 
2011 and August 2012. Using a combination of interviews and non-participant 
observations, I studied the planning and implementation stages of a project that saw a large 
University science laboratory ‘go paperless’ and adopt tablet computers21. The project had 
been first mooted in Summer 2010, and was given the green light in June 2011. The 
paperless lab opened in September 2012, just after I finished my fieldwork.  
The resulting chapter analyses the planning and implementation stages of the 
paperless project, answering the key research question, “why are tablet computers adopted 
as a paper replacement technology?” The purpose of this chapter is to examine the actual 
processes that take place in an organisation when a new digital technology is adopted. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, the definition of an object is determined by the discourses 
that surround it. The way that the new technology is understood by various parties within 
the organisation can show us what there is to be lost or gained with the change from paper 
to tablet computers; who will suffer or benefit from the change; and whose opinion counts.  
                                                 
21 For the sake of anonymity of the participants, the University has not been named. All names of people and 
buildings have been changed. Job roles have also been changed to an equivalent that describes the role and 
level of seniority.  
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A possible second phase of research had been planned that would analyse the actual 
outcome of the project: its success or failure in practice. Unforeseen circumstances dictated 
that this phase could not be carried out. This second phase might have added to the 
rapidly-increasing body of academic research into the impact of tablet computers in higher 
education (Lim, 2011, McCabe, 2011, Kukulska-Hulme, 2012, Morris et al., 2012, Sung and 
Mayer, 2012, Uluyol and Agca, 2012). As my primary concern in this thesis, however, is to 
understand the factors that dictate how technologies are understood, the fact that this 
second phase was not completed does not affect the arguments made here. What remains 
is a complete analysis of the planning stages of the project: the rhetoric, logic and 
discourses that together resulted in the decision to use tablet computers to replace paper.  
The chapter traces how the affordance ambiguity of the tablet computer allowed for 
the object to be defined in a way that suited the preferences of members of the institution 
in recognised roles of power. In short, the fluid ontology of the tablet meant that it could 
be discursively constructed as a legitimate and suitable paper replacement. In fact, the 
affordance ambiguity of the tablet allowed for it to be defined as perfect. The way that this 
definition was constructed and became accepted is the focus of this chapter.  
The fundamental argument here is that the way that the tablet computer is made to 
make sense reveals an overarching myth of technology. This overarching myth functions as an 
ordering narrative which affects how people think about the technology at hand. For 
Barthes, “myth is a type of speech” (Barthes and Lavers, 1993: p.109): it orders our 
thoughts about ideas, objects, people and so on. In this case, the myths of technology 
define the way that the tablet computer is understood in the Lab. In this case, the myths 
work to limit the ways in which tablet computers make sense: in other words, the myths 
work to define what a tablet computer is. Discussing language in semiological terms, 
Barthes argues that “it is very rare that it imposes at the outset a full meaning which it is 
impossible to distort” (Barthes and Lavers, 1993: p.132). At the outset of my fieldwork in 
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the Lab, the concept of ‘tablet computers’ was far from well-defined, making it a 
particularly susceptible target for myth.  
By using the word ‘myth’, I also intend to incorporate the idea that stories can be used 
to mediate power in organisations (Gabriel, 2000). This is similar to the way that Bell and 
Dourish discuss myths as “stories that motivate and celebrate the development of the 
Ubicomp agenda” (Dourish and Bell, 2011: p.4): The way that tablet computers are spoken 
about in the Lab, the stories that circulate involving these devices, can indicate which 
definitions have currency, whose version of events is most prominently circulated, and how 
tablet computers are understood by the broader community.  
The overarching myth involves a contradiction between the ideas of actual and 
potential in relation to technology. Specifically, the myth is that technology’s inherent 
potential means that it will eventually, but inevitably, improve a situation in which 
technology is employed. Note ‘will improve’, not ‘could improve’; the notion that 
technology will improve the situation was found repeatedly in the Lab, most often in the 
persistent discussion of tablet computers’ potential. Tablet computers, and I will argue 
technology more generally, were justified in terms of what they could potentially do, rather 
than what they would actually do. This myth can be traced in this case study in the way that 
the tablet computer was defined. As a way of capturing the definition that users gave the 
tablets, I outline the requirements that the tablet was intended to fulfil.  
In my conceptual framework myth sits underneath the broader concept of the tablet 
imaginary. Myth is identified in this chapter as a way to trace the tablet imaginary. Similarly, 
I discuss the management of failure in the following chapter as a way to develop the idea of 
the tablet imaginary. The tablet imaginary is constructed in the use of tablets and consists 
of a range of meanings, only some of which will apply in any given context. Myth as I use it 
here is an idea that draws on and contributes to the tablet imaginary; a specific 
manifestation or enactment of an idea for a situated political purpose.  
113 
Setting the Context: the reason for going paperless 
The case study in this chapter is a UK University undergraduate sciences teaching lab 
that made a decision to ‘go paperless’, and began using tablet computers to replace paper in 
all of its teaching and learning activities. In one sense, the decision to go paperless was a 
simple response to a health and safety requirement. But the way in which this decision was 
reached, and the subsequent decision to use tablet computers, reveals much about how 
new digital technologies are regarded.  
The Lab 
This case study features the chemistry and biology undergraduate teaching laboratories 
of a UK University, which in 2012 moved from their existing location in one campus 
building where each discipline had its own dedicated lab, into a newly-renovated building in 
which all disciplines would work together in one large lab. As explained by Technical 
Manager Elsie and IT Solution Manager Ben22, the move was made possible because an 
existing campus building was unexpectedly vacated by an external party, leaving a free 
building with the potential to develop. Although in perfect working order, the existing labs 
were fairly old, and Elsie explained that it was agreed from the very initial planning stages 
that, “over the next five years maybe something would have to be looked at” in terms of 
renovation of the existing labs, “and then that opportunity came on board, so it sort of 
sorted itself out really”. So instead of renovating the existing labs in the near future, the 
decision was taken to move into the empty building and renovate it for the purpose of 
housing the labs. Rather than the existing series of separate labs which could hold around 
40 students at one time, the large new lab – referred to hereafter as ‘the Lab’ – would 
house up to 200 students at once, and be ‘paperless’. Before explaining a little more about 
the tablet computers and paperless initiative in the case study, I will describe the Lab itself.  
                                                 
22 Names used throughout the chapter are pseudonyms. 
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Located within a large building on the university campus, the Lab is a large open-plan 
space containing lab benches in rows in the middle, and fume cupboards and other 
workspaces around the edges. Approximately 35m long by 30m wide (within a building that 
is a further 15m long and 5m wide in total), with high ceilings containing metallic air vents 
and strip lighting, the space has not quite shaken off the feeling of being like a factory 
floor: before its conversion to house the science laboratory, the building had in fact been 
operated by a car manufacturer. Adjacent to the Lab is a preparation area, containing 
chemical stores and space for the technicians to prepare materials for lab classes. The rest 
of the ground floor consists of two smaller self-contained lab spaces, a plant room, several 
locker areas, and a social space with tables and chairs and two vending machines. The 
upper level contains two more small self-contained labs, an office space for the 
administrative and technical staff, and various storage areas. Although only taking up 
roughly a quarter of the total floor space of the new building, the importance of the Lab as 
its primary function meant that during my time on site, the whole building was always 
referred to as the Lab. In this chapter, I will use ‘the Lab’ to refer to the laboratory itself, 
and ‘the Lab Building’ to refer to the building as a whole.  
Why paperless? 
Moving from existing laboratories into this newly converted building involved 
bringing together various disciplines that had previously been housed in individual labs, 
including biochemistry, chemistry and microbiology. All laboratories are subject to 
biocontainment precautions, designed to protect workers and the environment from 
potential harm arising from working with biological agents. This is controlled in the 
European Union by an EU directive23, and by similar legal directives in other territories. It 
                                                 
23 Council Directive (EEC) 1990/679/EEC of 26 November 1990 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to 
biological agents and work (seventh individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L374, 
31.12.1990, pp.1–12. 
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is commonly referred to as the ‘biosafety level’ or ‘containment level’ of a lab, and ranges 
from 1 to 4 depending on the materials being used in the lab, with 1 being the least and 4 
being the most potentially hazardous.  
In the case study, the microbiology lab used materials that meant it was containment 
level 2. None of the other labs were subject to this containment level. One requirement of 
containment level 2 labs is that no organic material can be allowed to leave the lab space 
without being treated This requirement can be met in various ways, primarily by 
‘autoclaving’ – a process in which a range of lab materials including glassware and 
instruments are sterilised with steam heated to over 100°C – and by controlling the 
movement of materials into and out of the lab.  
Previously, when each discipline was located in its own lab, this meant in practice that 
staff and students working in the microbiology lab were required to complete extra health 
and safety training, and access to the lab was limited. This was quite simple to control, as 
microbiology was housed in its own bespoke lab. In the Lab, however, the open-plan 
layout meant that the containment level 2 requirement of microbiology had to be extended 
to the whole shared lab space, including all the disciplines. One material requiring 
management is paper: its physical characteristics of being porous and light, along with its 
ubiquity in most people’s daily lives, mean that its movement in and out of containment 
level 2 or above labs must be regulated. This is the rationale behind the decision for the 
Lab to be paperless: it is a way to meet the containment level 2 requirement. The paperless 
policy extends to all parts and all members of the Lab: lecturers, students, technicians and 
administrative staff are all required to work entirely without paper inside the lab space.  
This brief outline of the Lab gives a sense of how the project originated and 
developed. The developments that led from ‘this lab must be paperless’ to ‘this lab uses 
tablet computers’ are the particular focus in this chapter. The question that runs through 
this analysis is, ‘how is the tablet computer made to make sense in this context?’ The 
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definition of what a tablet computer is and does in this context reveals much about our 
relationship to technology. Because although the tablet computer’s ‘official role’ in the Lab 
is to replace paper, the way that it is spoken about by interviewees and fieldwork 
participants reveals that they conceive of it as much more than a paper replacement tool. It 
is seen as environmentally-friendly, as a marker of progress, a tool of surveillance, a storage 
medium, a security threat, a radically new technology, a familiar object, a comfort, a risk, 
and a panacea for the problems encountered in teaching in a large open plan space.  
Requirements of the paper replacement technology in the Lab 
The previous section explained the rationale as to why the Lab had to be paperless. 
Using fieldnotes and interview responses, this section gives an account of why tablet 
computers were chosen to replace paper in the Lab, instead of other possible paper 
replacement systems or technologies. The simple answer to this is that tablet computers 
were regarded as being the best way to replace paper. But of course this is anything but 
simple: the phrase ‘best way to replace paper’ is incredibly complex. The choice of tablet 
computers as a paper replacement was not simply based on tablets’ usefulness as writing 
tools. In fact, tablets were found to be quite poor writing tools. Their presence in the Lab 
was based on their ability to fulfil other roles: as evidence of expense spent by the 
University, as symbols of ‘cutting edge’ research, and many other things beside. The ‘best 
way to replace paper’ in this context had little to do with the micro-level activity of reading 
and writing, and much to do with the macro-level activity of running, organising and 
marketing an academic institution.  
The fundamental reason for adopting tablet computers in the Lab was to replace 
paper. Sellen and Harper (2002) note that organisations wishing to ‘go paperless’ often do 
not fully appreciate what function paper actually fulfils in the workplace. This ties into a 
more general sense in which “users are often [at] fault for expecting ‘magic bullets’ – 
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technical systems that will solve social or organizational problems” (Star and Ruhleder, 
1994: p.263). Sellen and Harper argue that paper typically represents one of three different 
kinds of problem that organisations wishing to go paperless perceive (2002: p.25). Firstly, a 
symbolic problem that using paper marks you out as old-fashioned. Secondly, a cost 
problem particularly related to the long-term physical storage of paper records. Thirdly, an 
interactional problem relating to the fact that paper requires people to be present; both 
with the paper itself, and with anyone else working on the same thing (2002: pp.23-33). 
Sellen and Harper argue that the complex role of paper means that “new technologies need 
considerable forethought before being introduced into working life” (2002: p.19).  
The gap between the representation of paper as a background tool and the reality of 
its complex role has a parallel in the idea of visible and invisible work (Suchman, 1995). 
Suchman argues that representations of work are “interpretations in the service of 
particular interests and purposes” (Suchman, 1995: p.58). The effect of treating paper as a 
simple tool – as a mediator of invisible work – may well be to devalue types of work 
achieved in this manner. The person who can define the work as such is in a position of 
power (Star and Strauss, 1999: pp.13-14). Star and Strauss give the example of “Feminist 
movements like the British ‘Wages for Housework’ [which] began a public campaign to 
define those activities as work – work with real economic value” (1999: p.10): a clear 
response to the vulnerability that can arise from having one’s work badly-defined or 
invisible. Yet this does not mean that invisibility is necessarily an entirely vulnerable 
position. Invisibility can allow the person to engage in the type of unseen practices that de 
Certeau calls tactics “[which] do not obey the law of the place, for they are not defined or 
identified by it” (de Certeau, 1988: p.29). Suchman’s ‘Equivocal Reflection on Making 
Work Visible’ (Suchman, 1995: p.60) recognises the tension between the benefits of having 
one’s work recognised as such and the risk that opening up and defining previously 
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invisible work can leave the person and their work exposed to increased rationalisation and 
control.  
In the Lab, the ‘definer’ was Ben, the IT solution manager and head of the paperless 
Lab project as a whole. Ben summarised the function that the paper replacement would 
fulfil as follows: “anything that students do requires a method of writing what the lecturer 
says, recording what they have written, and being able to access it later”. This recalls 
Freud’s Mystic Writing Pad (Freud, 1925), mentioned in the previous chapter: a medium 
that can repeatedly record and store information. The requirement of the paper 
replacement technology is to allow for writing, and storage and retrieval of that writing. 
This can be stated as the first requirement that the tablets must fulfil in the Lab (Table 5).  
Table 5. Requirements 
Requirements 
Must replace paper’s functions as a means of 
recording, storing and retrieving writing 
 
So why were tablet computers specifically chosen to fill this role? The interviewees 
most often explained the role of the tablets as providing a paper replacement due to the 
Lab being containment level 2: 
the lab itself is a biochemistry lab so we didn’t want to take porous material in 
there as it could get contaminated and it can’t be taken out. The idea with the 
tablets is that they would sit in the lab at all times (Susan, IT Trainer); 
one of the aspects that has determined what we do is the health and safety aspect. 
And this need for the Lab to be containment level 2, and what the implications 
were for how we worked in there. And so in those meetings last summer, we were 
discussing various options […] And as part of those discussions, the use of tablet 
PCs was first mooted (Edward, Senior Lecturer); 
 microbiology has a containment level issue which is where the tablets came in 
(Ben); 
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 So from the containment level, obviously that’s where the tablet came about 
(Elsie).  
It is clear, then, that the idea to use tablet computers was a response to a simple health 
and safety requirement. But the containment requirement explains why paper could not be 
used, not why tablet computers should be used: tablet computers were not the only paper 
replacement technology available. Ben the IT Solution Manager explained to me that they 
trialled various paper replacement options including continuing to use paper but scanning 
everything, using desktop PCs, using ‘thin client’ Citrix systems (where the internal 
workings of the computer are run on servers located away from the computer terminal, 
allowing the user to work with a physically small computer interface), and using tablet 
computers. Although I will return to this idea towards the end of the chapter, I would like 
to highlight here that these alternative solutions all involve computing technology of some 
kind: none are ‘low tech’.  
One way to get a better sense of why tablet computers were chosen is to examine the 
reasons these possible alternatives were rejected. This in turn reveals what the people 
involved in the project understood the tablet computer to be. Statements of other 
technologies’ failures are a way of defining the tablet24.  
Ben summarised the scanning solution as follows: 
Put some big screens up to be able to display the content that we want to show, 
do everything on paper, scan it and destroy it. It would work, it’s not a very good 
option, definitely not environmentally friendly, but it would work. So we quickly 
moved away from that…  
Another consideration of the scanning solution was the time it would take to scan 
everybody’s work:  
                                                 
24 In later chapters, I develop ‘analysis of the management of failure’ as a key method in understanding what 
tablets represent to users. As my time researching the Lab included the planning stages but not the 
implementation, I could not apply this analysis of failure to tablets in this case. 
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if there were 180 students and 6 scanners dotted around the place, then at the end 
of the lesson, even if it only took one minute per student, that would be [half an 
hour]: that would simply have taken too long (Ben); 
there were clearly logistical difficulties – if you’ve got 180 students all wanting to 
scan, do they scan themselves, do they, do we get the technical staff to scan them? 
(Ben). 
Thus, the paper replacement solution needed to be environmentally friendly, and not 
to take up too much time.  
The relative environmental friendliness of paper compared to tablet computers is 
debatable: the problems of definition and logistics involved in comparing the whole 
environmental impact of the paper industry to that of the computer industry make it 
virtually impossible to generate any conclusive result. Jordan argues that the rapid and 
widespread adoption of industrially produced tablets means that the “success of the iPad 
necessitates environmental exploitation” (2015: p.149, emphasis added). On the connection 
between paperless technologies and increased carbon consumption, a Greenpeace report 
published in 2010 argues that as “cloud computing becomes more common and demands 
on the internet grow, major companies hosting online services are using more and more 
energy for their data centers” (Greenpeace, 2010). The report makes a specific connection 
between tablet computers, the cloud metaphor and increased energy consumption. The 
‘truth’ of the relative level of energy consumption between paper and tablets is not a 
problem here, however, because in this case ‘environmentally friendly’ functions simply as 
a symbolic phrase. Throughout the fieldwork in the Lab, the only mentions of 
environmental issues centred around an assumption that ‘going paperless’ was a carbon-
saving initiative. Ben had this to say: 
there’s also the further impact of looking at the carbon initiative. At the moment 
there’s a lot of focus on carbon use, carbon buildings, carbon efficiency et cetera 
and we are looking at a regeneration of this campus. So as part of that, going on 
this route was a good staging post. 
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When asked directly what was the primary motivation for losing paper, Ben had no 
hesitation in answering, “The university’s is carbon. Saving on carbon, saving on paper”, 
clearly equating the two. While there is no reason to doubt the University’s intentions to 
reduce carbon, I found no evidence that the University had any plans, proofs or forecasts 
regarding the impact that replacing paper with tablet computers would have on carbon. 
Furthermore, while making an argument about the relative monetary costs of tablets and 
paper, Edward, a Senior Lecturer, also revealed that no study was ever undertaken, no 
report produced, which determined how much paper is actually used ‘per student’ in the 
University’s labs.  
This is why I argue that the carbon-saving properties of tablets in the context of the 
Lab are symbolic. Rather than actually reducing carbon, the University wished to be seen to 
value carbon reduction. This is summed up by Ben’s rejection of the scanning option: 
There is also a carbon issue, as any notes would have to be recorded in the lab, 
then scanned, then destroyed, then probably printed off at home. That was 
something that we didn’t really want to sell! 
Note, it is not something that the University did not want to do: it was something the 
University did not want to be seen to be doing. Given this, the requirement needs to be 
changed subtly to read ‘must symbolise environmental friendliness’.  
Interestingly, Ben noted that “lecturers would prefer scanning, as this would not 
require any change in their working practices”, but that it was nevertheless quickly decided 
that this solution was unsuitable, because it would take too long. I was surprised that Ben 
was effectively saying that changing lecturers’ fundamental working practices was 
acceptable; taking too much time was not. From the scanning solution, we can infer some 
requirements of the paper replacement technology, and some things that it is not required 
to do.  
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Table 6 Requirements 
Requirements 
Must replace paper’s functions as a means of 
recording, storing and retrieving writing 
Must not take up too much time 
Must symbolise environmental friendliness 
 
Another option was to use Citrix PCs. We might note here that Ben’s description of a 
Citrix PC solution demonstrates that he disregards or underestimates the complexity of 
replacing paper that Sellen and Harper identify, as outlined above (Sellen and Harper, 
2002): 
So if you’re using Citrix PC, as your input device, it’s not that much of a change. 
You just remove pen and paper, and you just type everything up. Everyone’s all 
really comfortable with that. (Ben) 
The Citrix or thin client terminals were rejected on the basis of being unable to 
broadcast video satisfactorily. Ben said that “the Citrix system … could do broadcast. But it 
would be at its limit. And we didn’t want something that was working at its maximum 
capacity, we wanted something that could handle what we asked of it”. We can therefore 
add to our table: 
Table 7. Requirements 
Requirements 
Must replace paper’s functions as a means of 
recording, storing and retrieving writing 
Must not take up too much time 
Must symbolise environmental friendliness 
Must be able to broadcast video without 
working at full capacity 
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Desktop computers were also considered as a paper replacement technology, but were 
rejected for two reasons. Firstly, another issue relating to the health and safety 
requirements of the lab, and secondly a consideration of the aesthetics of the lab space:  
the fans in PCs can suck in all sorts of bacteria and so on, [so with] PCs there 
might be containment issues. And if anything was to go wrong, we couldn’t send 
the PCs off to be fixed because they would be contaminated (Ben)  
Also, the other part of the remit they wanted us to avoid was turning the lab 
space, as it is determined, into an IT facility. That was one of the big ones: it can’t 
be an IT space (Ben) 
Table 8. Requirements 
Requirements 
Must replace paper’s functions as a means of 
recording, storing and retrieving writing and a 
means of drawing 
Must not take up too much time in each lesson 
Must symbolise environmental friendliness 
Must be able to broadcast video without 
working at full capacity 
Must not turn the Lab into an IT space 
Must have a screen per student  
Must use cloud-based storage (“Which is the 
direction of the future”)  
Must be able to fulfil the function of a lab 
book, which records daily activity in the lab  
 
As ‘conforming to containment level 2’ was a requirement of any technology in the 
Lab, it has not been added to the list of requirements of paper replacement technology 
specifically. The necessity not to look like an IT space, however, was another requirement. 
Seemingly out of step with the search for a technological solution to paperlessness, this 
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requirement refers to a fairly subjective impression of how the technology would make the 
space feel. Adding this requirement, and others mentioned by participants, results in the 
Table 8.  
Suitability of tablet computers 
Taking each requirement of the project individually, we can see how well tablet 
computers fulfil these, categorising them as suitable, questionable, or unsuitable in each case. 
Doing so will allow us to judge the overall suitability of the tablet computers as paper 
replacement technology in the Lab. The judgement of tablets as suitable or not is based on 
the relative success of the tablet computers at fulfilling the requirements of this particular 
case study.  
Firstly, ‘must replace paper’s functions as a means of recording, storing and retrieving writing and a 
means of drawing’. The ease with which the touchscreen tablets can be used for typing is 
doubtless subjective, but several different people raised concerns about this. Fiona, a 
Senior Technician, complained that “writing on them with a stylus, I can’t get on with 
that”, and “the time it took me to write a chemical formula, switching between letters and 
numbers – I just gave up”. Two Technicians had the following conversation showing 
doubt about tablets’ ability to support typing: 
Yeah you can’t type on them can you? (Owen) 
Yeah that would be my main thing on them, I’d need to be able to type. (Tammy)  
It could be argued that some of these reservations result from the unfamiliarity with 
the technology. Tammy admits that she got used to using her mobile phone’s touchscreen: 
“typing text messages with a touchscreen, getting more used to that maybe in the long term 
with iPads it might, I might get used to using touchscreens for typing more lengthy 
documents”. It was unfeasible in the fieldwork to conduct a study into the ease of 
touchscreen typing and how this changed over time with increased familiarity with the 
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technology. Accuracy and speed of typing have been shown to be higher on physical 
keyboards as opposed to various types of touchscreens (Hoggan et al., 2008). The size of 
the touchscreen keyboard has an effect on the rate of typing (Sears et al., 1993). Different 
keyboard configurations have been suggested as ways to improve comfort or accuracy of 
touchscreen typing (Trudeau et al., 2013). Regardless of research into the efficacy and speed 
of touchscreen typing, the fact remained that, anecdotally, members of the Lab had serious 
doubts whether touchscreen typing could ever be a satisfactory method of data entry.  
The issue of drawing using tablets was also raised, with Neil, a Laboratory 
Demonstrator, telling me during an observation that using tablets “ruins students’ futures”. 
His concern was that he already comes across students who can only draw graphs using 
computer software, not by hand. And it was not only graphs: Neil said that many final year 
undergraduates “can’t use pipettes”, implying that these students are wrongly being taught 
more advanced techniques without being competent doing ‘the basics’.  
During a lab test of the tablets in the ‘old labs’, one student complained that reading 
the protocol on the tablets was fine, but that she likes to tick things off once they’re done. 
On a paper protocol this is simple, but on the tablets it is tricky. Although the student had 
tried typing ‘done’ on the document in lieu of a tick, this altered the layout of the protocol 
and made it difficult to read. This seemingly simple stage in the student’s preferred lab 
practices may be surprisingly important for her learning. Hoffmann (2013: p.299) argues 
that writing “may not be reduced to its archival function alone”: writing can be a procedure 
for thinking and can function in science as a ‘non-material research device’. The inability to 
tick off parts of the protocol is one instance of tablet computers failing to replace the full 
functionality of paper.  
All in all, tablet computers are an unsuitable paper replacement in this regard. Although 
they could replicate paper’s functions, this could only be done by radically changing the 
process. While providing a means of recording, storing and retrieving writing, the tablets 
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required users to learn completely new processes. This was not a way of ‘writing’ or 
‘reading’ that anybody would recognise as such.  
Despite tablets’ unsuitability for this task, there was little concern amongst participants 
that tablets could replace paper. The difficulties experienced in the lab tests were put down 
to the fact that these were trials: it was simply a question of finding the right app to 
replicate the process of writing with pen and paper. Members of the Lab showed an 
endless faith in the potential of the technology. With the requirement of replacing paper’s 
function of writing, storing and retrieving data, the tablets were always seen as capable: the 
problem was working out how to make use of this capability. How did tablets remain a 
going concern despite all the evidence that their use would require changes in the processes 
of reading and writing? The answer lies in the bureaucratic process involved in the running 
of the Lab. Tablets were initially signed off as a paper replacement: 
using the tablet as a book was the first one. So purely as a notebook. You can 
either get content and read stuff on it, or you can write. Very plain and simple. We 
decided yes it would do that. So when it was originally signed off to go the tablet 
route, it was signed off on that premise (Ben)  
This rationale had clearly been accepted by the members of the Lab that I spoke to. 
When asked what tablets were for, participants always gave simple answers: 
when it was first signed off it was signed off as a notebook realistically, nothing 
more (Ben); 
the tablet PCs are primarily a paper replacement (Edward); 
the tablet is the solution to the paper-free problem of the Lab (Owen). 
Once the idea that tablet computers will replace paper has been fixed in the 
bureaucratic process, their suitability for this task ceases to be questioned. In fact, it ceases 
to be questionable.  
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If we analyse Ben’s account of the ‘signing off’ process more closely, the hierarchy of 
power in the university as an institution comes into play. The interplay of authority and 
expertise was interesting in this instance. Ben and the IT Solution team decided that the 
tablets could replace paper, with Ben freely admitting that this was his personal preference. 
Given this assurance, the academic staff agreed to the use of tablet computers. On this 
basis, the administrative hierarchy signed off the tablets as a paper replacement technology. 
In this process, Ben’s original decision is ratified by the academic community, who defer to 
his expertise. Yet it is not Ben’s decision to make, so it is upon the academic staff’s 
authority that the University ‘sign off’ the tablets. The academics defer to Ben’s expertise, 
thinking it must be a good solution if the IT manager recommends it. The University defer 
to the academics’ expertise, thinking it must be a good solution if the academic staff 
support it. And everybody involved defers to the University’s authority, thinking it must be 
a good solution if it has gone through due process and been signed off. There is a triple 
system of justification to which every party has given their authority on the basis of 
somebody else’s expertise. The whole process makes the concept of tablets as a good paper 
replacement unquestionable. The myth that tablets can replace paper without changing the 
processes of reading and writing – that must at least require some justification – goes 
unexamined.  
The second requirement identified was that the paper replacement ‘must not take up too 
much time’. As a paper replacement, the tablet computers would work in the following way25. 
The lab protocol (the instructions from the lecturer to the students on how to complete 
that session’s lab work or experiment) is uploaded onto the Virtual Learning Environment 
(VLE) by the lecturer 24 hours before the lab session. The students enter the Lab, find a 
free bench space, turn on the tablet and download the protocol from the VLE. During the 
                                                 
25 This is taken from a teaching delivery flow chart produced by Ben. I was free to view and discuss the flow 
chart but not to reproduce it. 
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lab session, the students use the touchscreen keyboard on the tablets to make notes in 
Evernote, a commercial note-taking software that records and stores notes using cloud 
storage. At the end of the lab session, if students’ notes are to be marked, then they upload 
their notes to the VLE. Compared to the paper system in place in the old labs, this takes 
more time. Simply having to turn on, log in and download the protocol introduces at least a 
minute or two extra compared to paper: as one technician Tammy put it, “there’s no 
loading of the paper before you can write on it”. In one of the lab testing sessions when 
students were given tablets to use in the ‘old’ laboratory (i.e. before moving to the Lab), 
several students were observed to complain that they don’t have time to email work to 
themselves during a class.  
Tablets are unsuitable for the requirement of ‘not taking up too much time in each 
lesson’. In which case, why were tablet computers chosen as a paper replacement tool? The 
answer is that the Lab was always envisaged as a high-tech space, and the management 
were happy to go through a difficult teething stage in order to accommodate the 
technology. Elsie, the Technical Staff Manager, was keen to stress that the Lab would be 
high-tech: in an interview she interjected to add the phrases “pushing boundaries” and “at 
the forefront”, and described the Lab as cutting edge and progressive.  
There was a necessary adjunct to phrases such as ‘cutting edge’ and ‘at the forefront’. 
It would be no good introducing radical new technologies that nobody could use. The idea 
that people would ‘get used to the technology’ was a very common theme amongst those 
involved in the Lab: 
“I like to tick things off once they’re done … but I suppose it’s just getting used 
to it. (Undergraduate student, comment during lab test); 
other staff involved, the demonstrators and stuff, they didn’t appear to find any 
problems once they’d got used to it (Edward); 
“I think it’s just a matter of time getting used to them (Sam, Lecturer); 
129 
It’s an extra strain on students to get used to using it. (John, Support Librarian). 
The adoption of new technologies relies on the idea that people ‘will get used to it’. 
This allows the transfer from existing to new technology to go ahead smoothly. Anybody 
who objects to the new technology can be dismissed with the phrase ‘you just need to get 
used to it’. And more than this, the difficulties associated with getting used to the 
technology can be offset by the promise of the technology’s extra potential. The 
implication here is that getting used to technology is not a matter of training or practice. It 
occurs simply by exposure, by owning or using the technology. In the Lab, this was 
manifested in the fact that all members of staff were offered a tablet to ‘just have a play 
with’, as the phrase went.  
And as regards to myself, because I’d had one to play with both last year for a 
while and then again from December I’ve had this one – so I’ve got more familiar 
with them (Edward). 
Playing with the tablets was seen to be a way to get used to them. Why play? There are 
two primary reasons, both related to the infantile connotations of the word. Firstly, the idea 
that you can get used to a technology just by playing with it undermines anybody who 
claims they find it difficult to use the technology. It’s child’s play. Secondly, calling it ‘play’ 
encourages an informal self-training that comes at zero cost to the University. Telling staff 
to ‘just have a play with it’ gives the impression that it’s something of a treat, an enjoyable 
task. Using Android devices, the participants would have been able to find and purchase 
‘productivity’ apps on the Play store, Google’s online app shop. The rise of ‘playbour’ 
practices (Kücklich, 2005, Goggin, 2011) contributes to the conflation of work and leisure, 
expressed in a form of consumption in which skills useful for work are ‘gamified’ and 
consumed as leisure activities. Whether or not the person does find this playbour 
enjoyable, from the University’s perspective this involves huge savings in staff training.  
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Another requirement of the paper replacement technology was that it should 
symbolise the University’s commitment to be environmentally friendly. In the promotional 
material for the Lab (which I cannot cite directly here due to anonymity), the idea of 
paperlessness and carbon saving have equal billing with the idea of the Lab being a high-
tech learning environment. The use of paperless technology is described as part of a carbon 
reduction policy. While the University does have a flagship carbon initiative, Ben revealed 
that “[Our carbon initiative] was launched after the Lab came about, but before we started 
considering these solutions”. So although any carbon savings in the Lab could be usefully 
promoted under a grander carbon initiative, they could not be said to be a planned 
intention of such an initiative: remember that the Lab was necessarily going to be paperless, 
regardless of carbon considerations. Although it could be accused of being disingenuous to 
do so, the University can certainly point to its paperless Lab as evidence of its commitment 
to carbon reduction. As a result, I would argue that the tablet computers succeed in giving 
the impression of environmental awareness, and are therefore suitable.  
Citrix terminals were rejected because they were unable to fulfil the requirement of 
broadcasting video without working at full capacity. The task of using tablet computers to 
broadcast video was the biggest technical problem faced by Ben the IT Solution Manager. 
The tablets proved to be unsuitable for this. But an interesting issue is raised when we 
examine the reasons that the tablets were unsuitable: the reliance on external factors. The tablet 
computers themselves are able to broadcast and stream (i.e. send and receive) live video via 
the Internet. This is perfectly within their capabilities, and indeed Internet video streaming 
apps such as iPlayer and YouTube are often featured in advertisements for tablet 
computers. Yet when it came to implementing this in the Lab, several problems were 
encountered. Ben explained that their experiments with online video broadcasting services 
failed because of audio and video synchronisation issues: “the quality was full. […] There 
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was, however, approximately a two- to four-second delay if you pumped all your audio out 
at the same time through the same stream”.  
Ben described this tablet-to-tablet video broadcasting system “a good concept but bad 
solution”. He explained that they then spoke to a number of suppliers, including Cisco, 
HP, Apple, and Samsung to try to get technical support for a tablet-to-tablet video 
broadcasting system:  
We went to people like Cisco, who couldn’t underwrite us on the tablet solution, 
because it’s never been done in the world. It’s a world-first, so they wouldn’t 
underwrite us as a teaching method. […]Because the big thing everyone was 
worried about was the quantity of devices. You can happily stream, and stream 
reliably, to 10 devices. To 20 devices. Even 30 most probably. The problem is, up 
to 200 at the same time, all in sync, with an audio solution, gets a bit more 
complicated. 
Although there is nothing about the tablets themselves that makes them incapable of 
this kind of video streaming, the problem comes in the amount of third-party support that 
is required. Firstly, as with any IT service, this would require reliable and high-quality IT 
infrastructure within the University if it were to run successfully (Alsabawy et al., 2013). 
This particular service would also need to be supported by a reliable external company who 
would provide the software and, crucially, take responsibility if it failed. This third-party 
support, necessary for the video broadcasting function, was never found. Although one 
tablet could broadcast video without working at full capacity, 200 tablets could not. As this 
was the actual requirement, tablets were unsuitable for this.  
The next requirement that the tablets had to fulfil as a paper replacement technology 
was not to turn the Lab into an IT space. This is important when considering the influence 
that the setting has on teaching and learning. Roth and Hsu (2014) argue that science 
laboratories should be designed as “smart spaces” which enable participation. Blatt 
comments “the setting [of science learning] itself can be viewed as active, an active 
participant, in fact, in contributing to the action that occurs in that setting” (Blatt, 2014: 
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p.124). Keeping a ‘scientific’ aesthetic would therefore be beneficial to the teaching and 
learning planned for the Lab. According to Ben: 
The other part of the remit they wanted us to avoid was turning the lab space, as 
it is determined, into an IT facility. That was one of the big ones: it can’t be an IT 
space – that was one of the big things [another University] did badly. […] they’ve 
got beautiful benches, but then they’ve got half the benches taken up with a PC 
cluster, where you’ve got full PCs, full mice, full keyboards, nice big monitors on 
there. Really good if it was an IT suite, but as a lab it’s awful, because the actual 
amount of space you’ve got to do the lab work is very small. 
Partly this relates to a practical concern about how much space the technology would 
take up on the bench. This concern was expressed by researchers in a case study from 
1994:  
When asked whether, in a future system, it would be desirable to replace lab 
notebooks with small palmtops or digitized pads, most researchers were dubious. 
Respondents at one cramped lab in an urban high-rise, simply noted that there 
was no place to put another computer — they did not even have space for all the 
necessary lab equipment. (Star and Ruhleder, 1994: p.256) 
But more than a practical consideration, Ben’s concern also relates to the ‘feel’ of the 
Lab. There is an interesting juxtaposition of requirements here, with technology regarded 
as the best means of achieving paperlessness, but also being seen as undesirable 
aesthetically. Even though it is evidently a science laboratory, the idea that the technology 
could take away from the ‘sciencey’ feel of the Lab was clearly a concern for Ben, who 
mentioned some of the technology installation:  
it’s not what we’d class as the right kind of cable management for the visually [sic] 
aesthetics. Because it’s obviously going to be a very clean lab, we want it to look 
the part. So if that means tidying away cables into white sleeves or whatever, fine, 
we’ll pay the bit extra to have that done to give the right impression to fall 
alongside with the lab environment 
Although to some extent this is a subjective matter, I consider the tablets to be 
successful in this regard. The fact that they are mobile, battery-operated, wireless devices 
means that there are no wires or cables on the lab benches, nothing is plugged in, and there 
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are no monitors, keyboards or mice on the benches. In addition, the fact that the tablets are 
handed out and taken back in at the start and end of each lab session has the symbolic 
effect of making the technology feel subordinate to the lab space itself. The feeling is that 
the Lab is first and foremost a science lab, with the technology being a useful but not 
essential add-on.  
Although I consider the tablets to be suitable in terms of not making the Lab feel like 
an IT space, there was another technology introduced in the Lab, which did make it feel 
unlike a science space. Due to the size of the room, the fact that the technicians would be 
in a separate room, the number of students in the room, and the fact that there may be 
several different classes running at once, it was decided that for both practical and health 
and safety reasons, everybody in the Lab would use an audio headset to communicate. 
Lecturers and demonstrators have microphones and earpieces to broadcast and receive 
audio; students only have earpieces so they can hear instructions but not communicate 
back. Against the potential for interactivity offered by computing technologies, the tablets 
in this instance seem to resurrect the rote learning practices associated with nineteenth 
century writing slates. Whilst not necessarily like an IT suite, the presence of headsets 
means the Lab does feel different from other lab spaces: one lecturer worried that it would 
feel like a call centre. My own interpretation is that the headsets are in fact far more 
intrusive than a computer monitor on a lab bench would be, and the AV system does make 
the lab feel more like an IT space than it would otherwise.  
The next two requirements were that the paper replacement technology in the Lab 
needed to provide one screen per student, and needed to use cloud-based storage. 
Evidently, the tablets are suitable in both cases. The idea of providing ‘one screen per 
student’ also raised an interesting question on the simultaneously personal and impersonal 
nature of the tablets.  
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On one hand, tablets are impersonal devices: they were handed to students at random 
at the start of each class and did not belong to any individual. On the other hand, students 
were required to sign in and work with their personal data. This leads to a rather self-
evident summary: every device is impersonal except the one you are using at the time. In 
terms of the Lab, this allows the users to work with a handheld, portable, personal device 
all the time they are signed in, and allows any sense of that person to be erased from the device 
as soon as they sign out. The tablets are therefore at once personal and impersonal. It 
might be added here that this has a significant financial advantage, as the University only 
have to purchase the 200 tablets for one full class, rather than the 1000 it might take to 
provide every student in every cohort with one.  
The final requirement that the tablet computers had to fulfil if they were to 
successfully replace paper was the ability to replicate the function of a lab book. A lab book 
is essentially a daily diary used to record the work in the lab. The lab book is used as 
standard across scientific disciplines in both academia and industry to keep a precise record 
of the activities taking place in the lab on a daily basis. This record serves two functions: 
scientifically, it acts as a record of past experiments which can be referenced in future; 
bureaucratically, it acts as a record of lab activities including what was done and who did it, 
so that responsibility can be apportioned if litigation, health and safety or any other such 
problems arise. The importance of the lab book depends on the institution, for instance in 
industry it functions more often as a legal record of scientific work that is used to defend 
intellectual property, whereas in academia it might be more commonly used to record and 
recall previous work. Some academic publications have started to include scanned copies of 
the paper lab book as supplementary information, (for example Lang and Botstein, 2011). 
In the Lab, keeping a good lab book is treated as an essential part of learning to be a good 
scientist. Partly this is regarded as “best practice” (Ben), and partly it is a skill that students 
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will realistically go on to use if they enter industry (Edward). All in all, the ability to keep a 
lab book is crucial to the running of the Lab.  
To what extent can a tablet computer be a lab book? For the purposes of this 
discussion, I will disregard the questions raised earlier about the convenience of writing 
using tablets, and focus on the ability of tablets to fulfil the function of a lab book. Edward 
raised some immediate concerns regarding the difference between paper and tablets: 
[A paper lab book] kind of self-organises because you start on page one, and then 
page two and page three, page four. With electronic information like this, there is 
a potential for having a whole set of bits which are not necessarily in the right 
order 
As well as representing an organisational problem, the difference between an 
electronic form of note storage and a paper-based form has significant implications for the 
validity of the data. As Edward continues: 
The one advantage of the lab book as a piece of paper, paper-based, is that I as a 
member of staff can go back if need be and look through what they’ve done. 
Electronic has the potential for – I’m trying to think of the best way of putting 
this – manipulation. I mean obviously with paper, people can rip pages out, but 
then you can see that they’ve ripped a page out 
One means by which the physical properties of paper are incorporated in the use of 
lab books is that nothing is allowed to be erased. As Ben explained: “If you cross 
something out, you put a cross through it, clearly, sign it and say why you crossed it out”. 
Lecturers would therefore be required to check the electronic lab books for alterations. 
This requirement of surveillance did not apply to paper lab books, where checking for 
alterations was an inherent part of reading the student’s work: part of the normal process 
of teaching.  
Overall, the tablet computer is an unsuitable means of replicating the function of the 
lab book. The paper system forces a particular order upon the lab book, which follows the 
passage of time and ensures that the entries in the lab book imitate the chronology of the 
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lab work itself. This is not present in the tablet computer, which allows sorting by time and 
date, but also allows several other means of sorting. More importantly, the tablet computer 
affects the lecturer’s role and demands an active process of surveillance.  
Table 9. Requirements and Suitability 
Requirements Suitability of tablet 
computers 
Must replace paper’s functions as a means of 
recording, storing and retrieving writing 
Unsuitable 
Must not take up too much time in each lesson Questionable  
Must symbolise environmental friendliness Suitable 
Must be able to broadcast video without working 
at full capacity 
Unsuitable 
Must not turn the Lab into an IT space Suitable 
Must have a screen per student Suitable 
Must use cloud-based storage Suitable 
Must fulfil the function of a lab book, which 
records daily activity in the lab 
Unsuitable 
 
Why were tablets adopted if they were unsuitable?  
The table (Table 9) that results from this discussion of requirements demands some 
further analysis. How and why were tablet computers adopted in the Lab when as a paper 
replacement technology they are suitable only for four of eight tasks, and in fact unsuitable 
for three tasks? Considering the extent to which tablets are flawed as a paper replacement, 
how are they justified? How can it make sense for the University to purchase around 250 
tablet computers, the same number of AV headsets, several projectors, screens and high-
definition visualisers, and myriad supporting technologies such as Wi-Fi, which ultimately 
combine into a distinctly imperfect replacement for paper?  
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Why did the Lab adopt tablets even though they were unsuitable? The answer is 
twofold. Firstly, a combination of the institutional politics of the University and people’s 
personal and professional investment in the Lab meant that there was really no choice but 
to make the tablets make sense. Secondly, the way that this was achieved involved an 
overarching myth concerning tablets and digital technology more generally: Digital 
technology can be justified by its potential. Taken to its logical extreme, this myth helps to 
construct a technoscientific imaginary in which tablets are treated as perfect. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will analyse these two aspects that explain how and why tablet 
computers were made to make sense as a paper replacement technology.  
Institutional Politics 
Most institutions are organised around a hierarchical structure of roles and offices 
(Grint, 1998), as is the case for academic and industrial science laboratories. The 
organisational structure of the University in this case meant that the final say on matters 
pertaining to the Lab fell to the Campus Regeneration Board, headed by the Dean of the 
School of Science and Technology. While the requirements of the project from the point 
of view of those who would be working in the Lab have been discussed at length, it must 
be recognised that the requirements of the project from the perspective of the Campus 
Regeneration Board may be different. It is important to look to functions other than ‘a 
paper replacement technology’ that tablet computers fulfil in the Lab.  
The Lab was conceived of as part of a larger campus redevelopment programme that 
was already taking place when an external party, a car manufacturer, left the original 
building. Importantly, it was decided that the space would become the Lab before it was 
even decided what such a lab would really be. Although reluctant to be drawn on the 
details, it is clear from interviews with Ben and Elsie that the idea for the building to 
become the Lab was chosen amongst competition from other schools and departments of 
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the University, each vying for the prestige of having a bespoke building dedicated to their 
work and research. From Ben’s account, it was the science aspect that won out: 
From that it opened a new opportunity of what to do with the building – do we 
invite someone else on? Do we do something else with it? Sciences in general are 
a developing area of academic interest, so it’s a good area for use to invest 
resources and money into.  
The following quote from technician Owen reveals both the perceived status gained 
by moving to the Lab and the somewhat controversial debate surrounding the decision to 
turn the building into a biosciences laboratory rather than put it to another use (note that 
sports sciences had labs alongside biosciences in the old building but did not move to the 
Lab): 
I know the sports technician, he said it would have been better to move just sport 
over to the Lab. Because it’s a large area and the way that sport teaches, they just 
need large areas with things like running machines and different large equipment 
that they could house in there, so they said it would be better suited to them. It 
would be cheaper to fit out. But you don’t know if that’s a bit of sour grapes that 
they’re not getting [it] […] maybe this building is not as pretty as the [new] 
building that we’re going to. So I think maybe sport are a bit sour about not 
going. 
Although the sports science technician’s envy of the ‘pretty’ new building seems rather 
superficial, it was in fact hugely important to the University that the Lab should be 
aesthetically impressive. Specifically, the building’s appearance in terms of both its 
architecture and its internal fittings had to function as a marker of expense spent: 
obviously it’s nice for the students to see the University’s putting into its 
infrastructure (Elsie); 
I guess it’s being built because the Vice Chancellor had a great vision of an 
amazing new Lab full of happy students all paying thirty thousand pounds a year 
or whatever it is [note: heavily sarcastic] (Owen); 
last Summer we were discussing what we could provide for the students to offset 
for the fact that they’re going to be paying large fees from this coming October 
(Edward). 
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As an institution, perhaps the University required the Lab project as a whole to 
represent investment in infrastructure and resources which would justify the increase in 
fees from £3465 per year for full-time UK or EU students to £8500. Support Librarian 
John offered this opinion on the purpose of the tablet computers in the Lab (taken from 
my interview notes):  
The university wants to please the students so they fill in the Student Survey; it is 
for the perceived wants of the students, not for any actual ‘good reason’. 
This differs from, and in a sense shortcuts and simplifies, Veblen’s (1994) notion of 
conspicuous consumption. The obvious spending on technology and architecture in the 
Lab, rather than a display of power or status, may be read simply as a display of expense 
spent. What for Veblen was a spectacular display of the exotic and unknowable wealth of 
the nouveau riche, in the Lab is a more or less literal translation of the students’ own fees into 
tangible objects, with the increased impressiveness of the Lab acting as an analogue for the 
increased fees charged.  
There are clear parallels here too with Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument that, for 
products of the culture industry: “The universal criterion of merit is the amount of 
‘conspicuous production’ of blatant cash investment. The varying budgets in the culture 
industry do not bear the slightest relation to factual values, to the meaning of the products 
themselves” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1999: p.34). Their pejorative sense would be shared 
by John the Support Librarian but presumably not by Edward, who simply thought it ‘nice’ 
that students could see this direct investment.  
This goes some way to explaining the justification of tablet computers as a paper 
replacement in the Lab, and answers an earlier question about the absence of any ‘low-tech’ 
solutions. The containment issue could have been solved, for example, with this low-tech 
solution: use paper lab books that are kept in the Lab at all times. Remember, the 
containment requirement is exactly that: it is in place to keep potentially harmful 
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substances contained within a laboratory. The existing microbiology labs worked in this way. 
While this would have solved the containment issue, this would not have been suitable for 
the institutional politics which required, bluntly, an expensive paper replacement.  
The operation of institutional politics partly explains how and why tablets made sense 
as paper replacements despite being unsuitable or questionable in various ways. Yet 
institutional politics affect decisions in any large building project. The importance of 
displaying expenditure to justify an increase in tuition fees is admittedly particular to the 
Lab because of its place within a University. The premise that tablets are a suitable paper 
replacement was provided by key members of the University hierarchy and then enacted as 
seemingly common sense notion by other members. This partly explains why participants 
were motivated to justify the tablets in this way, rather than rejecting them or the project of 
the Lab as a whole. This case clearly contradicts the microphysics laboratory context 
discussed by Galison (1997), who argues that “broader institutions do not determine the 
bench-top environment of physicists’ laboratory life” (p.3). In the Lab, the broader 
university institution did directly affect the material culture of the lab.  
But the influence of institutional politics is not enough alone to explain how and why 
tablets were justified as a paper replacement in the Lab. In addition to the institutional 
politics, participants were engaging with a technoscientific imaginary that focused on the 
potential of tablets rather than their actual suitability.  
Digital Technology as Justifiable by its Potential 
Throughout this case study, tablets were not being judged by what they did but by 
what they could potentially do. Taking this more broadly, I call the idea that “digital 
technology is justifiable by its potential” an overarching myth of technology. This overarching 
myth explains why, in the face of a set of requirements for which tablet computers are 
significantly ill-suited, they can be regarded as perfectly suitable. The ‘trick’ to making tablet 
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computers make sense in the Lab was to judge them not by what they can do, but what 
they could do.  
One example of the promise of potential being used to justify the tablet computers 
relates to their ability to use a split display, or have two apps running side-by-side. In a 
planning meeting with Kevin the Head of IT Services and eleven members of technical and 
academic staff from the various disciplines that would be moving to the Lab, the idea of 
tablets being able to display two apps side-by-side was discussed. At this stage, it had been 
decided that tablets would be used, but the choice of brand had not been finalised: a choice 
between the Apple iPad or the Samsung Galaxy Tablet.  
Lecturers discussing the requirements of the tablets and the perceived relative 
advantages of each brand focused on the ability to have more than one app displayed on 
the screen at the same time. This would typically be one app used to display the lab’s 
protocol and a separate app to take and record notes. This function is not supported by 
either the Samsung or Apple tablet computer, but the lecturers and technicians clearly 
expected it to be so. One lecturer said in a meeting that he assumed Ben the IT Solution 
Manager was ‘on his way to resolving the two screen problem’. The tablets’ inability to 
have two apps open was clearly stated by Ben in a telephone interview one month before 
this meeting, when he told me, ‘what neither [Apple’s nor Samsung’s operating system] can 
do is open two apps side-by-side on the screen’. Yet the frequency with which I 
encountered the idea that the tablets could potentially run two apps side-by-side throughout 
my fieldwork at the Lab made it clear that this idea was being circulated somehow. I 
strongly believe that Ben (whom I described earlier as ‘the definer’) was the source of this 
idea: firstly because his position as IT Solution Manager made him the ‘expert’ in terms of 
what the tablets could do, and thus more able than anybody else to influence the definition 
of a tablet computer that would circulate in the Lab; and secondly because he mentioned it 
to me more than once. In an observation of a laboratory trial of the tablets just one week 
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before the meeting mentioned above, Ben told me that a developer version of the Android 
operating system (used on the Samsung tablets) was available that could split the screen 
and thereby display two apps side-by-side. A developer version is a version not for general 
public release, which is shared amongst members of online communities with the tacit 
expectation that they can use the new operating system if they also reprogram any bugs 
that they find. In other words, it is in development, and as Ben pointed out ‘not 100% 
stable’.  
Although the idea that the tablets could show apps side-by-side never materialised and 
thus eventually ceased to inform the definition of a tablet computer in the Lab, this idea 
still had agency during the period in which the academic staff were discussing the changes 
in their working practices that would be required when moving to the Lab. I am not 
arguing that Ben or anybody else was being deceitful or consciously misleading in 
suggesting that the tablets had this potential. In fact, Ben is careful at various points to 
make a clear distinction between what tablets could potentially do in the Lab, and their 
actual function: 
So yes we’ve got potential to long-term develop onto stuff like [new apps] , but 
we shouldn’t… Well… I believe we shouldn’t be looking at that from the 
beginning. Because in the beginning, we’re looking to replace pen and paper. 
My fundamental argument in this chapter is that this overarching myth of technology affects 
how digital technologies are understood and defined. There is a slippage in the definition 
such that the potential of the technology informs how we understand the reality. In other 
words, it is not ‘mistaken’ or ‘misleading’ to include some idea of what a digital technology 
potentially could do in how we understand what it actually does. Quite simply, the potential 
of the device, whether realisable or not, informs how we understand the device.  
This is not a particular quirk of how tablets were treated in the Lab: this slippage 
between potential and actual pertains to a technoscientific imaginary that is more generally 
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widespread. I discussed this in chapter two, drawing on Ellul (1964), Marcuse (1982) and 
others to argue that this split follows a split inherent to our understanding of technology as 
having both a general and a specific sense. Specific technologies (or uses of technologies) 
express a general technological rationality. The slippage occurs between an imagined 
potential world of technological perfection and the actual devices that represent this 
imaginary: in this case, tablet computers. While the actual tablets were unsuitable paper 
replacements, the tablets fulfilling their imagined potential were perfectly suitable.  
The overarching myth was first identified in an early laboratory observation, around 3 
months into the 11 month fieldwork time frame. A demonstrator asked Ben how data can 
be uploaded to the tablets if they do not have a USB socket. The tone of Ben’s reply, that 
an adaptor can be purchased that will allow you to connect USB devices, implied a distinct 
sense of triumph: that the USB question was solved. Yet Ben’s very next sentence was, 
‘Now, we haven’t looked at that for the Lab, because obviously if you take the USB stick, 
you can’t take it out’. So although it is possible in theory to use a USB adaptor, in practice 
in the Lab this would be impossible or at the very least hugely impractical. My fieldnotes at 
the time include the comment: 
I think Ben’s discourse implies that the tabs are a fix-all solution. But he is careful 
to note that what he is actually doing right now is replacing pen and paper. I think 
this division between expectations of the University and what Ben is providing is 
being driven by the misleading way in which Ben mixes ‘potential’ of the tablets 
with what he can actually provide in the lab. (Fieldnotes) 
The reader may object that this fieldwork covers the planning stage of the Lab and 
therefore we should expect the potential of the tablets to be tested against real world 
conditions. But it is crucial to note that what I describe as the slippage between potential 
and actual in the way that the tablets are understood is not a stage in a process in which we 
go from an uninformed ‘potential’ understanding to an informed ‘actual’ understanding. 
The slippage is permanent. This is demonstrated in another example of the technology 
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being justified by its potential: the video streaming requirement discussed earlier. The idea 
that the tablets could be used to stream video was an essential requirement in the Lab. In 
an interview one month before the Lab was due to open, I asked Ben whether it was still 
on the cards to use the tablets to broadcast and receive audio and video: 
Still is. It still is. But no network provider in the world would underwrite it. 
Because we’d be the first in the world. So we’re now testing it. Actually as of 
yesterday, we were doing a YouTube test yesterday. Which failed. But we think 
that’s a limitation of YouTube. […] But because nobody would underwrite it, we 
needed a fall-back. So the fall-back is: everything will be produced in advance and 
be uploaded onto [our] virtual learning environment. 
Despite the continued currency of the idea that the tablets could potentially broadcast 
and stream live video, the actual solution had no live video element at all. In this case, Ben 
has not accepted that this potential is unachievable in practice. The tablet is still defined 
here as a device that could broadcast and stream live video. Its potential continues to inform 
its actuality.  
In the case of the Lab overall, I would argue that the slippage between potential and 
actual in the definition of digital technologies explains the choice of tablet computers as 
paper replacements. Tablets were suitable for the potential applications that Ben envisaged, 
but not suitable for the actual function they were originally intended to support. Although 
there were several instances of tablets having potential that differed in practice from what 
they could actually deliver, Ben describes one quite broad application that sums up the way 
in which digital technologies can be justified by their potential: 
The thing in the back of my mind was always the potential for you to be able to 
collaborate over distance with different institutions or different individuals. My 
theory came about because, [we previously] ran a system using Live Meeting 
which is a video conferencing tool. And we did a flexi Masters programme with a 
number of people out in the NHS. All over the country. […] we used Live 
Meeting to broadcast out to them and have discussion with them, for them to do 
presentations to us, and to manage that relationship. Following on from that, if 
you put that into the lab context that we’re now in, if you think a bit bigger on 
that, you can be teaching 200 people in this lab, and if everything was cloud-
based, you could then be teaching another 10,000 people if you really wanted to, 
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at remote locations or remote institutions. All at the same time. You can hear your 
instructions. If they have the appropriate instrumentation and stuff, which they 
would have if they were at a different university, or if they were a medical 
establishment – if they were at home, they might have to get all the stuff 
themselves, but I’m sure they can do that for the majority of stuff. But the audio 
can be piped out over the Net, content’s on-demand. It is possible. 
I can only speculate on the extent to which Ben’s vision influenced the University’s 
decision to use tablet computers in the Lab, but the idea of using digital technologies to 
provide virtual courses is appealing to any education institution that wishes to reduce costs. 
In a damning account of ‘educational corporatism’, Spring argues that the savings achieved 
by delivering online courses are counterbalanced by a reduction in the quality of instruction 
(Spring, 2012: p.2). While this argument must be judged on a case-by-case basis, Spring 
associates online courses with a broader trend of educational profiteering, citing examples 
of ‘branch campuses’: for-profit franchises of public Universities set up overseas (Spring, 
2012: chapter two). The attraction of this educational corporatism is undeniable in the 
context of the Lab, when the state of the national economy means the University is facing 
huge budget cuts and simultaneous uncertainty about student intake after a 150% increase 
in tuition fees. If tablet computers, and the move towards online teaching methods that 
they represent, have the potential to usher in profitable teaching services like the one 
outlined by Ben, then the importance of their ability to work as an actual paper 
replacement may be diminished in the eyes of the University’s.  
A final illustration of this myth comes from a comment in which Ben relates the 
adoption of technology with a broadly defined sense of progress: 
Speaking to a lot of the people in industry […] they’ve been saying that our 
students when they come will be able to help them as an industry move forward 
and adopt these practices which should have been adopted already, which haven’t 
been because the people they have are extremely good at their discipline, but 
aren’t really good at embracing new technology and change. So this will bring 
about that ability to adapt correctly. 
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Ben’s curious phrase ‘adapt correctly’ is an example of what Feenberg describes as the 
“dominant view of modernization [which] is based on the deterministic assumption that 
technology has its own autonomous logic of development. According to this view, 
technology is an invariant element that, once introduced, bends the recipient social system 
to its imperatives” (2002: p.138). 
This teleological understanding of technological development requires a concomitant 
understanding of technology as ‘potentialful’. This rather ugly neologism is an attempt to 
capture the sense that the potential that is attributed to digital technology is not regarded as 
possible, but as inevitable. That the physical devices of digital technology somehow hold, 
contain or imbue a potentiality that, when the devices are used, will automatically spring 
forth and become actual. This understanding is summed up by Ben’s answer to the 
question, ‘what is your primary motivation for losing paper?’: “Mine is adapting technology. 
The more people that use it, the more technology will move forward”. This potentiality of 
technology is a fundamental characteristic of what we understand technology to be.  
We can now return to the overarching myth of technology, which stated that “digital 
technology can be justified by its potential”. For this myth to operate, there are two 
simultaneous requirements that must be fulfilled: firstly, the general and commonplace 
understanding of technology as ‘potentialful’; secondly, a local and context-specific will or 
desire to focus on the potentiality of a particular technology. In the Lab, the former is a 
commonplace understanding of technological development (Feenberg’s ‘dominant view’); 
the latter was manifested as an acceptance of the necessity to go through a difficult 
‘teething stage’ (i.e. the technology’s actual) in order to reach a hoped-for advanced stage 
(i.e. the technology’s potential).  
At this stage we can finally return to the definition of myth: 
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; 
simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and 
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eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but 
that of a statement of fact. (Barthes and Lavers, 1993: p.143) 
In the Lab, tablet computers are a paper replacement technology. That is a statement 
of fact. The myth of technology works to remove the ambiguity, the problems, the 
questions and the debate from the way that tablet computers are understood. Ultimately, 
the myth helps users to clearly define exactly what a tablet computer is.  
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Chapter 5. Management of Failure: Getting tablets to work in a 
chemistry department 
 
“I’ve already got a real inkling that this is going to be… The way 
forward” (Nathan, research participant) 
 
Description of Fieldwork 
Between August 2013 and February 2014, I conducted ethnographic research in a lab 
with two members of the chemistry department at a university in the South of England. 
Tom is a Teaching Fellow and Nathan is a technician. The research involved regular visits 
to the lab for observations and informal discussions, seven extended interviews and the 
exchange of around 50 emails. Tom, Nathan and the technical services manager Ursula, 
Nathan’s line manager, each responded individually to an email I had sent to all science 
departments at the university to find participants who used tablets or apps in the 
laboratory. They each emailed me to say that Tom and Nathan were intending to begin 
using tablets in the laboratory but had not yet bought any. I met Tom and Nathan two 
weeks after this initial email exchange, by which time they had bought a 16GB Wi-Fi iPad 
Mini each.  
In this chapter, I consider how Tom and Nathan engage with and make use of the 
affordance ambiguity of the tablet. Reflecting on the ethnography, a key theme that 
emerged was the idea that Tom and Nathan were managing the tablet’s failure. I use the 
management of failure as a paradigm with which to analyse the way that Tom and Nathan 
deal with affordance ambiguity. Their use of affordance ambiguity was most clearly 
expressed at moments that I observed to be failures but that Tom and Nathan never 
treated as such. Over the six month period of investigation, Tom and Nathan searched for 
149 
and tested various different apps and tried to adopt tablets in various ways in the lab. 
Throughout these six months, Tom and Nathan’s aim was to find ways to use tablets in the 
lab. At the outset, they did not have a clear or specific idea of what they wanted to use 
tablets for. They simply had a strong desire to use tablets in the lab somehow. At the time 
of our final meeting, Tom and Nathan had not found a way to implement tablets in the lab. 
As an observer, I would have considered their attempts to have failed (although I will 
expand on my use of this word shortly), but Tom and Nathan’s attitude was unchanged. 
Throughout, they remained keen and enthusiastic to find ways to use tablets in the lab, 
despite never in six months finding any application that they found to be definitively 
useful.  
Tom and Nathan suspend failure: I trace their attempts to use tablets over the course of 
six months, showing that whenever the tablets do not fulfil a desired or expected function, 
Tom and Nathan simply ‘move on’. The failure of the tablets is never conceived as such 
because the definition of the tablet – what it is for – is fluid. This differs from my analysis 
of perfection in the previous chapter regarding the Lab. In that case, the tactical redrawing 
of the boundaries of the object allowed users to construct the tablet as a perfect, infallible 
object. In the case of Tom and Nathan, the management of failure took a different form. 
Failure was never accounted for, it was simply avoided. When the tablets did not work in 
the way Tom and Nathan had expected, they did not discuss or explain it because they had 
already moved on to try using tablets in another way. Failure was neither denied nor 
accepted, it was suspended. The constant redefinition of the object meant that success and 
failure, understood as static or stable judgements about the object, did not apply. This was 
the clearest way in which affordance ambiguity was manifested in Tom and Nathan’s use of 
the tablet.  
Tom and Nathan’s changing definitions of the tablet are presented by tracing their 
ideas and expectations about what the tablet could or should do. Although at any given 
150 
time, Tom and Nathan discussed the tablet as having a singular function, taken over six 
months the tablet was seen as an object with many possible uses. I account for this 
complexity by presenting a series of vignettes representing key themes of the definition of 
tablets expressed by Tom and Nathan. Tom and Nathan made use of the affordance 
ambiguity of tablets by cycling through several definitions. By engaging in an excessive, 
slipping definition of the tablet, they expressed their subjectivities as good scientists with a 
‘researcher attitude’ and capable, expert testers of technoscientific objects. The tablets 
acted as affiliative objects (Suchman, 2005), with the definition of the tablet entailing a 
definition of a given group of users. Tom and Nathan’s use of tablets did not only express 
their own subjectivities as scientists, it invoked their colleagues as a potential network of 
users who would all benefit if everybody adopted tablets.  
The methodological approach in this chapter entails analysing the participants’ 
management of failure. The management of failure consists of the participants’ efforts to 
make the technological object work. When the object is not used in the way that 
participants have stated they wish it to, I consider this to be a failure. Failure may well not 
be recognised as such by the participant at the time. To give a concrete example; Tom and 
Nathan began intending to use the tablet as an inventory management tool, but its 
perceived role changed several times. Tom and Nathan never felt they had failed to use the 
tablet as an inventory management tool, nor that the tablet had failed. As a researcher 
observing their practices and conducting interviews, however, I identified this changing 
definition of the tablet as a failure. The term is not pejorative and is intended only to reflect 
the fact that the idea of the tablet changes over time. This approach runs the risk of framing 
the participants as dupes and the researcher as an objective expert. This is not the 
intention. Analysing the management of failure over time takes the analysis away from 
stable definitions and fixed assessments of the use of the technology, towards an 
understanding of the emergent, active definition of the material object. This is the type of 
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understanding discussed with reference to Barad (Barad, 2003) in chapter three on 
scientific instruments. The aim of tracing the management of failure is to trace the user’s 
active construction of the object. The focus on failure is beneficial because it allows 
analysis of emergent uses of tablets without falling into a discussion of single emergent uses 
of tablets as instantaneous, novel, and ephemeral. Linked to the conjunctural analysis 
approach, analysing the management of failure is a way of examining specific emergent 
uses of tablets whilst maintaining connections between different uses over time. I also 
consider how this analysis links with the concept of closure (Bijker et al., 1987b, Wynne, 
1988).  
In a final section, I use the material presented in this chapter to develop and clarify the 
concept of the tablet imaginary. My account of Tom and Nathan’s adoption of tablets in 
the lab aims to demonstrate their reliance on an imagined future in which tablets are useful 
in given ways. The practices that they adopt based on their faith in this imagined future in 
some sense create the future that they envisage. This is the essence of the tablet imaginary – 
a set of ideas that is formative of and formed by specific uses of tablets in context. By using 
the concept of the tablet imaginary, I aim to account not only for the meanings and ideas 
associated with tablets ‘imposed’ on Tom and Nathan by the economic order, popular 
culture and other factors (including my own presence and involvement in their project), but 
also for the meanings and ideas that they contribute and develop through their uses and 
experience of tablets.  
I argue firstly that Tom and Nathan’s use of tablets engages with a pre-conceived idea 
of an imminent technological future, and secondly that the use of tablets then actualises 
certain aspects of this imagined future. The phrase ‘tablet imaginary’ is used to capture 
both the usage of tablets in the present and the technological culture that this present usage 
develops. The tablet imaginary is both the idea of an imminent technological future that led 
Tom and Nathan to start using tablets, and the outcome of using tablets in this way.  
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Emergent Definitions of the Tablet 
I always met Tom and Nathan together: they were working as a pair, having both 
bought tablets together at the same time. Tom and Nathan had a close working 
relationship and clearly got on well with each other, sharing jokes and asking about each 
other’s personal life at various times during interviews. They had set out to trial tablets 
together in the lab and they clearly felt that it was a joint endeavour. On occasions when 
one had to cancel or rearrange a meeting, the other always postponed too; they evidently 
wanted to meet me together as they felt that they were engaged in a joint project.  
They shared an idea that using the tablet computer would change their laboratory 
practices and be beneficial in a mostly unspecified way. Throughout the interviews, the 
tablet imaginary can be traced through their references to capabilities or potential uses of 
tablets. It was striking that they did not have a clear idea of what tablets would specifically 
do. They did not have a specific task or function in mind that they envisaged tablets 
fulfilling. Their decision to buy tablets was based on a desire simply to use tablets. Not to 
use tablets for something in particular. Their motivation for using tablets was based on a set 
of ideas about what effect using tablets might have; the tablet imaginary. The tablet 
imaginary was never stated explicitly or succinctly by Tom and Nathan, instead it was 
something identified in their responses throughout the six months of interviews and email 
exchanges. The first part of this chapter presents their responses and builds up a picture of 
the tablet imaginary expressed by Tom and Nathan. To flesh out the concept of the tablet 
imaginary, I present comments from Tom and Nathan that refer to the intended, hoped or 
imagined idea of what using tablets would or could bring about in the lab. The main 
elements of the tablet imaginary for Tom and Nathan are that tablets: will save money; 
allow for more efficient and productive working practices; are a gateway to a mass of free 
material and apps; will change other people’s practices; succeed best when used by 
everybody; are inevitably soon to become extremely important in laboratories and 
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universities generally; should be easy to use with little barriers to adoption; are futuristic; 
and become indispensable once adopted. Each theme is addressed individually, using the 
management of failure paradigm to build up a picture of the fluid definition of the tablet. I 
consider this through two key framing concepts: the affordance ambiguity of the material 
object, and the subject position of Tom and Nathan as scientists and therefore expert users 
of technoscientific objects. Taken together, the vignettes presented here also illustrate the 
tablet imaginary as it operated for Tom and Nathan. The definition of the tablet in each 
case was based on an element of the tablet imaginary; advertising, software elements, the 
app store, recommendations from colleagues, comments made by the other participants or 
me the researcher, and countless other influences that form the tablet imaginary. I do not 
address every key concept – tablet imaginary, affordance ambiguity, subjectivity of Tom 
and Nathan as expert users, the emergent definition of the tablet – in my discussion of 
every theme. To avoid repetition, I focus on some of the key concepts when addressing 
each theme. Taken as a whole, the findings presented here should develop and explain 
these key themes.  
Saving Money 
Tom did have one clear idea of a change in lab practices that he wanted to occur. 
Early in the first interview, Tom stated that he wished to use software to manage the lab’s 
inventory: 
Back home we’ve got a restaurant and we’ve got something called Macros. It’s a 
software. So basically on Macros it tells you exactly what is the stock and where 
the stock is. So that’s the one thing I wanted to have somewhere for the lab. 
Because we are spread in so many different areas, say if you want something like 
Sodium Chloride you need to run around ten thousand miles just to find it, 
whereas if you just had something like Macros, it just say ‘oh you’ve got two 
grams there and five grams there’. You know and then, also when you are 
ordering stuff if you already know you’ve got a few bits spread around you can 
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combine them to know ‘oh I actually don’t need to buy anything’. That saves 
money. 
Tom did have a clear idea of a change in lab practices that he wanted to bring about; 
financial savings through inventory management. What was absent from this was any 
connection with tablet computers. Tom already knew of a PC app ‘Macros’ that did the job 
he wanted. This type of inventory management was something that Tom wanted to use in 
the lab and Tom recognised that the adoption of tablet computers might allow him to 
introduce it. But he did not have any clear idea of how tablets would make this change 
occur. He simply connected the arrival of a new technological device with the arrival of 
new practices. The idea that using tablets would help to save money was also expressed by 
Nathan, who had an idea to manage apparatus as well as inventory: 
I’ve got somewhere boxes and boxes of certain bits of apparatus. Now if no one 
else is aware of that, they’re going to go out and buy them. Now if I’ve got them 
sitting there and I don’t use them, it’s sensible that someone has access to that. So 
there is a monetary gain there. 
Nathan’s idea to save money by maximising access to apparatus came about in 
response to Tom’s desire for inventory management. It was not something that he had 
considered before buying the tablets and meeting with Tom and I to discuss using tablets 
in the lab. It should be noted that during the six months of these interviews, Tom and 
Nathan discussed as well as trialled several different lab-specific inventory management 
apps (such as Quartzy, LabGuru) that did exactly what Tom wanted, but Tom never used 
them beyond trialling.  
In this case, analysing the management of failure shows how the mismatch between 
intention and result was never taken to be a failure. The fact that Tom and Nathan did not 
use the tablets to manage the inventory or apparatus was never conceived of as a failure 
because it was never conclusively tested. Rather than treating the use of tablets for 
inventory management as an experiment with a clear result (i.e. the tablet can be used for 
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inventory management; this particular app is the best one to use etc.), Tom and Nathan 
circuited through inconclusive and seemingly endless trialling. In one sense this could be 
explained as a form of ‘experimenter’s regress’ where “it is hard for a test to have an 
unambiguous outcome because one can never be sure whether the test has been properly 
conducted until one knows what the correct outcome ought to be” (Collins and Pinch, 
2014: p.3). The tablets were an unknown quantity and indeed this may help to explain why 
Tom and Nathan engaged in the perpetual beta, constantly trialling more apps for the same 
job. Yet a more convincing explanation lies in the idea of the tablet’s affordance ambiguity 
and its emergent definition. Rather than a failure on Tom and Nathan’s part to use the 
tablets or a lack of suitable and effective apps, the affordance ambiguity of the tablet meant 
that Tom and Nathan were never sure what it was for. This led to a compulsion to always 
find another thing to do with the tablet. Each successive trial of the tablet – as inventory 
management, as source of free material, as signifier of progress and so on – was conducted 
on the basis of a test of what the tablet could be. The combination of the expansive tablet 
imaginary and the affordance ambiguity of the tablet as a material object led to Tom and 
Nathan being able to experiment indefinitely with the definition of the object and, in turn, 
their own subject positions. At one moment they could cast themselves as scientists using 
tablets to save money, at another moment as scientists conducting research efficiently, at 
another as influential members of a faculty in which more and more people were adopting 
tablets as well.  
Desire for Efficiency 
Nathan also foresaw a gain in efficiency by using tablets to have information ‘to hand’ 
when he needed it: 
If I bump into people and meet people and say you know ‘we want to meet at two 
o’clock on Thursday is that OK’, whereas normally I’d have to say to people ‘well 
you’ll have to come back to my store room and I can find out’. But if I had all the 
information there I could actually do it and book it there and then. So it’s more 
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efficient, this is it. The other person can go on their way and I can go back and 
carry on what I was doing as well. Once you get used to the system, you’re being 
more productive in some respects.  
Nathan’s idea of efficiency is based on changing the temporality of everyday 
encounters with colleagues, which links to the idea of ‘ incorporation’ of technologies as 
discussed by Silverstone, Hirsch and Morley (Silverstone et al., 1992) in the context of 
domestication.  
Efficiency, monetary savings and reduction of waste were all articulated by Nathan 
when discussing ‘going paperless’: 
I mean one thing I aim to do, one thing that I was interested in getting a tablet for 
here was, go paperless. Get rid of it. I hate it. It’s clutter everywhere. You receive 
it, you put it in the bin, or you scan it. […]And we had a grumble back yesterday 
from one of our administrators that we were using far too much photocopying 
and colour photocopying as well. Well I thought, why are we using paper at all? 
Tom identified one particular change in his working practice since starting to use the 
tablet that he felt was particularly efficient: 
Coming on the train it has been quite useful, because all your emails are 
downloaded, even though it doesn’t have Wi-Fi access, all the emails are 
downloaded on it. So you can write all of them and save them as drafts. So the 
moment you come on campus, all of them get sent. So it does save you time. 
Instead of sitting on the train for 10 minutes, 20 minutes, waiting for the journey 
to finish.  
Tom expresses the sense of regaining lost time, expressed by ICT industry 
commentators as the Lazarus principle: the idea that “previously dead time can be revived 
and given back to individuals through mobile ICTs” (Bassett, 2009: p.50). Tom’s train 
journey was transformed from “Just sitting there and watching cows” to “now going 
through the emails”. Of course, this particular instance of increased efficiency is not 
manifested in the lab, it extends the space and time of the workplace, reinforcing the 
tablet’s involvement in Tom’s developing sense of personal productivity. The affordance 
ambiguity of the tablets allowed Tom and Nathan to easily move on from considering the 
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tablets as devices that could be used for inventory management to devices that could 
achieve efficiency in their working practices more generally. This displacement meant that 
the specificity of inventory management was forgotten as Tom and Nathan moved on to 
new applications. But ‘moving on’ did not involve a consideration of the tablet’s efficacy as 
an inventory management device – inventory management was simply suspended. The 
tablet was just not an inventory management device any more. Neither success nor failure 
apply in this context, as the inexhaustible affordances of the tablet meant that its limits 
were never tested.  
Two things are happening simultaneously here in the definition of the tablet. Firstly, 
the tablet is experienced in an emergent relationship between user and device. In that 
atemporal emergent ‘moment’, the tablet’s affordance ambiguity leads to a surplus of 
possible uses such that it is never clear what the tablet is for, and thus the tablet can neither 
fail nor succeed. Secondly, this emergent relationship means that each individual use of the 
tablet stands alone and cannot be judged against a previous or subsequent use. When Tom 
and Nathan began discussing the tablet as a device that improved efficiency, it was striking 
that this was never mentioned in the context of its success or failure as an inventory 
management device. It was as though a totally new object was being discussed.  
These two ideas that are based on the emergent definition of the tablet and its 
affordance ambiguity are an underlying theme throughout this chapter. Each new use or 
definition of the tablet was discussed by Tom and Nathan in complete isolation, as though 
discussing a thoroughly new object. The fact that each of them were carrying a physically 
identical object to work each day did not lend a sense of continuity to their treatment of 
the tablet. 
In the following sections, the presentation of each theme should be treated as another 
instance of the definition of the tablet (and its user) being radically changed by Tom and 
Nathan, with previous definitions suspended – in effect, ignored. Each section should 
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therefore add some concrete examples to the abstract ideas presented in this regard thus 
far.  
Gateway to free material and apps 
A related but distinct aspect of Tom and Nathan’s tablet imaginary was the idea that 
tablets were a gateway to unlimited free material and free apps. Even the inventory 
management apps that both Nathan and Tom had identified as potentially saving time and 
money were rejected if the app cost money or if there was a subscription cost for the 
inventory management service. In addition, Tom was keen to find, and find a use for, free 
material such as free ebooks of chemistry reference guides or public material from iTunesU 
chemistry courses. The search for free material was representative of their adoption of 
tablets more generally. Rather than identifying a problem or requirement and trying to find 
a way to resolve or fill it, they first found apps and resources and then tried to identify 
problems or requirements to apply them to. After describing a chemistry ebook that Tom 
had found on the iBook store, Nathan commented that they would need to decide what 
parts of the ebook they could use in the lab: “So again these are some of the things we 
need to extract and see what usefulness we can get out of it.” The context of the discussion 
made it clear that Tom had not been intending to find specific course material, but had 
encountered this ebook by chance. There was nothing in their current course that was 
lacking or that they wanted to change, but they responded to the availability of new 
material by trying to find a way to make it fit.  
Again it was striking when Tom began focusing on the tablet as a device that allowed 
access to free material that he made no mention of his previous idea that they could save 
money by subscribing to – and paying for if necessary – an inventory management app. 
Using the tablets to find free material was not conducted on the basis that this was much 
better than paying for apps as had previously been discussed. There was no comparison 
between previous conceptions of the tablet and the present one. The tablet at that stage 
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was nothing more and nothing less than a device that could be used to access free material. 
The idea that Tom would have to ‘see what usefulness we can get out of it’ when he found 
free material is indicative of the changing definition of the tablet. Again, there was no 
definitive sense of success or failure, either in the current definition of tablets as gateways 
to free material or in comparison to previous definitions.  
Will change others’ practices 
Although it was not stated explicitly, another aim of Tom and Nathan’s iPad trial was 
to involve others within the department. The sense that they wanted other department 
members to adopt iPads too developed gradually throughout the ethnography. At one stage 
in the penultimate interview they began counting the staff who use iPads, with Tom noting 
that of 16 chemistry faculty members, tablets are used by “five of us, that’s more than 
25%”. Tom and Nathan were also both pleased and faintly amused to see that their (in 
their characterisation) infamously luddite colleague Gloria bought an iPad of her own: 
Tom: But the thing is, she’s very reluctant to change anything. And she’s actually 
using a tablet now.  
Nathan: Yes so that’s good and I think that’s been brought on by the fact that 
Tom and I have got one.  
Tom: That we were using them.  
Nathan: So I think it’s sort of rubbing off in a way. And people see how useful 
they are I think quite honestly.  
In these statements the subject positions of Tom and Nathan are stated and 
reaffirmed against that of Gloria. At stake here is more than Gloria’s willingness or ability 
to use a tablet computer: her subjectivity is brought to account by Tom when he states that 
she is ‘very reluctant to change anything’. The enactment of relations of power here falls 
along the lines of gender, with Tom and Nathan speaking on behalf of Gloria. In this type 
of discussion, Tom and Nathan’s own positions are reinforced twofold. As well as being 
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expert testers who have the ability and knowledge to use the tablets, they are also 
innovators whose efforts allow others to engage with the technology. I did not regard their 
comments here as self-aggrandising, but it is clear to see that they are using their adoption 
of the tablet to position themselves as gatekeepers whose work and expertise allows 
colleagues, specifically non-expert technology users, to adopt the promising new 
technology.  
Here, the tablet does not have an easily-identifiable function in the tool-like sense 
discussed in previous sections. It’s a device used in the explicit statement of aptitudes and 
expertise that is part of the way that Tom and Nathan express their subject positions. The 
management of failure can still be analysed here. By bringing in colleagues to the network 
of users under consideration, Tom and Nathan allow for success and failure to be 
measured in terms of individual uses of the tablet. The management of failure here sees 
failure inscribed as inability to use the tablet, a subject position that is assigned to Gloria. Note 
the tablet is not under question here: it is the user who succeeds or fails. In fact, the 
implication of Tom and Nathan’s discussion is that Gloria is actually competent in using 
the tablet; she needed only to be encouraged and helped along by expert users. This is 
another case of failure of the tablet being suspended. If Gloria had never adopted a tablet, 
it would have been her failure or unwillingness to adopt, rather than a problem with the 
tablet.  
Requires others to adopt 
This section deals more closely with the materiality of the tablet and how its design 
and structure invokes certain types of uses. More than simply drawing on affordances that 
enable and encourage Tom and Nathan to use the tablet in particular ways, Tom and 
Nathan’s use of the tablet involved building a network of other users. Part of the desire to 
share was based on a recognition that the particular way in which tablets work depends on 
a lot of information being shared: “I can see it being very, very useful, but it depends if 
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people are up for it” (Nathan), “the more contacts you’ve got, the more useful it becomes, 
yes? Because you can send what you’ve just written to the person, or share it with people” 
(Tom), “by choosing your device well, you can have things, like these apps there, and create 
additional information which will be useful which you can actually share and communicate 
between each other” (Tom);  
So if there was a sort of inventory that we shared, or she created one and I created 
one, we could both look for things on that inventory. We’re already talking about 
things like that. I’ve got a chemical store out there as well. That inventory could 
be shared with the rest of the academia in chemistry as well. (Nathan) 
Describing these advantages as ‘network effects’, Jarrett argues that “the value of 
information, and the network within which it is transmitted, actually increases through 
widespread use” (Jarrett, 2003: p.339). The awareness that tablets and apps often operate 
based on a logic of the benefits of sharing is one concrete explanation for Tom and 
Nathan’s desire to have others use the technology. Yet they both said that they were not at 
all evangelical about tablets and believed the reason that their colleagues were also 
beginning to adopt tablets was because they could see how useful they were. When asked 
whether he was evangelical and promoted the tablet, Tom responded: “I don’t really say it’s 
useful but when I use it then people kind of see how easy and useful it is.” Talking about 
using his iPad in meetings, which he commented is acceptable unlike using a mobile phone, 
Nathan stated that: “The iPad’s kind of acceptable and people will actually look. And I 
think that they might actually be encouraged as well to a certain extent”. The physical 
presence of the tablet in the meeting is important here, but so too is the flashiness and 
impressiveness of the tablet. This resonates with Silverstone, Hirsh and Morley’s account 
of ‘objectification’ of objects: “physical artifacts, in their arrangement and display, as well as 
in their construction and in the creation of the environment for their display, provide an 
objectification of the values, the aesthetic and the cognitive universe, of those who feel 
comfortable or identify with with” (Silverstone et al., 1992: p.23). Tom’s phrase “people will 
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actually look” indicates that the tablet’s visual impact is key to the way that it encourages 
others to adopt. Bassett (2009) describes how the posture of somebody using a mobile 
device communicates their activity, which affects others’ experience of the space in which 
the activity is taking place. Reflecting on these points, I recall how Tom and Nathan had 
the same red protective case for their tablet and would often stand the tablet in the most 
upright position possible. Whether intentionally or not, this had the effect of showing off 
the device, making sure that it would be seen. For Tom, the tablet is performing its 
usefulness just by being present: the imaginary of the tablet as a useful lab object is enacted 
by Tom simply by his using it.  
The tablet’s mere presence could be regarded as convincing or impressive because the 
tablet imaginary is content-ambivalent, meaning there is no objective measure of success or 
failure: and mere use of tablets therefore indicates success (a point developed further in the 
conclusion to this chapter). The measure of success is that tablets are being used at all, not 
that they are being used successfully for a particular task. This idea is found in Nathan and 
Tom’s belief that colleagues are adopting tablets based on observing Tom and Nathan 
using them. With Tom and Nathan using the tablets in the lab every day, the appearance 
was that tablets were useful. This is despite the fact that the tablets were often present 
without being used, or were being used simply in order to try to find ways in which they 
would be useful. In this way, Tom and Nathan’s use of tablets perpetuates the tablet 
imaginary. On this basis, colleagues such as Gloria bought tablets of their own, convinced 
by Tom and Nathan’s apparent successful adoption of tablets to engage with the tablet 
imaginary themselves. This point will be clarified in the following section which discusses 
the perceived inevitability of change.  
The idea that using tablets requires others to adopt is another way in which Tom and 
Nathan’s use of tablets resembles Balsamo’s discussion of innovation, reinforcing the 
strength of this paradigm as a way of thinking about users as innovators or productive 
163 
consumption. Balsamo (2011: pp.9-10) outlines how the “creation of new technologies 
requires the involvement of many people who contribute distinct forms of labour” 
including various functions: “coordination, facilitation, acquisition, maintenance, allocation, 
recruitment, and dispersion”. Balsamo argues that these are all articulatory practices: 
“processes whereby the activities of individuals are organized as part of a collective effort 
identified as ‘innovation’” (2011: p.9). Of interest in Tom and Nathan’s case is the way that 
this same articulation work occurred despite it being a casual implementation. Tom and 
Nathan were not explicitly involved (and did not consider themselves to be involved) in an 
innovative process requiring this articulatory work and the engagement of other users to 
create a network. Their understanding was more simply that they believed tablets would be 
useful in the various ways discussed throughout this chapter. Unlike the innovators in 
Balsamo’s case study, Tom and Nathan were not consciously trying to create a network 
with a common goal.  
Rather than objects of innovation and work for a specified group, tablets are better 
understood in this context as ‘affiliative objects’. Suchman (2005) discusses “the afﬁliative 
powers of objects”, how different people can enact different subject positions in relation to 
any given object. When several people position themselves as affiliated to the same object 
(or disassociate themselves from that object), each affiliation enacts a particular definition 
of the object and the subject. One implication of this is that objects must be thought of not 
as innocent, “but fraught with signiﬁcance for the relations that they materialize” (2005: 
p.379). Tablets exhibited significant affiliative powers, bringing about various relationships 
and acting in the development and maintenance of individual subject positions. The 
concept of the affiliative object goes beyond thinking of objects as either instruments or 
commodities (echoing Knorr-Cetina (1997) discussed earlier) and accounts both for the 
materiality of the object and the context in which it is used. The recursive nature of the 
tablet imaginary becomes clearer here. The tablet is regarded as an object that benefits 
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from being sited within a network of users. Constructing the tablet in this way creates that 
network of users. Tom and Nathan’s practices draw on Jordan’s conception of imaginaries, 
which “bond people into communities and, simultaneously, drive them to try to realise 
their fantasies” (1999: p.207). This recursive process is central to my discussion of the 
tablet imaginary as being formative of and formed by specific uses of tablets.  
Star and Ruhleder (1994) term the advantages gained from increasing the number of 
people in the network ‘positive network externalities’. They note that these same 
externalities can be negative depending on the user in question. If the network becomes 
hegemonic, then its positive externalities become a significant disadvantage to those who 
do not participate, whether by choice or otherwise.  
Externalities may be negative in that eventually, not being “hooked up” may make 
it impossible to participate effectively within a given community of work or 
discourse. For instance, the telephone network became a negative externality for 
those businesses without telephones sometime in the early 20th century. (Star and 
Ruhleder, 1994: pp.259-260) 
Tom and Nathan treated tablets as beneficial if adopted by others and also as 
benefiting from others adopting. This definition performed the further work of affiliating 
their colleagues as part of a potential network of users who would all benefit if they all 
adopted. Non-adoption in this scenario is not an innocent or neutral position: it is 
constructed as an active barrier to what Tom and Nathan define as a mutually beneficial 
process.  
Inevitability of change 
A further aspect of the tablet imaginary was the idea that tablets were inevitably going 
to become important, perhaps essential, devices in laboratories and universities in general 
in the near future. This manifested in an unwavering belief in the tablets that was also 
found in the case study of the Lab. In both cases, the tablet imaginary includes the idea that 
just using tablets will change and improve working practices. Where in the Lab I 
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characterised this in terms of ‘perfection’, stating that tablets were perceived as perfect by 
users in that case, for Tom and Nathan this faith takes a different appearance. The 
infallibility of the tablet for Tom and Nathan is defined by the idea that the tablet has 
something extra to offer them and that they need only find the appropriate apps and 
material using the tablet to benefit from this potential. In other words, the suspension of 
failure is key for Tom and Nathan, while perfection in the Lab involved the denial of failure.  
The main practical difference between the Lab and Tom and Nathan’s experience is 
the level of institutional support or backing. In the Lab, there was a level of institutional 
and personal investment that contributed to, or perhaps ensured, the success of the 
paperless lab project. The context in the Lab meant that the tablets could not be allowed to 
fail, leading to a perpetual splitting of the object along the lines of what it could potentially 
and actually do, with the consequence that tablets remained perfect in the Lab. Tom and 
Nathan’s situation was very different. Nathan’s line manager did initially contact me about 
the possibility of Tom and Nathan using tablets, indicating managerial support. They 
bought an iPad Mini each with the chemistry department’s budget, yet at the start of the 
second interview, Tom told me that further purchases were not to be supported by the 
managerial hierarchy: “Yes so we managed to, these were the only two that we managed to 
buy.” The department financed the purchase of Tom and Nathan’s iPad minis with some 
reluctance and would not provide iPads for other staff members nor money for apps. The 
institutional support in this case was minimal and did not manifest in any pressure or 
imperative for the use of iPads to be successful.  
The apparent failure to adopt the iPads in the expected manner, combined with the 
lack of institutional support, could have led to Tom and Nathan losing interest and losing 
faith in the technology. Yet this did not happen; they kept their faith in the iPads and 
continued to look for ways to use them in the lab, never becoming discouraged. This 
develops the findings in the previous case study of the Lab, in which institutional support 
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and pressure was a key factor in the success of the Samsung Galaxy tablets. The case of 
Tom and Nathan shows that institutional support is not required for continued faith in 
tablets. The key factor in Tom and Nathan’s adoption of tablets apparently against the 
odds is their belief in the tablet imaginary, which includes the belief in the inevitability of 
change.  
Tom and Nathan wanted to use tablets in order to participate in this imaginary in 
which tablets are part of an imminent technological future. They felt that the coming 
importance of tablets was inevitable and that they would benefit by being part of a first 
wave of users to usher-in the technology, rather than being left behind: “I’ve sensed for a 
while now that we need to move on”, “students, I think, they will just turn up with stuff 
like this in the future. And expect the university to provide all their stuff in electronic 
form”, “I guess give it three or four years and laptops will be… this will take over, [tablets] 
definitely, will take over”, “But you know I see the way and the future of this coming”, 
“they’re going to have a huge influence, you can see this already”. The perceived 
inevitability of tablets being central to laboratory work and university life is clear in these 
statements. This inevitability is the central tenet of the tablet imaginary and the idea that 
encouraged Tom and Nathan to keep the faith and continue using and trying to adopt 
tablets in the lab. It is important to note that this inevitability lacks content and is not 
dependent on particular functions working well or becoming popular. The affordance 
ambiguity of the tablet meant that the perceived inevitability was similarly ambiguous. The 
inevitability is that tablets will be important; the sentiment is that everybody will be using 
tablets. The sentiment is content-ambivalent, it is not ‘everybody will be using tablets for…’ 
The content-ambivalent nature of this imaginary allows no judgement or evaluation. 
Without a specific role, task or function defined for tablets, the only measure of successful 
adoption is mere adoption itself. This is reflected in Tom and Nathan’s satisfaction merely 
with using tablets in the lab, even simply with tablets being present in the lab. They were 
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never aiming to use tablets for a particular task, only to use tablets. Equally, this gave their 
colleagues the impression that the tablets were useful, despite it being difficult to give a 
concrete example of their utility.  
Tablets are particularly suited to supporting this content-ambivalent idea of 
inevitability because of their affordance ambiguity. This is not to say that the imaginary has 
no content. There is of course content to the imaginary – throughout this chapter I have 
described the content of the tablet imaginary as it is expressed by Tom and Nathan – but 
the content is not fixed, the imaginary is fluid and can take on different forms and support 
many different ideas. In the final sections of this chapter I will develop my analysis of this 
point, arguing that the tablet imaginary is both a formative logic that influences the use of 
tablets and at the same time is formed in the process of using tablets. Before developing 
these ideas more generally, I must finish outlining the themes of the tablet imaginary as 
observed throughout the case study.  
Barrier to adoption 
One aspect of the tablet imaginary that was present before the adoption of tablets and 
then clearly changed with their adoption was the idea that tablets would be easy to use 
immediately. The difference between the imaginary and Tom and Nathan’s actual 
experience is significant here. The ethnography shows that Tom and Nathan both found 
that their desire to use tablets in the lab was often unmatched by a willingness to try out 
new applications or practices. As an example, we can return to the two specific tasks that 
Tom and Nathan eventually came to want to use tablets for: Tom wanted an inventory 
management system and Nathan wanted an apparatus management system. They did not 
have a specific idea of how to use tablets for either purpose. In fact, there are several apps 
that do exactly this, including some apps that other research participants had told me about 
in other interviews. Over the course of the six month ethnography, we discussed the apps 
that I was aware of as well as finding several different apps or methods to achieve these 
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two requirements. For Tom’s inventory management, we discussed using laboratory-
specific apps that are specifically designed to manage a lab’s inventory in exactly the way 
that Tom had outlined. Two apps were discussed in detail: LabGuru and Quartzy. 
LabGuru promises to allow users to:  
 “Manage your materials collections, inventory, and storage 
Save time and money on ordering 
Schedule and maintain shared lab equipment”26 
Although this app promises to fulfil the required task, Tom and Nathan were reluctant 
to use any app that required a subscription. A subscription to LabGuru would cost $10 per 
person per month. An alternative app that was discussed in more detail was Quartzy. Its 
equipment sign-up function, which schedules usage of shared apparatus, promises to 
“Minimize conflicts and maximize productivity”27. It also includes an inventory 
management system and its main claim is: “Quartzy helps you run your lab more 
efficiently, allowing you to stretch every dollar as far as it can go”28. These functions match 
perfectly with Tom and Nathan’s requirements. Furthermore, Quartzy is a free service:  
“Quartzy is completely free, and always will be. Leading life-science vendors pay 
us to host their catalogs and make their products accessible to the tens of 
thousands of labs on Quartzy.”29 
Throughout the ethnography, Tom and Nathan repeatedly stated that they wanted to 
start using specific lab apps such as Quartzy, but that something was stopping them. The 
primary cause of their failure or inability to use these lab apps was the barrier of changing 
habits. They both mentioned ‘habits’ repeatedly:  
                                                 
26 LabGuru website http://www.labguru.com/features/lab-logistics/orders-and-inventory [Accessed 1st May 
2014]. 
27 Quartzy website https://www.quartzy.com/tour/equipment-sign-up [Accessed 1st May 2014]. 
28 Quartzy website https://www.quartzy.com/tour [Accessed 1st May 2014]. 
29 Quartzy website https://www.quartzy.com/why-is-it-free [Accessed 1st May 2014]. 
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“So it’s a matter of getting into the habit and that is where I’ve stopped at the 
moment. I haven’t got into the habit” (Tom) 
“Again it’s getting into the habit of doing that and keeping things on there rather 
than writing down on bits of paper” (Tom) 
“Because you do have that big hurdle as we said of changing people’s habits as 
well. That’s the big big thing” (Nathan) 
“As far as the lab stuff goes, yes I was talking through it with Fred [a colleague] at 
lunchtime: it’s just so hard to get into new habits. Even though you see the 
advantage there, you can edit the material, you can correct it, you can date it. It’s 
just habit. It’s tough breaking the old habits” (Nathan) 
Tom and Nathan were consciously aware of this difficulty and mentioned it in every 
interview, yet it remained a problem and they never did manage to change their habits and 
start using Quartzy or an equivalent app or method. The reason that they gave for the 
continued failure to use the promising lab apps was that the apps required time and effort 
to ‘get used to’: “Once you come across a barrier you tend to drop it and go back to what 
you were doing before. That is the problem” (Tom). “Sometimes you try things and it 
just… When you reach an impasse and find that you can’t get around things, that doesn’t 
encourage you to carry on and use it, does it?” (Nathan).  
 Their comments reveal an ambivalence about who was to blame for this: themselves, 
for being lazy or not putting in enough time and effort to become familiar with the apps, or 
the apps, for not being attractive or simple enough to use without this period of learning. 
Nathan summed up this ambivalence:  
And I haven’t used any of the software that is on here. Any of the lab stuff or 
anything like that yet. So I don’t know if it’s I’ve yet to be convinced. Or whether 
it’s just my laziness generally. I don’t know. But there is stuff that I could do on 
there certainly. 
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Tom and Nathan both elaborated the idea that they were ‘yet to be convinced’ 
elsewhere and the balance of comments weighed in favour of the apps being to blame 
rather than themselves:  
“at the moment there’s nothing tempting me in to actually suddenly use to 
actually store data that I actually might record in a book or somewhere else at the 
moment. So something hasn’t drawn me in” (Nathan) 
“at the moment haven’t found anything that I like and love enough to actually 
alter my habit” (Tom) 
“the advantage has to be sometimes perhaps over-egged on these programs […] 
so you need something there to catch you sometimes. To actually draw your 
attention, to say ‘yes I think this is worth doing, yes I’m going to alter my habits’” 
(Nathan).  
Of interest here is the fact that Tom and Nathan bought tablets with the clear 
intention to change their working practices. Yet over the course of six months, despite 
finding promising apps that seemed to offer the exact functions they wished for, they did 
not actually change their habits.  
Again an analysis of the management of failure can help to explain these findings. The 
comments from Tom and Nathan in this regard are the clearest point at which failure was 
discussed. Earlier I described the suspension of failure in terms of a rapid cycling between 
definitions of the tablet. One minute an inventory management tool, the next a way to 
gather free material, Tom and Nathan moved from one conception of the tablet to another 
without ever exhausting its potential for a given task. Failure was suspended because it was 
structurally disavowed, never being taken into account. In the discussion of barriers to 
adoption, the suspension of failure takes on a different form. It is much more consciously 
considered and is characterised as an inability to change habits. Failure is suspended here in 
the explicit definition of the tablet as as-yet-untested for a specific use. This suspension of 
failure is more static than that described earlier, with a given definition of the tablet – for 
example as an inventory management tool – being designated as untested.  
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The idea of barriers to adoption is particularly instructive in understanding the 
development of the tablet imaginary. The imaginary that Tom and Nathan began by 
envisaging before they used tablets developed as they actually used the devices. Tom and 
Nathan were engaging with the tablet imaginary; a set of ideas about what tablets can and 
should do. In this particular case, the tablet imaginary included the idea that adopting 
tablets would automatically change their practices. Their comments about a barrier, or 
needing to be ‘tempted in’, or that tablets and apps were not immediately easy enough to 
use suggest that they believed tablets would and should be adopted with no effort. Whether 
the user or the tablet and its apps are to blame, the imaginary remains that the tablets 
would be simply adopted with the effect of changing and improving working practices. Part 
of the tablet imaginary for Tom and Nathan was the idea that tablets would be simply 
integrated into their existing practices. The imaginary developed as they actually used 
tablets, becoming the idea that tablets and apps must have clear benefits and be easy to use 
in order to overcome inherent barriers to adoption such as ease of use and promise of 
eventual benefit. This aspect of the imaginary was maintained by their belief that they had 
not yet found the ideal app suitable for their purposes. As such, they continued searching 
for ways to use tablets, rather than concluding that these barriers to adoption were an 
unavoidable or inherent part of using a new technology.  
Futuristic 
The final two themes were expressed throughout the ethnography and were addressed 
explicitly in Tom and Nathan’s responses to one question asked in the final interview: 
“what do tablets represent for you?” Nathan’s response was: “Modern I’d say”. Nathan 
argued that using tablets “could give red brick universities like us an edge. A real edge. And 
not only in the lab here but in other areas too”. Nathan believed that using tablet 
computers would give the university a sense of being an up-to-date, forward-looking 
institution, which would have significant benefits on, for example, student recruitment: 
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Because I think it looks good. It does. It looks good, it looks organised, it looks 
professional. And someone is going to flag it. Certainly at the registration desk, if 
the two people there have got something like that and they’re calling people on, it 
will be noticed. It will. […] You want the technology there, because it does 
actually give such a sort of a forward impression, a futuristic impression sort of 
thing. 
Nathan’s belief that the cultural capital of tablets could be instrumentalised by the 
university is clear, and is only made more significant by the fact that he and Tom had no 
specific reason to use tablets. The gain in cultural capital is not a beneficial side effect of 
adopting tablets for a specific reason; it is a primary reason itself. Interestingly, this gain in 
cultural capital would be most significant at the level of the University’s brand or public 
image. Tom and Nathan have nothing to gain directly themselves by this, other than the 
rather limited gain in cultural capital by association that would come from working for a 
‘futuristic’ university. This supports my argument that they are engaging with the tablet 
imaginary; they do not have a specific gain in mind, but are aiming to benefit from a 
general improvement and unspecified benefit by using tablets.  
Becomes indispensable 
Tom’s response to the question, ‘what do tablets represent to you?’, was as follows: 
It’s like a child to me. The more you see it, the more you get attached to it, and 
the more you cannot live without it. You know like, you keep doing things again. 
It’s just a Wi-Fi iPad. But sometimes I connect it to the iPhone for the internet 
just because I’m on the train or something. Whereas before I wasn’t even thinking 
of that. So like you know you keep going on and keep getting more and more 
dependent on it which is bad but good at the same time.  
Tom definitely entered into a relationship with the tablet that was more significant 
than that between a mere user and device. Describing the iPad as ‘like a child to me’, Tom 
also gave the iPad a name; “Because it’s got its own name, its own identity now because it’s 
Tommy, you know”. Tom would sometimes hold the iPad like a baby, in a self-mocking 
gesture that was humorous and allowed him to express the genuine relationship that he 
clearly felt. While Tom was being playful in giving the tablet a name, he was also genuine in 
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his comments that he was becoming dependent on the iPad. The idea that the tablet 
becomes indispensable to the user was acknowledged by Tom as being bad and good at the 
same time. The ‘good’ aspect of this dependency formed part of the tablet imaginary that 
Tom and Nathan envisaged before buying the iPads: they wanted to become dependent on 
the devices because they wanted the devices to be useful and transformative of their 
laboratory practices. The ‘bad’ aspect of this dependency was unexpected and developed 
through use. Tom’s example of tethering his iPad to his iPhone ‘just because he was on the 
train’ is indicative of the ‘bad’ aspect of this dependency. The tablet had crossed the 
boundary of being useful at work to being useful outside work. Tom and Nathan were 
both conscious about keeping the two separate. Nathan managed this separation by having 
an iPad for personal use at home and using the iPad Mini for work: “I’ve got a big iPad at 
home yes but I don’t use it for work. And I haven’t used any of the software that is on 
here. Any of the lab stuff or anything like that yet”. Although this strategy did allow 
Nathan to have two physically separate devices, he found that maintaining this separation 
was not so easy with devices that are designed to sync, as he discovered when his Kindle 
app automatically downloaded ebooks from his personal account to his university iPad 
Mini: 
I’ve got here at the moment The Great Book of Wonder by Lord Dunsany. Which is 
nothing to do with chemistry or anything like that. […] The other concern I think 
that we had from the management here was the fact that you’d use them as 
playthings or something like that. I mean I haven’t downloaded any games or 
anything like that on this. Yes, the other books did come, right. But I find that if I 
look at the books then I look at them on my tea breaks 
Tom expressed similar sentiments about using the iPad only for work purposes, 
stating that: 
But at the moment it’s been bought by [the University], I tend not to put my 
private life on it. I just leave it as work […] Like I wouldn’t even let is sync with 
my laptop at home because then all my photos and all my music will go on it and 
people will think I’m using university resources for my own stuff.  
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A certain amount of internalised discipline is evident here, with Tom and Nathan 
aware that they should not be using their devices for anything other than work. The 
slippage between work and non-work applications created by the way that apps such as 
Kindle would sync mirrored the slippage described by Tom when he discussed using the 
iPad on the train. Here, the technical logic of the devices, which wants to connect and sync 
at every opportunity, is expressed in the user experience, which finds the iPad as a locus 
that connects work and non-work activities. There is a sense here in which the affordance 
ambiguity of the tablet becomes unnerving for Tom. Finding that the tablet is useful for 
many things is advantageous and pleasing but at the same time disconcerting. Not knowing 
the object’s limits means that Tom does not know where to draw the line and stop using 
the tablet, stop trying to find new ways to adopt it, stop the permanent beta that is the 
main process of his casual adoption of the device.  
More than this, there was a sense from Tom’s characterisation of the tablet as ‘bad but 
good at the same time’ that the tablet made demands of the user. Its affordance ambiguity 
meant that the tablet was extremely limited – if not useless – without being subject to 
constant testing and trialling that Tom and Nathan engaged in. The permanent beta was 
not simply something that Tom and Nathan chose to do in order to develop their use of 
the tablet and achieve more complex tasks. It was fundamentally required in order for them 
to find out what the tablet was for. Against this reading an alternative process was also 
taking place. In defining and redefining the tablet, Tom and Nathan expressed their 
subjectivities as scientists and expert testers. The mutual constitution of subject and object 
enacted through the emergent construction of the tablet was not something that happened 
to Tom and Nathan. It was a process that they embodied and took control over. The fact 
that they were able to do so results from the specific situation in which they worked. The 
comparison with the hierarchical top-down insistence on a certain definition of the tablet 
in the Lab is stark.  
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In a trick of the discursive construction of the object, the tablet requires and demands 
ever-more definition. As an ambiguous technological object, the tablet initially requires 
some articulation. Of course much of this articulation is achieved in marketing and cultural 
discourses that initially frame the object for Tom and Nathan. In contrast to Gibson’s 
affordances that are repeatable and dependable, the tablet’s ambiguous affordances offer 
no stability. Each use of the tablet can be radically new. Indeed, this is echoed in the 
phenomenological experience of using an app-based device, in which each app ‘takes over’ 
the entire device in a totalising way, filling the screen and denying other functionalities any 
expression, with each app subsequently opened doing the same. Again, the experimenter’s 
regress is instructive in understanding this perpetual experimentation and redefinition. 
Without a clear notion of success – a definitive use or set of uses of the tablet – Tom and 
Nathan were unable to define failure and had no choice but to engage in the perpetual beta 
in which they could only find more uses for the tablet, never ‘the’ use that would allow 
them to stop.  
Tom and Nathan’s position as scientists and expert testers led to two somewhat 
conflicting sentiments that help to explain their experience using the tablets. On the one 
hand, their subject positions contributed to their eagerness to test the tablets and may 
explain the tenacity with which they pursued this unending experimentation. On the other 
hand, the lack of a final result may have been particularly disconcerting given their 
experience as scientists whose work is founded on the idea of reliable, repeatable 
experimental results. The operation of these conflicting ideas may be one interpretation of 
Tom’s phrase ‘bad but good at the same time’.  
Development of argument about tablet imaginary 
Up to this point I have built up a picture of the content of the tablet imaginary as 
expressed by Tom and Nathan. In the concluding section, I would like to elaborate and 
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clarify certain points about this concept more generally, focusing on three key aspects: the 
tablet imaginary takes the shape of a future constructed in the present; it is content-
ambivalent; and it is both formative of and formed by individual uses of tablets in particular 
contexts.  
Future in the present  
The tablet imaginary is constructed in the present based on an idea about the future. 
Crucially, it is constructed in the present with an aim to bring about the imagined future. 
Jordan argues that imaginaries “offer hopes and fears that often do not appear as hopes 
and fears, but as real projects just one or two steps away from completion […] meaning 
that people feel a need to act quickly to prevent the imagined disaster or bring on the 
imagined benefit” (1999: pp.183-184). Tom and Nathan’s efforts to adopt tablets were 
based on the belief that using tablets would mean they would benefit from useful 
applications of a new technology in the present and at the same time bring about 
technological change in the future. This perpetual deferral to an imminent future affected 
how failure was understood. To illustrate this, I will return to the first theme that I 
identified above: the idea that tablets would be used to save money. This idea was originally 
content-ambivalent, with Tom and Nathan having no clear idea of how tablets would be 
used in practice to save money. Tom connected the idea of using tablets with the idea of 
implementing an inventory management system similar to the one he used in his restaurant 
back home. By using tablets to manage their own inventory in the present, they envisaged a 
future in which all lab inventory was totally rationalised, with zero wastage.  
As it happened, I had recently interviewed another lab scientist who had mentioned a 
few inventory management systems that were specifically aimed at science laboratories, 
notably LabGuru and Quartzy. These apps perfectly fulfilled the function that Tom and 
Nathan had described and we discussed them in some detail. The tablet imaginary gained 
specific content at that stage. Yet, as outlined above, Tom and Nathan did not ever use 
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these apps other than to trial them, stating repeatedly that they had ‘not yet got into the 
habit’ of using an app. They never discussed the notion that they or the tablets had failed in 
this regard, only that they had not got into the habit yet. The temporality of the tablet 
imaginary – as a future constructed in the present – does something interesting to the idea 
of failure. After more than six months had passed since they had begun trialling various 
methods and apps for lab inventory management, I felt that Tom and Nathan’s plan to 
save money using tablets had failed. They had spent a lot of time and energy (and a small 
amount of money to buy some of the paid apps) and had not started saving money in the 
way they had envisaged. But the slippage allowed by the imaginary future constructed in 
the present meant that failure never occurred, it was always deferred or suspended. 
Without a definable moment of judgement, the tablets were always in a state of ‘being 
trialled’. Instead of admitting failure or dealing with the issue of saving money in any way, 
the idea of saving money simply drifted out of focus. Towards the end of the six months of 
the ethnography, Tom and Nathan had stopped mentioning saving money altogether and 
instead focused on another of the themes I outlined above: the idea that tablets will change 
others’ practices. Again this process of emergent definition highlights the fluid ontology of 
the tablet and its affordance ambiguity.  
Towards the end of the ethnography, Tom and Nathan most commonly discussed 
getting others to adopt tablets. Rather than dealing with the failure of tablets, Tom and 
Nathan had developed the imaginary in response to their actual experience of using tablets, 
and chosen to shift the focus onto part of the imaginary that was more achievable in 
practice. This is referred to as ‘closure’, the perception of a group of users that a problem 
has been solved: “Closure in technology involves the stabilization of an artifact and the 
‘disappearance’ of problems” (Pinch and Bijker, 1987: p.44). Closure is not objectively 
proven, it is an issue of perception. Tom and Nathan achieved closure, stabilising the tablet 
object for themselves, by what Pinch and Bijker call ‘closure by redefinition of the 
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problem’ (Pinch and Bijker, 1987: p.44). The temporality of the tablet imaginary as a future 
constructed in the present is key to the closure that Tom and Nathan used in order to 
stabilize the object into something that made sense for their use in the lab. The deferral 
involved here means effectively that closure cannot be permanently or definitively 
achieved, in the same way that I argued above that failure is not definable in the absence of 
a clear moment of judgement. Closure is always temporary; always a negotiated state that 
must be actively performed by users in the way that they construct the object. The term 
‘closure’ suggests a fixity and stabilisation that I reject in order to maintain an emphasis on 
the emergent definition outlined throughout the chapter. As Wynne notes,  
Closure of the system as the ideal pursued by both experimentalists and 
technologists can never be complete, and is more problematic the more socially 
and physically extended is a technological system. Interference effects as a routine 
fact of life repeatedly tend to upset attempts to organize closure, and as 
technologies become more extensive, the discourse of tidy closure only engenders 
more disorientation (1988: pp.163-164) 
While closure is an ideal, the concept nevertheless describes well the process and aims 
of technologists in making sense of their objects. Closure in this context can be thought of 
as part of the tablet imaginary in the sense that it is a guiding aim or principle, but one that 
always recedes due to the atemporal and emergent nature of the definition of the tablet.  
Content-ambivalent 
The content-ambivalence of the tablet imaginary also contributes to the emergent and 
fluid definition of the tablet object through closure by redefinition of the problem. They 
are adopted on the assumption that they will have unspecified benefits. The tablet 
imaginary is a constellation of ideas about what these benefits are: a set of ideas that is 
content-ambivalent because it consists of abstract ideas as opposed to specific means or 
methods to achieve these ideas. There is a case-specific imaginary, which includes ideas 
about what the tablets can be used for in a particular context, such as Tom and Nathan’s 
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university laboratory. These case-specific imaginaries combine to form a general imaginary, 
which is what tablets represent in a society. The general imaginary functions in two ways: 
firstly, as a repository of abstract ideas that are formed into specifics in any given case; and 
secondly, as a projection of an imminent technological future that would be achieved if 
tablets were generally adopted. With no clear content to this repository of abstract ideas, 
there is no right or wrong imaginary that operates in any given context. So Tom and 
Nathan could begin thinking of the tablet as a way to save money, then reject this in favour 
of the idea that tablets benefit from being used by many people. There are of course 
cultural and social biases towards particular uses, with advertising undoubtedly contributing 
to some stabilisation of what the tablet is and does along with the attitude or advice of 
colleagues (both users and non-users). Nevertheless, the tablet imaginary is nebulous and 
abstract, meaning there is no definitively right or wrong way to construct the object. This 
content-ambivalence, along with the affordance ambiguity of the material object, allows the 
imaginary to be actualised in various different ways and for the object to be stabilised in 
various ways. As a consequence, what might be considered ‘failure’ to use tablets as 
expected (i.e. to save money) in fact becomes a new emergent stabilisation of the object. 
For Tom and Nathan, the tablet began as an object primarily defined by saving money and 
eventually became an object primarily defined by its use when connected with a network of 
other users. These moments of stabilisation are always fluid and temporary, always being 
actively played out by the users.  
The outline of themes from the ethnography in this chapter traces the development of 
the imaginary from a repository of ideas with no signified, through various stabilisations 
which fluidly changed in response to the actual experience of using the tablet. These 
stabilisations are moments in which Tom and Nathan treated the tablet as having a well-
defined single use. The list is not exhaustive but is indicative of the various ways that they 
defined the tablet. What was striking was the lack of overlap between these stabilisations. 
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Where near the beginning the tablet was a device to save money, near the end it was a 
device that increases efficiency if everybody uses it. While evidently temporary, each 
definition was distinctly totalising, with the tablet at each stage being thoroughly defined in 
a particular way. The content-ambivalent nature of the tablet imaginary allows for this type 
of fluid development in the construction of the object. This goes against common sense 
understandings of tablet as an object that can do many things. The affordance ambiguity of 
the object was expressed in single definitions, according to which the tablet could do one 
thing. As an observer my impression of the tablet as used by Tom and Nathan was one of 
multiplicity over six months. But my impression of Tom and Nathan’s experience of the 
tablet was one of singularity in emergent moments.  
Formative of and formed by individual uses 
The characteristics of the tablet imaginary as having a fluid temporality and being 
content-ambivalent combine in the recursive nature of the tablet imaginary. The tablet 
imaginary is both formative of and formed by individual uses of tablets. To illustrate this 
final point, I will return to one of the themes outlined above: the ‘inevitability of change’. 
The development of the notion of the inevitability of change is insightful in understanding 
how the imaginary functions. Tom and Nathan had a clear sense that tablets would soon be 
very important in universities and university laboratories. This was a key theme in the tablet 
imaginary and was their motivation to adopt tablets: they wanted both to participate in this 
imminent future and to help bring it about.  
Tom and Nathan set out to use tablets because they clearly believed that tablets would 
be very useful, if not essential, in the future. Subsequently, they bought and began using 
tablets in the lab. Here an interesting twist occurred. The fluid temporality and the content-
ambivalence of the tablet imaginary mean that failure is impossible to define for these 
objects. With no way to define failure, Tom and Nathan’s mere use of tablets appeared as a 
successful use, with the consequence that other people in the department also adopted 
181 
them. In Nathan’s words, “I think it’s sort of rubbing off in a way. And people see how 
useful they are I think quite honestly”. The twist comes here: the fact that many people 
started using tablets made them useful. As with any networked device, the more people that 
use it, the more useful it becomes. And the more useful it becomes, the more people use it. 
The development of the imaginary in this case took on an almost self-fulfilling circular 
route. The only thing that Tom and Nathan ever did with tablets was use them to try to 
find something useful to use them for. They arguably did not succeed in this goal. They 
never really achieved the imaginary that they sought to actualise. Yet in failing to do so, 
they encouraged others to adopt tablets, which to some extent did bring about one primary 
aspect of the imaginary: the inevitability of tablets becoming important and widespread. 
From ‘adopted because they will be useful’, the tablets became ‘useful because they have 
been adopted’. As an affiliative object (Suchman, 2005), the tablet did not have to succeed 
or fail to be used in any given way. What their use did successfully achieve was the 
definition of the tablet as an object generally regarded to have positive externalities (Star 
and Ruhleder, 1994); being of general benefit to the lab. In the same process, they achieved 
the definition of their group of colleagues as a potential network of tablet users.  
The imaginary ‘tablets will inevitably be adopted’ was formative of Tom and Nathan’s 
use; indeed it was instrumental in their adoption of tablets in the first place. The imaginary 
was then formed by their actual use, where this same abstract idea took on a very different 
guise. Subsequent adopters of tablets in the chemistry department may well have engaged 
with the tablet imaginary in this second guise; wanting to adopt primarily because it was 
useful to join the flourishing network. The specific tablet imaginary for the users was 
substantively differently than that which Tom and Nathan engaged with. Yet it worked in 
the same way, to the same end. Users adopt new technologies based on an imagined 
technological future that they aim both to participate in and to bring about.   
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Chapter 6. Expertise: The use of tablet computers in an 
interdisciplinary neuroscience research project 
 
“All we need to do is get all the tech to work” (Grace, research participant) 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I use ethnographic research in a neuroscience laboratory to further 
question the role of tablet computers in the everyday practice of science. Concepts 
developed in previous chapters are deployed here, but a new focus is taken in response to 
my findings and observations in this final case study. Once again, I found the participants’ 
efforts to define and understand the role of the tablet was fundamental to their work. And 
as with the previous chapters, the particular circumstances that I encountered in the 
ethnography lead me to focus my analysis in particular ways. In this case, the neuroscience 
research examined in this chapter meant that the question of expertise became central. The 
status of scientist as expert and the distinction between scientist and technologist were 
tacitly interrogated through the practices and discussions of the laboratory group. These 
questions are taken up throughout this chapter.  
This chapter focuses on the use of tablets in a research project by the London Group: 
an interdisciplinary research group involved in neuroscience. In stark contrast to the 
previous chapter, the tablet was treated by this group as a totally static, stable object with a 
clear definition. Of particular interest here is how this definition was ‘given away’ to a 
temporary member of the research group designated as the tablet expert. By giving away 
responsibility for defining the object, the main group avoided confronting the tablet’s 
affordance ambiguity. They also asserted their expertise as neuroscientists as superior to 
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that of technical expertise that they assigned to tablets. As such, the case study allows an 
analysis of the way that the tablet was constructed in order to reveal the performative 
operation of expertise amongst the group. At the same time, an analysis of the attribution 
of expertise gives an insight into how the group understood tablets.  
The primary way in which the tablet imaginary manifested in the ethnography was in 
the treatment of tablets as neutral. The tablet imaginary does not feature as significantly in 
this ethnography as in others, though it plays a crucial role. What was so interesting about 
the London Group’s use of tablets was how they narrowed the definition of tablets so 
radically. This constraining definition does not hold much space for expressions of the 
imagery, meanings and discourses that make up the tablet imaginary. Throughout the 
chapter I elaborate on the role of this narrow definition and how it was used in the 
construction of the scientific subjectivities of the participants.  
I draw on discussions of expertise from STS (Galison, 1997, Lynch, 2007, Collins and 
Evans, 2009, Coopmans and Button, 2014) to consider the role and the standing of 
computing expertise within natural science research. I compare expertise to digital literacy 
(Gilster, 1997, Bassett et al., 2013) and consider how these terms value particular skills or 
competences. Lynch writes that ‘science’, ‘scientific’, ‘scientist’ and ‘expert’ are membership 
categories, “used tendentiously to claim or confer authority and credibility” (2007: p.161). I 
trace how the tablet acts as a focal point for the policing of boundaries of technoscientific 
expertise leading to inclusion of certain skills and knowledge and the exclusion of others.  
Description of Fieldwork 
Between November 2013 and August 2014, I conducted ethnographic research with a 
group of scientists at a UK University based in London working on a neuroscience project 
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examining spatial cognition30. This consisted of several visits to the main laboratory where 
they conducted the majority of their research, associated office spaces and attached labs 
and individual offices of researchers. During this time, I also conducted several individual 
interviews with key members of the group. Where quotations are given, they are taken 
verbatim from interviews. Where details of the research project or impressions of 
technologies used are given, they are based on my own non-participant observation of the 
work as well as comments made by participants outside of formal interviews.  
Due to their location and their research topic, which examined navigation through a 
specific area of central London, I term them here ‘the London Group’. Members of the 
group worked together, in neuroscience, at the same university. The group had 
interdisciplinary elements, with secondary interests including architecture, psychology and 
virtual reality. This main group consisted of a lab head, a postdoc, two PhD students and a 
Master’s student. Also working on the project were one Master’s student and one 
Bachelor’s student working in neuroscience, one Master’s student in computer science and 
one Bachelor’s student in medicine. The Master’s student in computer science, Edgar, 
became central to my analysis of this ethnography, despite the fact that I never met him as 
he was based in Belgium working on the project remotely. While the main group all worked 
together on several projects, I focus in this chapter on one specific research project, ‘the 
London Project’. For clarity and because of the similarities of the terms, I would like to 
point out that this is not intended to reflect the ideas of the ‘core set/core group’ as the 
nomenclature is used in STS:  
A core-set has been deﬁned as being made up of those scientists deeply involved 
in experimentation or theorization which is directly relevant to a scientiﬁc 
controversy or debate. A core-set is often quite small – perhaps a dozen scientists, 
or half-a-dozen groups. A core-group is the much more solidaristic group of 
                                                 
30 Names of people, roles and buildings have been changed for purposes of anonymity.  
185 
scientists which emerges after a controversy has been settled for all practical 
purposes. (Collins and Evans, 2002: p.242) 
Edgar’s role working on the project without being a member of the group disrupts the 
distinction between core-group and core-set or any other definition of membership defined 
by the research role conducted by a given person. Where I use the phrase ‘main group’, it 
refers to those working on the London Project that belonged to the research lab, headed by 
principal investigator (PI) Ian. When referring to other people who worked on the project 
but were not part of that research lab, I use the more widely-encompassing phrase ‘London 
Group’. These terms also reflect the way that the participants spoke about different people 
working on the project.  
The main group collaborated on several projects relating to spatial cognition each with 
a different focus comprising a combination of psychology, neuroscience and architecture. 
The lab head and PI on the project, Ian, summed up his research interests as follows: 
The research I do is all related to spatial cognition. How people think about space, 
how they navigate through space, how they remember space. With a particular 
interest in our group on how the brain represents that. So trying to understand 
how different bits of the brain perform or represent space.  
The London Project aimed to understand how the brain represents space by 
conducting experiments in central London, by following participants trying to navigate 
their way through the city. This research entailed the use of several advanced scientific 
technologies, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
electroencephalogram (EEG) devices. Along with these large pieces of scientific apparatus, 
the Project entailed the use of a Google Nexus 7 tablet computer and a Google Nexus 5 
smartphone, each named for the size of its screen. Ian was also considering using 
commercial products such as Google Glass31, a wearable technology that offers a sort of 
                                                 
31 http://www.google.com/glass/ [Accessed 12th September 2014]. 
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augmented reality, and Oculus Rift32, a virtual reality headset. These products had not been 
used in any research projects but were being considered for future research. Ian was also 
keen to show me around other labs in the same building that used ‘cool kit’. This included, 
for example, a device that used a laser beam fired at a mound of sand to replicate (with the 
aim of predicting) the patterns that lava flows from volcanoes may take. One of the PhD 
students from the main group had a desk in this open-plan computer lab, so I had an 
opportunity to spend some time in there. The tell-tale signs of a tech culture of making were 
evident throughout: soldering irons placed next to coffee cups on many computer desks; 
kits for DIY computers like Raspberry Pi33 and Arduino34 laying half-built or wired to 
obscure devices; whispered discussions about the Makerbot Thing-O-Matic 3D printer that 
it was rumoured another lab would soon purchase. While the main group whose work I 
studied did not use any of these technologies, it was clear that they were not too far 
removed from this DIY tech culture.  
Wayfinding: The London Group’s research project 
To outline how each device or apparatus was used and to describe the research 
project, I will summarise the process that one participant would go through. As I had been 
told about various elements of the experiment, I was unable to be a participant in the 
project. 
The participant is given a briefing in which they are told about the aims of the project 
to examine the brain’s function during ‘wayfinding’: navigating around the city. The 
participant is then taken on a two hour tour of a specific area in central London, where the 
researcher points out various landmarks to the participant. The next day, the participant 
visits the lab, a room around 2.5 metres square containing desks against two walls each 
                                                 
32 http://www.oculusvr.com/ [Accessed 12th September 2014]. 
33 http://www.raspberrypi.org/ [Accessed 28th January 2015]. 
34 http://www.arduino.cc/ [Accessed 28th January 2015]. 
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with two computer stations. The participant is fitted with an EEG cap with eight electrodes 
that record brain activity. The EEG cap is connected to a computer in an adjacent room, 
separated by a large window. The researcher sits in this room and can view the EEG 
readout, as well as watching to ensure the participant is comfortable. The participant can 
see the researcher and can attract their attention if they would like to stop or ask for a glass 
of water. Upon entering the main lab, the participant is led to one computer, the same one 
each time, and views the PC monitor. They are played a video clip of a walk through the 
area of central London they had toured the day before, aiming towards a given landmark 
with the instruction ‘navigate to location A’. The clip stops at several road junctions and 
the participant is asked if they would turn left, right or continue straight on to get to the 
landmark. The participant thinks about the best way to navigate to the target location and 
uses the mouse and PC to click icons indicating left, right or straight on. The video 
continues towards the landmark. Participants are told in advance that the video may not 
follow their response. Occasionally the destination is changed, and the process repeats for 
twelve routes, the first two considered training routes and the results not collected. 
Throughout this time, the postdoc who acted as the EEG technician would observe and 
record the EEG data. Afterwards, the participant has a debriefing session with the 
researcher to ask about the experience, how well they remembered the routes, and whether 
they were pressing left or right randomly at any stage.  
Another group of participants undergoes a different experiment. In this group, the 
participant receives the same walking tour of London but does not visit the lab the next 
day. Instead, the next day the participant returns to the streets of London and physically 
navigates through the routes depicted in the video. They are fitted with a portable EEG 
cap to record their brain activity. They are given a backpack containing a laptop, which acts 
as both the recording device for the EEG and as a local Wi-Fi network to connect and 
sync the tablet and smartphone. The participant is given the Nexus 5 smartphone, which 
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conveys information about the route that they should follow, such as saying ‘navigate to 
location A’. These cues are relayed to the smartphone by the researcher who uses the 
Nexus 7 tablet computer to send cues at appropriate times. The smartphone and tablet 
both use an app written by the Master’s student in computer science especially for the 
experiment to send and receive these cues. The participant is given twelve routes via the 
smartphone, the first two considered training routes, and navigates through the streets 
accordingly. A debriefing session is undertaken to ask about the experience of navigating 
and whether the participant was choosing the route with intention or at random.  
At the time of my research, it was undecided whether the results of the two groups 
were best published as a single comparative experiment or as two individual experiments. 
Although the second group of participants were navigating through actual city streets, both 
experiments were understood to take place within a lab environment. The lab for the first 
group is easily identified as the room in a university building in which the participants 
watched videos while wearing an EEG cap. Yet the streets of London were also considered 
a lab. Although lacking the clearly designated boundaries of a walled laboratory space, the 
streets through which participants navigated were part of the material setting (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979) that is the general condition of the production of scientific phenomena, in 
this case EEG data regarding a participant’s brain function while making decisions when 
navigating. In addition, the material setting of the street lab contained experimental devices 
including the laptop, smartphone, tablet computer and EEG headset that can be 
considered scientific instruments because they facilitate or determine the production of 
scientific phenomena, in this case EEG data: a distinction that I will return to later.  
Designation of expertise 
The designation of expertise was used as a discursive tool to define different members 
of the group and their roles. The Master’s student who was responsible for the tablet and 
the app was defined as a particular type of expert, against the tacitly assumed scientific 
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expertise of the rest of the group. This discursive work in turn defined the tablet itself: the 
way that expertise was assigned to the object allowed me to infer the ways in which the 
tablet was understood. My aim in this analysis is not to engage in a normative argument 
about expertise (after Collins and Evans, 2002), but instead to observe how expertise was 
deployed by participants. Their practices can then be read as a way to see how different 
members of the group define themselves and others as experts of a particular type. As 
Lynch argues in reference to his study of courtroom settings: 
“By considering 'expert' and 'scientist' as membership categories that are deployed 
in moment-to-moment, institutionally embedded, discursive interaction, we can 
become apprised of the way parties position themselves and one another with 
respect to those categories and their conventional associations. (Lynch, 2007: 
p.178) 
Making a lateral step from Coopmans and Button’s treatment of expertise and tacit 
knowledge, I treat the different types of expertise expressed by members of the London 
Group as actor’s categories: “treating them, and the activities relating to them, in terms of 
how they are ordinarily understood by those involved” (Coopmans and Button, 2014: 
p.760). These categories are based on my observations of the group’s practices (thus 
‘actor’s categories’) but are of course intended to impose a sense of order at the level of 
analysis. To gain an insight into the manner in which expertise was defined and deployed, it 
is necessary to discuss the way that the group encountered and dealt with the affordance 
ambiguity of the tablet and how this was manifested in ‘getting the tech to work’. In the 
case of the London Group, the designation of expertise was key to their understanding of 
the role of the tablet in their research project. Before a discussion of getting the tech to 
work, I will therefore spend some time outlining the group dynamics that led to one group 
member being designated the tablet expert.  
Chronologically this was the third research group that I had dealt with as part of the 
current research and my initial impressions were very different from the other two. For 
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both the Lab, and Tom and Nathan, the initial impression was that much of their work and 
discussion regarding the tablets entailed attempts to define the object, work out what it 
could be used for, consider its limitations and so on. For the London Group, this 
discursive work was noticeably absent. They had a clear sense of what the tablet would be 
used for and how it would fit into their experimental setup.  
As a PhD student in the group stated early on: “the preparations for the experiment 
are done. All we need to do is get all the tech to work.” This comment was literally waved 
away, indicating that getting the tech to work was a mere triviality. The phrase ‘the tech’ 
here referred to the whole experimental setup including the EEG, laptop, tablet computer 
and smartphone. At that stage, the equipment had all been chosen and bought, but the 
setup had not been tested. It actually took a further eight months of testing before the 
setup was ready to be used in the collection of data contributing to publications. This 
testing primarily involved designing and troubleshooting the app that would connect the 
tablet and smartphone, allowing the experimenter to give cues to the participant. The app 
also recorded GPS location data, so that the precise location of waymaking decisions could 
be recorded. The app was written by Edgar, the Master’s student working in computer 
science, who was based in mainland Europe. The fact that Edgar worked with the group 
on the same project suggests that he had at least ‘interactional expertise’, the ability to 
interact interestingly with the other party; or even ‘contributory expertise’, enough to 
contribute to the science of the field being analysed (Collins and Evans, 2002). I will return 
to a discussion of these terms shortly. Edgar was generally referred to as ‘working with us 
on the project’ or a similar phrase that at the same time expressed his belonging and his 
otherness. The fact that his membership of the group had to be stated in this way served to 
emphasise that he was only a temporary member. In my terms, Edgar was part of the 
extended London Group, but not part of the main research group. 
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Edgar’s status as a collaborator but not a longstanding member of the group was 
significant in the way that the main group treated the tablet. I outlined above the wide 
range of disciplines represented by members of the group: architecture, neuroscience, 
psychology, medicine and computer science. Yet despite this range of expertise, all of the 
group members except the computer scientist were linked by an interest in neuroscience, as 
one PhD student stated: “[it is] neuroscience which links us all up because we all work in 
neuroscience now, except for Edgar who doesn’t have any expertise in this”. Despite 
different specialities and disciplinary affiliations, all of the group members apart from 
Edgar had shared neuroscience expertise. When asked about Edgar’s role, Quentin, a PhD 
student with interests in architecture and neuroscience, described Edgar as “the person that 
brings the technologies together, the tablet expert”. Again this description served to 
reiterate Edgar’s separation from the rest of the group on the basis that he was not a 
neuroscience expert.  
Far from being presented as a lack, this separation served to emphasise the difference 
between Edgar and the rest of the group. When asked why the particular model of tablet 
computer was chosen, the lab head Ian quipped: “Yes good question, what are the reasons 
for that? The team told me to as the PI! As the person running the thing!” Ian found it 
amusing and slightly embarrassing (in his words) that he did not have the expertise to make 
decisions about equipment selection for the project. Reflecting on this, he went on to 
discuss his role as Principal Investigator on the project.  
So as the PI I get in the grants and employ people to do things. And I have a team 
for that project where we’re using these [the tablet and smartphone] and it was 
really them that came to me and said ‘we’re going to need to run it on the Nexus 4 
[sic] and 7. Because the application that’s been written by the programmer that 
we’ve been working with is designed for those devices.  
Ian’s outline of his role (‘I get in the grants and employ people to do things’), though 
evidently oversimplified, aligns with Latour’s distinction between those members of 
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scientific groups who do lab work and those engaged in bureaucracy (Latour, 1986: pp.155-
157). Latour’s discussion concerns the boundaries of scientific practice, which he follows 
out of the lab into the world of institutional, governmental and cultural politics, arguing in 
short that the lab worker “is able to be deeply involved in her bench work because the boss 
is constantly outside bringing in new resources and supports” (Latour, 1986: p.156). Within 
the more limited lab context that is my focus here, it was clear that Ian’s perspective on the 
project was that he had facilitated and brought together various types of expertise to 
supplement his own. Against his slightly embarrassed response to the innocuous question 
about choice of device, Ian’s response can be read as a justification for his lack of expertise 
relating to tablet computers. It was not simply that he did not know, which might be seen 
as lazy or incompetent, it was that he had no need to know.  
In fact, Ian’s discussion of different members of the group indicate that to some 
degree he was invested in not knowing about what he saw as the ‘merely technical’ aspects of 
the tablet’s function: a point that I will return to shortly. On more than one occasion he 
commented that one member of the group or another could have learned the required 
programming skills to do the job that had been given to Edgar. In a quote discussing the 
postdoc EEG technician’s expertise (and that also further illustrates Ian’s lack of 
knowledge about the tablet and app), Ian observed that: 
He can make sure that the electrodes are all placed properly, that it’s all working 
properly, all the troubleshooting that’s required just for the one device to work 
requires many years of expertise. He could in theory have taken his time to learn 
how to program a mobile application. I think it was – a good question I don’t 
know – whether it was written in Java or some other programming language. But 
we didn’t – he didn’t do that job.  
With EEG expertise being conceived as equivalent to experience or time spent using 
the technology, Ian noted that there was not time for the postdoctoral researcher – 
undoubtedly an expert user of advanced technologies – to learn how to write an app and 
become a tablet expert. At another time, Ian commented that one of the PhD students was 
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using pencil and paper to note down certain results that she could have recorded 
automatically if she learned how to write a program to do so, “but it would have taken 
longer than her possibly writing them all down.” Ian was invested in not knowing about 
the technical aspects of the tablet and the app because of the time pressures of the 
research. He indicated at the outset that he aimed to be in a position to submit for 
publication within a year; this timeline had been revised as problems with the app delayed 
the process. While conceding that other members of the lab could obtain the necessary 
expertise, this was not practically possible within the timescale of the experiment. The 
contradiction in this understanding was characteristic of Ian’s treatment of tablets. On the 
one hand, he treated the ability to use a tablet as a fairly mundane skill that merely needed 
to be learned. At other times, he treated it as an expertise that was so sophisticated that it 
was beyond his comprehension and indeed beyond scrutiny. This apparent contradiction 
can be explained in reference to the materiality of the tablet computer: a point that I will 
return to at the end of this chapter.  
Edgar’s expertise was ‘bought in’ on the basis that he would be able to write the app 
and troubleshoot the experimental setup without needing to discuss, explain or justify what 
he was doing. His job was to make the experiment work. If Ian or any of the group 
members understood Edgar’s role, they could have done the programming themselves. 
Any effort to understand the coding or programming of the tablet was effectively time 
wasted. The gap between their expertise and Edgar’s was thus important to justify the 
decision of including Edgar at all. This added to the sense that Edgar’s expertise and his 
work writing the app was separate from the rest of the group’s work. The designation of 
Edgar’s work as separate was part of an on-going contestation about where to draw the 
boundaries of the experiment. Galison notes other examples of computing practices within 
science research that raise questions about the definition of experiment and experimenter: 
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Who counted as the experimenter in the $700 million detector planned for the 
Superconducting Supercollider, or in the only slightly smaller activities at CERN 
during the 1990s? Is the activity of the software designer for a subassembly of the 
detector ‘experimentation’? (Galison, 1997: p.7) 
The main group’s negotiation of Edgar’s expertise as simultaneously included and 
excluded from the research project demonstrate how “the physical, temporal, and 
epistemic boundaries of ‘experiment’ have been and remain in flux” (Galison, 1997: p.7). It 
also raises the question of ‘passing’ and whether Edgar’s presence could have gone 
unnoticed by the others. Lynch argues that: 
For some of the more rightly controlled membership categories it is possible, but 
not very easy, for an imposter to 'pass' without being noticed. In the case of the 
family of terms associated with science (and the related, but not identical, term 
'expert'), their assignment of persons, activities and facts to that category has well 
known strategic advantages, and thus efforts are made to control such 
assignments. (Lynch, 2007: p.166) 
It was not possible for Edgar to pass as a member of the neuroscience expert group 
because of their need to police the category of scientific expertise. While he might not have 
considered himself an ‘imposter’, the main group’s status was threatened by his inclusion 
and could not allow him to pass. They had to account for Edgar’s tablet expertise in order 
to reaffirm their own neuroscience expertise.  
Efforts have been made to account for and define the different types of expertise that 
may contribute to the production of scientific knowledge. In Collins and Evans’ terms 
(taken now from Collins and Evans, 2009), the main group had “beer mat knowledge”: 
knowing about the principles of programming and of tablet computers without knowing 
enough to do anything in this regard (Collins and Evans, 2009: pp.18-19). Edgar had a similar 
level of knowledge of the main group’s research. This would fail to fit the description of 
‘interactional expertise’, in which a person “may be able to understand scientific things, and 
to discuss scientific things, but is still not able to do scientific things” (Collins and Evans, 
2002: p.35). Yet they all worked on the same research project that did produce publishable 
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results recognised by the scientific community as reliable, suggesting that each party might 
have acquired ‘contributory expertise’: “what you need to do an activity with competence” 
(Collins and Evans, 2002: p.14). The way that expertise was attributed within the London 
Group suggests that none of these categories are applicable. By actively framing their 
respective domains of expertise as incommensurate, the London Group tacitly reject the 
categories that Collins and Evans make available. At the same time, this framing was 
necessary for the successful ‘doing’ of the research project in question. Collins and Evans 
do offer a more finely-grained series of options to define various levels of expertise (Collins 
and Evans, 2009: especially chapter one), but at this juncture the abstract categories are 
beginning to lead the research material. I will move away from this mode of discussion that 
focuses on what expertise is and instead begin to analyse what expertise does. In other 
words, rather than trying to state what precise analytical category best describes the types of 
expertise observed in the London Group, it is more instructive to consider expertise as it is 
expressed by the actors in the case study, and how their definition of tablets intersects with 
their designation of Edgar as the tablet expert.  
The terms on which Edgar’s role was defined also served to cast his technical 
expertise in subservience to the scientific expertise of the rest of the group. While bringing 
in this other type of expertise to the lab, the main group also held it at arm’s length, not 
allowing the tablet expertise equal status with their own scientific expertise. Although the 
inclusion of Edgar could be read as an example of the main group “building links and 
trying to integrate what they know with what others want to, or should, know and do” 
(Nowotny, 2003: p.155) and thus perhaps producing socially more robust knowledge 
(ibid.), the fact that Edgar’s tablet expertise was cast as inferior suggests otherwise. It was at 
this stage of the ethnography that I began to focus on how Edgar’s expertise was formed 
by the main group and how this articulated and expressed their understanding of their own 
research work. The tablet was deployed as an affiliative object (Suchman, 2005), a locus 
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where different types of expertise could be expressed and assigned value. Discussing the 
Xerox 8200 photocopier – a mundane object that became the focus of research – Suchman 
writes that, “To be recognizable as a scientific object, the 8200 had to be rendered 
interesting in the terms of the disciplinary communities with which the group, and each of 
us as individuals were affiliated” (Suchman, 2005: 385). For the London Group, the tablet 
was not rendered interesting in terms of neuroscience and remained an unscientific object.  
The group treated the tablet as an object that facilitated the production of 
experimental data, but did not determine it. They treated the tablet as both theory-neutral 
and value-neutral, like the water pipes in Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) example. The tablets 
were theory-neutral and did not reify previous scientific theory in the way that more 
familiar scientific instruments do. In the case of the tablets being treated as value-neutral, 
however, the situation was rather more complex. What made the group treat the tablet as 
value-neutral was an understanding of technical expertise as neutral: which is itself a cultural 
value. The group introduced the cultural value of ‘value-neutrality of expertly-produced 
apps’ into the experiment by including a tablet expert to write the app. Edgar’s expertise 
could be unproblematically introduced to the group because his role was seen as a technical 
expert, somebody who could be given a brief to write the app as required without 
influencing the experimental setup, at which point his impact on the research project would 
end.  
This point of analysis is significantly abstracted from the ethnography: the group did 
not talk about value-neutrality or discuss Edgar’s expertise as neutral. I hope that the 
description of the case study – in particular Edgar’s role – that constitutes a large part of 
the material in this chapter makes this point. My argument that this is a normative cultural 
value suggests that it will necessarily remain hidden, implicit, unsaid.  
It is not unexpected that the London Group thought of the app as a neutral 
technology. The idea of neutrality is a central tenet of technological imaginaries. As 
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Feenberg argues, the instrumental view of technology is the most widely accepted: “It is 
based on the commonsense idea that technologies are ‘tools’ standing ready to serve the 
purposes of their users. Technology is deemed ‘neutral’, without valuative content of its 
own” (Feenberg, 2002: p.5).  
Considering this perception of neutrality using the more specific example of software, 
Fuller argues that software “is seen as a tool, something that you do something with. It is 
neutral, grey, or optimistically blue” (Fuller, 2008b: p.3). The idea that software is neutral 
was critiqued in more detail in chapter two. Further to this, the London Group’s 
perception of the neutrality of the app is challenged by the recognition that cultural values 
apply to programming practices. A particularly pertinent cultural value that is recognised as 
applying to software and coding is that of ‘elegance’: a concept defined by four criteria 
according to Donald Knuth: 
the leanness of the code; the clarity with which the problem is deﬁned; spareness 
of use of resources such as time and processor cycles; and, implementation in the 
most suitable language on the most suitable system for its execution (cited in 
Fuller, 2008a: p.87) 
Although technically definable according to these and other criteria, the concept of 
elegance is itself not reducible to the realm of the ‘merely technical’. As Fuller argues: 
Elegance, because it cannot be proven, comes down to a rule of thumb, 
something that emerges out of the interplay of [given] constraints, or as 
something more intuitively achievable as style (in Knuth’s terminology, an “art”) 
(2008a: p.89) 
Whether a rule of thumb, a style or an art, achieving elegance in software code is 
clearly a value defined within the technical and social culture of programming. The idea 
that simple code is preferred to complex code has parallels with the discussion of lab 
management apps in chapter three, which were seen to inhere the cultural value of 
efficiency. All of which is not to deny that an elegantly coded app might be advantageous 
to the London Group (indeed, it is clear that the elegance valued by programmers has 
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pragmatic value in terms of testing and so on). The point is that the assumed value-
neutrality of the app, and of Edgar’s practice more generally, does not hold up to closer 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, the group did treat the app and tablet as necessarily neutral elements 
of the experimental setup, and the casting of Edgar’s expertise and his work as neutral was 
essential to the whole design.  
It might be thought that this treatment of the tablet and app as ‘merely technical’ was 
a result of a cultural bias in which computing technologies were considered beyond 
(perhaps beneath) the concern of the scientist. It was not my impression that arrogance or 
cultural bias informed the group’s perception in this way. At the same time, the discursive 
work that set the tablet and app within the realm of the ‘merely technical’ was not unusual 
in the laboratory setting. Latour and Woolgar observe that “the relegation of material 
processes to the realm of the merely technical” (1979: p.63) is key to the understanding of 
scientific data – what they calls inscriptions – as representative of an a priori reality that the 
scientific experiment simply reveals. Latour and Woolgar argue that in fact the inscription 
produced by the experiment (in their example a bioassay, in mine an EEG readout) 
“constitutes the construction of the substance” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: p.64). The 
phenomenon that the data represents – such as EEG readings – is produced by, for, and 
because of the experiment. In other words, the experimental data that the London Group 
used as the basis of their publications would not have existed without the ‘merely technical’ 
equipment such as the tablets.  
On this basis, the tablet is as important in the production of experimental data as the 
EEG cap or any other material object. Despite this, the expertise pertaining to the tablet 
was regarded as different to that of, say, the EEG. While Ian and the rest of the group had 
a good understanding of EEG data – how it was produced, recorded, interpreted and so on 
– they did not have any understanding of how the tablet functioned. This understanding 
was a gap in the expertise of the group that Edgar filled.  
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This gap in expertise was manifested when installing the app on the tablet. Edgar had 
sent the files relating to the app to the rest of the group in London with instructions on 
how to install it. The group in London found they could not install the app correctly until 
they received additional instructions from Edgar. Grace, a PhD student, argued that 
Edgar’s expertise led him to underestimate the amount of instruction that the group 
required. Certain things that he took for granted in the process were simply not known by 
the rest of the group. In a parallel with Ian’s initial embarrassment at his lack of expertise in 
this regard, Grace commented, “it was so stupid – we all use tablets!”, implying that she felt 
the group should have been able to install the app without any problems.  
Grace’s comment recalls debates around a specific type of expertise: digital literacy. 
Gilster’s work, which helped to popularise the term, gives this definition: 
A literate person can read and write his or her native language. In contrast, 
although computers work with their own languages, such as Pascal and C++, 
digital literacy doesn’t mean we have to become programmers or learn to puzzle 
out long lines of computer code. It refers to a way of reading and understanding 
information that differs from what we do when we sit down to read a book or a 
newspaper. The differences are inherent in the medium itself, and digital literacy 
involves mastering them (Gilster, 1997: pp.28-29)  
For Gilster, the move from literacy to ‘digital literacy’ involves the loss of writing as a 
key skill. As Basset, Fotopoulou and Howland argue, “Literacy implies dual importance for 
reading and writing, but much of the focus so far in digital literacy has been on the reading 
aspect” (Bassett et al., 2013: p.15). Using Gilster’s terms but setting aside the prescriptive 
nature of Gilster’s work, we can read Grace’s comment and embarrassment as evidence of 
the problem with Gilster’s conception of digital literacy. Grace was digitally literate: she 
could use the tablet to locate, read and understand information. Though literate, Grace did 
not have the ability to write digitally: to create and manipulate content. Her frustration arose 
from the mismatch between this inability to write and being a competent digital reader or 
user of tablets. The apparent ease with which tablets can be used (read) belied the ease with 
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which they could be used (written). Going on to reflect on what we might call (now mixing 
the terms from Gilster and the critique by Basset et al.) the gap in between expertise and 
literacy that led to Edgar taking certain elements of the installation for granted, Grace 
speculated that the mark of an expert is that their work “becomes second nature.” Grace’s 
comment implied that Edgar’s involvement with the project was aimed at saving time. It 
also implied that tablet expertise, unlike neuroscience expertise, is simplistic enough to 
become second-nature. In the context of the time-pressured research environment, the 
London Group did not have the luxury of waiting until one of the established members 
had trained in programming such that these processes were similarly second-nature.  
Testing vs failure 
Throughout the process of testing and installation several bugs and problems were 
encountered leading to significant delays. If they ran into a problem when trying out the 
latest iteration of the app, the experimenters would make note of the fault and pass the 
information to Edgar, who would fix it. This process was very definitely regarded as testing. 
While evidently failing to work as required, the tablet and app were not treated as failing, 
but as ‘not ready yet’. The researchers’ attitude seemed to be that the tablet was not yet in a 
position to be regarded as faulty or failing because it had not yet been finished. It would be 
pointless to complain that it was not working while it was still being tested. This led to a 
curious situation in which the tablet and app setup was not regarded as finished until it was 
free from faults. And as long as it was faulty, it could not be judged as failing because it was 
not yet finished. While this felt similar to the ‘permanent beta’ that characterised Tom and 
Nathan’s use of tablets described in the previous chapter, it was different because there was 
a definite end in sight: the tablet fulfilling its experimental role. In comparison, Tom and 
Nathan cycled through several radically different roles for the tablet, rather than testing its 
success in one defined role.  
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It could be argued that this situation was a result of the affordance ambiguity of the 
tablet, meaning that there was no reliable definition of what it meant for the tablet to be 
working (echoing the experimenter’s regress, see Collins and Pinch, 2014). This would fit 
with the analysis of the tablets as used by Tom and Nathan, discussed in the previous 
chapter, where Tom and Nathan cycled through different constructions of the tablet, 
taking advantage of its affordance ambiguity to suspend failure. It might also be possible to 
draw a comparison to the Lab, discussed in an earlier chapter, where the tablet’s failure was 
denied by participants who split the tablet into generic and specific elements, allowing the 
object to be maintained by definition as infallible. Yet the context in which the London 
Group worked meant that something altogether different was taking place in the way that 
the tablet was defined and understood.  
Where the whole collective of participants in both the Lab case study, and that of 
Tom and Nathan, were responsible for defining the tablet and making it work, the 
experimenters in the London Group had no such responsibility. It was Edgar’s role to 
make the tablet work. In ‘giving away’ responsibility for the working of the tablet and app 
to Edgar, the main group had also given away their ability to define the object. This was 
not a mistake or a dereliction of scientific duty: it was crucial to the successful inclusion of 
the tablet in the experimental setup. By designating Edgar as the expert, the main group 
avoided having to deal with the affordance ambiguity of the tablet: a process that required 
users to wrangle with the expansive definitions of tablets as described in other chapters. 
This designation of expertise characterised the whole group’s attitude to the tablet 
computer. The tablet was part of the experimental setup for which the group as a whole 
was responsible. Yet Edgar alone was designated as the expert who had responsibility for 
ensuring the tablet worked as desired. The way that the tablet was constructed by the 
London Group is significantly different from the two other ethnographies addressed in this 
thesis. 
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In the other ethnographies, the participants ‘got the tech to work’ by going through 
complex, contested processes of articulation that focused on defining the tablet in certain 
ways. In each case, the affordance ambiguity of the tablet was key to the understanding of 
failure, as it allowed for a proliferation of definitions, roles and meanings to be ascribed to 
the tablet – an almost unlimited flexibility of definition that allowed for the idea of 
perfection to gain currency in the Lab, as well as the ‘suspension of failure’ approach of 
Tom and Nathan, where the tablet never stood still long enough to be thought of as failing.  
Both Tom and Nathan, as well as the participants in the Lab, began with a clear sense 
of what they wanted the tablet to do: act as a paper replacement; save money. The struggle 
to define the tablet arose when they had to determine how the tablet would do this. For the 
London Group, this was not the case. By working with a tablet expert, they gave away 
responsibility for defining the tablet object or exploring its potential. By ceding control of 
the definition of the object, they stripped the tablet of its affordance ambiguity. Giving 
responsibility for defining the tablet to Edgar meant that the tablet was rigidly defined. 
Edgar, the designated expert, was assumed to know the tablet’s possibilities and limits. In a 
sense, although the group did not use this terminology, Edgar’s job was to disambiguate 
the tablet: to turn it into a concrete, well-defined tool. His expertise meant that from the 
group’s perspective, whatever and however he made the tablet work, that was the best 
possible way for it to work. There was therefore nothing ambiguous about the tablet.  
The sense that Edgar’s job was to disambiguate the tablet and turn it into a simple tool 
was reflected in the occasionally dismissive manner in which other group members 
discussed Edgar’s role or the nature of his expertise. The group were never dismissive of 
the importance of his work, but were dismissive of the idea that they needed to understand 
what he did. To give one example, when asked about how location data was collected, one 
PhD student stated, “this is something you’ll have to talk to Edgar about, it’s something to 
do with GPS, I don’t know.” The hand gestures and demeanour that accompanied this 
203 
comment gave the impression that the question was being both literally and figuratively 
waved away: it was Edgar’s domain, and therefore of no concern. The PhD student did not 
know and had no reason to know or find out. The researchers, like those in the Lab, and 
Tom and Nathan, did not have the expertise to easily deal with the tablet’s affordance 
ambiguity. What set the London Group apart was that they gave the tablet to somebody 
who did have this expertise.  
The result of the relationship that developed between the main group and Edgar was 
that little or no consideration was given to the tablets by the main group except during the 
actual trials to test the equipment. During the trials, they identified problems with the 
tablets without ever having to think about why those problems had arisen or how they 
might be solved. For the main group, the tablet was a black box that simply fulfilled a role 
in the same way that the EEG fulfilled a role. For Edgar, of course, the story is different. 
He did have to deal with the problems encountered during trials and he did have to decide 
how best to make use of the tablet’s potential.  
Edgar’s role was to this extent comparable with those of the members of the Lab, and 
Tom and Nathan, who had to take the tablet, assess its potential, and put it to use in the 
best way possible. I previously discussed the affordance ambiguity of the tablet as a way of 
characterising the bewilderment with which the participants in other case studies 
responded to the tablets. Without a clear use for the object they were overwhelmed by its 
potential and found it difficult to ‘close down’ its meanings into a well-defined object. Yet 
Edgar’s role was different. His aim was not to find the best possible use for the tablet: he 
had been given a brief about what function the tablet needed to perform within the context 
of the London Group experiment and he had to create an app that would make this 
happen. The success of the app was measured by the group, based on whether it worked 
well in the trials and fulfilled the experimental role for which it was designed. The main 
group decided what the tablet should do, Edgar decided how it would do this.  
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The London Group ‘solved’ the problem of affordance ambiguity by commissioning 
an app that would allow the tablet simply to fulfil the required function. The scare quotes 
around ‘solved’ indicate that this was not the group’s stated intention: the inclusion of 
Edgar was discussed as a requirement because of the group’s own lack of expertise (and the 
phrase ‘affordance ambiguity’ was never used by the group). Yet this did not simply move 
the problem along, leaving Edgar with the same issue of having to deal with the tablet’s 
affordance ambiguity and struggle to find the best possible way to make the app work. 
Giving the problem away changed it. In giving Edgar responsibility for the tablet, they also 
gave him a brief. His task was to make the tablet record location data and send cues to the 
research participant’s smartphone. He was not required to make the best use of the tablet in 
the sense of using it to its full potential, whatever that might mean. He was required only to 
make the tablet fulfil a prescribed role defined by the rest of the group. In this way, the 
tablet was stripped of its excessive potential (which in other cases discussed in this thesis 
led to an overwhelmingly expansive flexibility of definition) and turned into a fixed, stable 
object with a discrete function.  
One response to the affordance ambiguity of the tablet is to be enchanted by its 
potentiality, its seemingly unlimited ability to fulfil any function. This was the response 
observed in the previous chapters where participants tried to find the best function for the 
tablet by using it. Another response, found in the London Group, is to close down this 
ambiguity by defining the object before using it.  
Crucial to this was Edgar’s designation as the tablet expert. By describing and treating 
him in this way, the main group conferred the responsibility for defining the tablet to 
Edgar. At the same time, they limited his responsibilities by giving him a clear brief. By 
definition, whatever he made the tablet do could unquestionably be considered the best 
solution because he was the expert. As outlined above, the main group showed virtually no 
interest in how the app worked, their only concern was that it fulfilled the brief.  
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Somebody else’s problem 
Getting the app to work as required took longer than expected. As the lab head Ian 
explained: 
it wasn’t a surprise but we were struck by it – the biggest challenge in that 
experiment was getting it all to sync and getting the app to work basically was 
technically quite demanding. I was more convinced that the EEG would be really 
problematic because any sort of walking movements cause problems in these 
experiments. But that seems to have been OK. 
It is clear that ‘getting the tech to work’ is not a simple requirement. It involved testing 
the experimental setup, noting any issues and trying to solve them. These issues took two 
distinct forms: problems and observations. The group’s understanding of scientific and 
technical expertise informed how they managed these points of potential failure. One issue 
that was designated an observation, was entirely beyond the group’s control, as Ian noted:  
On the whole, it worked, the performance of the subjects it was good, the 
technology worked. Interestingly, there was one hotspot in central London where 
the wireless went down consistently. Some street where maybe MI5 are bunkered 
or something! 
While a light-hearted quip, this ‘hotspot’ clearly impacted on the group’s ability to 
collect research data. The group’s evident inability to solve the problem meant that they 
simply ignored it, relegating it to an observation rather than a problem. This distinction was 
key in my observations of the way that the group thought about the tablet. Problems were 
issues that needed to be solved in order for the experiment to work. Issues that practically could not or did 
not need to be solved were relegated to mere observations. Another issue that took this form was the 
processing speed of the tablet. One PhD student, Quentin, described the issue as follows:  
There’s two devices and they have to communicate one to the other. And also we 
have the EEG headset and time delay that might be between something 
happening in the brain, the mobile EEG headset registering it, the laptop 
recording it, and the finger being the one that confirms whatever’s happening on 
the app. Having to inbuild all the time delays, this was something we were also 
having to look into with the kind of, the physical aspect of the different devices 
and how precise they would be. Because in the brain, milliseconds are important. 
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[…] When you’re actually recording these things and each second counts, each 
millisecond counts, this is something where you have to see, how fast is this tablet 
actually? My old tablet, for example, it wouldn’t give us the same results as a 
Nexus.  
The processing speed of the tablet was crucial to the accuracy of the experiment. As 
with the EEG cap, the possibility of upgrading the technology in this case was not much of 
a concern to the researchers. They were used to working with advanced technology that 
was regularly superseded by newer models. It was normal for them to accept this as 
something beyond their control and focus on the smooth running of the experiment with 
the technology that they had to hand – devices chosen because they were the best available 
at the beginning of the experiments. Again, this issue did not affect the basic function of 
the experiment, so it was relegated to an observation. Although not expressed by the 
researchers, it is reasonable to speculate that an approach to experimental design that 
focused on having the best possible technology would be doomed to failure as researchers 
would end up chasing the tails of the latest technology. The time taken to upgrade to a new 
device, introduce it to the experimental setup and troubleshoot it until it was working 
adequately would surely mean that the next new device would be available. Upgrading 
devices was seen as an impractical solution to an issue, so issues of this type became mere 
observations.  
Similarly, the electroencephalogram (“worth £15,000” noted Ian) had only eight 
electrodes, while newer models have more advanced software and include more electrodes. 
Ian pointed out that clinical EEG setups typically use 19 electrodes but can use anything up 
to around 250. Ian said they may look into investing in new EEG equipment for the 
experiment, but this did not happen during my time with the lab. This ‘problem’ was really 
only a speculative issue brought about because the technology used by the group had been 
superseded by more effective models. It was not a problem of ‘getting the tech to work’ 
but an observation that this was not the perfect possible setup. The group did not seem 
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concerned by this, appearing to aspire to a working experiment rather than a perfect one. 
This attitude may have been informed by the relatively high rate at which the technologies 
they used in experiments were outstripped by newer models or became obsolete. This was 
a normal and expected part of working with advanced technologies such as EEG, fMRI, 
virtual reality and so on.  
Another example of the problem of getting the tech to work related to the laptop that 
provided the local Wi-Fi network for the tablet and smartphone as well as recording the 
EEG data. Grace explained: 
And it was little things like, no matter how sure we were it was going to work if 
we closed the laptop lid – and we’d installed programs to make sure it wouldn’t 
shut down – sometimes it would still shut down. So in the end, for some of the 
pilots then we actually physically put a jumper or something in the middle of the 
laptop so that it wouldn’t close, because it would just shut itself down and there 
was no way of knowing that halfway through the experiment because you can’t 
keep checking.  
This decidedly low-tech solution worked well and became part of the standard 
experimental setup. It was also observed that the laptop was quite heavy and could make 
the experiment rather uncomfortable for participants who had to carry it in a backpack for 
extended periods of time. This was treated as a matter that could be resolved by buying 
newer, smaller and lighter technology, but such investment was not necessary to the 
smooth running of the experiment. The same applied to the EEG cap, which was noted to 
be rather cumbersome. Again this was noted as a comment rather than a complaint: in the 
absence of a more suitable EEG cap, the observation that the cap was cumbersome did not 
reflect a desire to improve the setup.  
Many of the issues encountered in testing were bugs in the programming code for the 
app that would be considered a normal part of the process of software development. These 
were dealt with straightforwardly by the tablet expert. Again from the perspective of the 
main group, this was ‘testing’ rather than ‘failure’: things for Edgar to fix. They never 
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counted as problems because they never affected the main group. Any such issue was 
designated Edgar’s responsibility and the main group forgot about it: it was somebody 
else’s problem. 
A final example of a problem leads us back to the beginning of the experiment and 
explains the reason for Edgar’s initial inclusion in the project. This is an example of a 
problem with the tablet computer being ‘given away’ to the designated tablet expert. One 
problem with the tablet that was not treated as a mere observation related to the accuracy 
of its GPS. As it happened, the problem affected the entire experimental setup and was the 
reason that both a tablet and a smartphone were used, rather than just one tablet. When 
walking through a street with tall buildings either side, the ‘line of sight’ connection 
between the satellites and the tablet, required to give an accurate GPS reading, can be 
disrupted. The original experimental design included an automated system of location-
based triggers, so that the app would automatically relay a cue (also called a ‘probe’) to each 
participant’s tablet computer when they reached a specific location such as a road junction. 
Although in principle this would work, the material setting of the urban landscape in which 
the experiments would take place prevented this method, as Quentin commented:  
Given that there is that room for error, we can’t risk programming when a probe 
comes up according to GPS location because it might be too soon, it might be too 
late, which means that we have to trigger these probing events ourselves. 
This was treated as a problem: the experiment could not go ahead without relaying 
accurate cues to the research participant. This problem was resolved by changing the 
experimental method to have a researcher use the tablet to manually trigger the cue, which 
would be relayed to the participant’s smartphone.  
Nobody in the group knew how to do this. It was the identification of this gap in 
expertise that led to the group seeking a tablet expert and inviting Edgar to join the 
research project. Edgar was given the brief of writing an app to connect the tablet and 
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smartphone, as outlined above. In this way, the problem that might have caused the 
research project to fail was relegated to an issue ‘given away’ to the expert. At all stages of 
Edgar’s involvement in the project, his status as the designated expert allowed the group to 
sidestep problems that would otherwise have arisen. Thus alongside the observations 
(issues that could not or did not need to be solved for the experiment to work) there were 
problems designated to the expert, which by definition were not problems for the main group as 
they were not of their concern.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, the status of technical expertise compared to scientific expertise has 
been questioned by examining the ways in which a tablet computer expert was included in 
a neuroscience research project. These questions, in turn, open up analysis of the way that 
the tablet computer is understood in this context.  
The inclusion of a tablet expert in the research project suggested that the main group 
considered this expertise to be on a par with their own scientific expertise. Yet Edgar was 
positioned as an outside expert who could be given a brief to write an app that could be 
simply given to the group. This illustrates that the group believed his expertise to be 
beyond the type of scrutiny typically allotted to scientific work. His expertise, along with 
the app that he produced, was considered to be value-neutral: contributing to the 
production of scientific phenomena without influencing the type of phenomena produced.  
In designating Edgar as an expert in the sense described here, the group also implicitly 
gave a strict definition of the tablet computer as a tool for relaying cues from the researcher 
to the participant in their project. By identifying a process that needed to take place and 
then subsequently selecting a tablet computer to mediate that process, the group locked 
down the affordance ambiguity that was observed in other ethnographies to lead to a 
spiralling definition that required management, expressed in different ways in each case. It 
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was the designation of Edgar as the tablet expert that allowed this stable, fixed definition of 
the tablet to be maintained. By giving away responsibility for the tablet and app to a 
designated expert, the group by definition removed themselves from the process of 
working out the best way to use the tablet. Should they have tried to do Edgar’s work 
themselves, I would speculate that they would have encountered the problems of definition 
that characterised the use of tablets described in the two previous thesis chapters.  
As it was, the problems that might have been encountered were relegated to issues for 
which the expert was responsible. This discursive action meant that the main group never 
dealt with the tablet other than as a tool that worked. When it did not work during testing, 
this was never seen as a failure but rather as a normal (indeed essential) feature of testing, at 
which point the problem was ‘given away’ to the expert and the tablet was not seen or 
thought of again until it had been fixed. With responsibility for failure of the tablet 
designated to an external expert, the group never had to confront failure. Where the 
participants in the Lab denied failure by treating the tablet as perfect, and Tom and Nathan 
suspended failure by cycling definitions of the tablet, the London Group designated failure to 
an expert. In each case, the sheer amount of work that goes into preventing the tablet from 
failing is striking. In the concluding chapter I will make further comments on the idea of 
technologies that never fail, examining the power relations that are manifested in what 
seems to be an almost inevitable success of tablets.  
In a final note, I would like to reflect on a response to a question that I asked Ian, the 
lab head, in an interview at the very end of my time with the group. I asked ‘in general, 
what makes an expert tablet user?’ I had expected his response to be clearly aligned to 
characteristics and attributes that he knew and admired about Edgar, the designated tablet 
expert. I was surprised by his responses, which I give in full below: 
What makes an expert tablet user? It depends what kind of expertise and again 
how are you thinking about [it]. You could be thinking about someone who’s a 
software developer for tablets, you could think of them as being an expert tablet 
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user, they’re using it to generate something. There could be someone who’s really 
good at making… I mean it’s a device that you could run PowerPoint 
presentations off, you could take to meetings and talk to people about work and 
graphics with the way that other people wouldn’t. You could use it for so many 
different things. And someone who’s using it in the most flexible possible way, I’d 
imagine they would be an expert tablet user. But it’s a curious question because 
it’s so, it’s not like a device where – so an expert in EEG as we were just 
discussing – you can clearly be an expert in technically how to get it working, how 
to get the most out of it and how to analyse the data and how to sell the data to 
the field. And how to review other people’s work. All those things go into being 
an expert EEG person. But the tablet’s so diverse that it’s quite hard I think to 
answer that question. So I don’t know if that’s useful, but it’s quite hard to answer 
it, yes. (Ian) 
Ian still clearly thought of the tablet as an ambiguous object. Despite having worked 
through a research project in which the tablet was understood as a well-defined, stable 
object, Ian still thought of the tablet as multiple and expansive. I argue that this is further 
indication that the tablet was simply not thought about by the main group. Not that the main 
group were unaware of the affordance ambiguity that other participants had encountered. 
This final comment from Ian convinced me that the articulation of Edgar, the tablet and 
expertise achieved by him and his research group was not a coincidence. Perhaps it was not 
a conscious decision, but the designation of the tablet as unambiguous functioned as a 
strategy to mitigate against the problems that can arise from opening up the tablet’s 
ambiguity. By designating Edgar as the expert, Ian did not have to think about tablets or 
their role at all. The ambiguous materiality of the tablet supported this contradiction. The 
tablet was a specific and well-defined object when being used by Edgar in his prescribed 
role. But this was not definitive. Outside of that specific context, the tablet was still 
ambiguous and expansive. Ian could not easily define what tablet expertise might be 
because he could not easily define what it was to use a tablet. The word ‘use’ in this sense is 
itself ambiguous. The argument that I outlined in relation to the case of Tom and Nathan, 
namely that the tablet is an emergent object, applies here too. The difference in this case is 
that the ambiguity was contained by designating an expert to handle a well-defined brief. 
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In terms of expertise, Ian’s comments support an argument made by Coopmans and 
Button, that: 
people (scientists and others) do not move through the world as experts; 
whenever this is relevant as a description, they move through the world as experts 
in ‘something’ (Coopmans and Button, 2014: p.767) 
As well as the definition of the tablet being emergent, the definition of expertise here 
is emergent. Edgar was not treated by the main group as ‘an expert’ in some general sense. 
And although they referred to him as ‘the tablet expert’, Ian’s comments make it clear that 
he was not seen as a general tablet expert. Rather, he was designated as being an expert at 
the specific task designated to him: writing an app that would sync with the smartphone 
and tablet computer. This designation had a performative function that allowed Edgar to 
enact his expertise, through the practice of writing the app, and for the rest of the group to 
enact their expertise, by giving away responsibility for the tablet. In all this, the tablet 
retained its flexibility of definition, being treated as a specific, expert object when used by 
Edgar and as a general or ‘merely technical’ computing tool that required no consideration 
when used by the main group.  
The expression of the main group’s subjectivities as experts of a higher order than 
Edgar relied on a particular understanding of the tablet. The tablet’s mundane everydayness 
was essential to the negotiation of expertise. It should be noted that the idea of the tablet as 
mundane would not have been part of the tablet imaginary at a different place or time. By 
2014, the tablet had indeed become very widespread in many contexts. And the London 
Group’s lab was already very tech-friendly, with much more exciting technologies to be 
found than tablets. The specificities of the site allowed for this particular construction. The 
main group affiliated Edgar and his expertise with the tablet defined as a banal 
technological device, disassociating themselves from it. There is a comparison to be made 
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with the 8200 Xerox photocopier that Suchman uses as an example of an affiliative object 
when it was being studied by researchers at PARC (Suchman, 2005). Suchman writes: 
Although the copier’s mundane status was the thing that made it relevant for 
users and for the majority of the company, this very commonality continually 
threatened to undermine its, and our own, scientific standing. (Suchman, 2005: 
p.394) 
Why should scientists concern themselves with a photocopier? Why bother thinking 
about a tablet computer? The neuroscientists constructed the tablet as a non-scientific 
object. This definition both allowed the tablet to be used within the experiment – it was 
treated as merely technical – and also asserted their expertise as neuroscientists who 
worked with fMRI and other impressive and recognisably scientific technologies. This 
draws on the tablet imaginary, especially certain advertising discourses that define the tablet 
as a commonplace, everyday device. The variety of settings (cafés, parks, living rooms, 
baths) and users depicted in advertisements for tablets supports – and is in turn supported 
by – the London Group’s construction of the tablet as mundane, and their expertise as the 
opposite.  
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Why 2010 Will Be the Year of the Tablet35 
Deloitte: 2011 Will Be The Year Of The Tablet (Say Goodbye To Your Laptop)36  
2012: The Year of the Tablet (Finally)?37 
Will 2013 Be the Year of the Tablet?38 
2014: The year of the tablet?39 
The year of the tablet: Gartner predicts global shipments will finally overtake PCs 
in 201540 
2016: The year of the tablet41 
 
Introduction  
Throughout this thesis I have considered tablets and technological practices as part of 
a process of a future being constructed in the present. In chapter two I compared tablet 
users to Balsamo’s designers: “they hack the present to create the conditions of the future” 
(2011: p.6). In chapter three I commented that “tablet computers, although not considered 
instruments today, may be considered instruments in future”. Ben, the IT solution manager 
in chapter four, stated that cloud storage was “the direction of the future”. In chapter five 
                                                 
35 http://www.wired.com/2009/08/dell-intel-tablet/ [Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
36 http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/20/deloitte-2011-will-be-the-year-of-the-tablet-say-goodbye-to-your-
laptop/ [Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
37 http://www.cio.com/article/2401144/it-strategy/2012--the-year-of-the-tablet--finally--.html [Accessed 4th 
February 2015]. 
38 http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2414200,00.asp [Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
39http://www.techradar.com/news/mobile-computing/tablets/2014-the-year-of-the-tablet-1225236 
[Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
40 http://thenextweb.com/mobile/2014/07/07/the-year-of-the-tablet-gartner-predicts-global-shipments-
will-finally-overtake-pcs-in-2015/ [Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
41 http://fortune.com/2012/07/12/2016-the-year-of-the-tablet/ [Accessed 4th February 2015]. 
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Nathan said that tablets give “a futuristic impression”. The only chapter in which this did 
not feature prominently was chapter six, where the participants gave very little 
consideration to this. The headlines that open this chapter are taken from mainstream or 
tech press, and demonstrate that the idea of a future constructed in the present is central to 
the tablet imaginary at the level of popular tech culture. The iterative process of claiming 
the certain triumph of the tablet computer in the near future works in the present to 
construct the device as essential now. Whether we define it as 2012, 2013, 2014 or any other 
year, the effect of such a statement is that the year of the tablet is always now.  
As Atkinson’s ill-fated A Bitter Pill: The Rise and Fall of the Tablet Computer (2008) 
demonstrates, you predict the demise of the tablet at your peril. It looks like the tablet 
computer is not going away any time soon. And I choose these words carefully, because 
this is precisely how the tablet imaginary works. As long as tablets promise to remain a 
going concern, they continue to be consumed, fulfilling the promise. This is not zombie 
media (Hertz and Parikka, 2012), obsolete and abandoned within the logic of capitalism, 
but lively media, full of potential for recuperation. In my analysis, it would make more 
sense to say that tablets and other mainstream everyday technologies are always actively 
being recuperated. There is no period of normal use in which they are current, before 
falling out of favour. A great deal of discursive work and embodied practices are required 
to construct tablets as in favour in the first place.  
Yet this is not to say that there is any inevitability about the dominance of this media 
form. I hope that the detailed analysis of tablets being used shows the great fragility that 
characterises tablets’ cultural position as popular media technologies. The fact that the 
tablet imaginary is the product of such a great deal of embodied and discursive work 
indicates that the appearance of easy dominance is itself a hard-fought and continuing 
battle.  
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At the same time as suggesting fragility, the fact that this continuing battle is fought – 
and by people with seemingly little investment in the success of the tablet in and of itself – 
gives reason for further reflection on the apparent ruthlessness of tablets’ success. In the 
ethnographic research there is a noticeable absence of any clear discussion by participants 
of resistance or counter-hegemonic uses or descriptions of tablets. There were no naysayers 
who outright refused to use tablets. Of the many people that I spoke to, only one – an 
undergraduate student in a tablet lab trial – was vocally in opposition to using tablets, and 
this was specifically a rejection of the Apple brand. Of course I was actively seeking to 
speak to tablet users. An inherent selection bias means that people interested in using 
tablets are inevitably overrepresented. On the other hand, within the large group of people 
that I chatted with, observed and interviewed during the research, who were all invested in 
using tablets ‘successfully’, whatever that might mean in their particular context, there was 
in fact a great variety of uses.  
Thinking in terms of resistance or counter-hegemony seems a rather blunt analytical 
perspective here. The concept of affordance ambiguity is based on the idea that there is no 
clear, obvious, normal or common sense use of tablets. Without a clearly defined way that 
one should use the tablet, it is difficult to identify ways in which this idea was challenged. 
Rather the use of tablets is a constant process of definition in which the normal or right 
way to use tablets is always being constructed. While a tablet user certainly implies several 
‘wrong’ uses in this process, they only ever exhibit ‘right’ uses. Evidently there are 
significant intersections with dominant cultural discourses. A person’s ‘best’ use of the 
tablet might look a lot like the type of tablet use set out in advertisements. The value of 
efficiency expressed in many uses of tablets was one way in which individual uses of tablets 
could be said to be of the dominant-hegemonic order. Conversely, somebody who 
establishes that the right way to use the tablet is to chop onions could be described as 
engaging in a counter-hegemonic practice, intentionally or not. The point is that each 
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individual user constructs the right way to use the tablet for themselves through the 
everyday practices that they undertake. While these practices draw on and are situated 
within an imaginary consisting of sets of cultural meanings related to tablets, they are not 
determined by these meanings. The everyday practices and the cultural meanings are 
mutually constituted in the process of using, defining and discussing tablets. The tablet 
imaginary is an analytical concept that can be used to connect micro everyday practices 
with broader cultural meanings, without favouring either.  
Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications 
The ethnographies discussed in the thesis show a wide range of uses of tablets even 
within what appeared likely to be a fairly limiting context of science laboratories. When 
using lab management apps (LMAs), tablets functioned as objects of reified practice, 
bringing cultural values into scientific practice. This supports previous work on the 
production of scientific knowledge (for example: Latour and Woolgar, 1979, Latour, 1986, 
Kuhn, 1996, Galison, 1997) that highlights the way that scientific objectivity is itself a 
cultural construction. It also extends this work by considering the role of material digital 
objects as carriers of these cultural values. LMAs present efficiency as a common sense 
advantage and enact this value in ways that are obscure and difficult to challenge.  
The tablet was used as a way to support the infallibility of the managerial hierarchy of 
the university in question in the Lab. This supported Barthes’ account of myth as 
something that orders our thoughts about ideas, objects and people (Barthes and Lavers, 
1993: p.109). The mythological power of tablets was shown in conjunction with a reflection 
on Sellen and Harper’s (2002) work into paper replacement technologies. The unsuitability 
of tablets as a paper replacement in the Lab supported both Sellen and Harper’s work – 
showing that the role of paper is often overlooked or misunderstood – and Barthes’ work, 
showing that the objective utility of a technology can be overridden by mythical discourse. 
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This research demonstrated how the idea of objective utility is itself a mythical discourse. It 
contributed to understandings of myth by accounting for the ways that myths can be 
articulated in the definition of objects as ‘potentialful’. The mythical power of tablets 
required both a general belief in technology broadly speaking as progressive, and a context-
specific desire to focus on the potential of the tablet device itself. These two aspects 
operated concurrently in the Lab and were manifested in definitions of the tablet that 
‘slipped’ between its actual and its potential functions.  
The tablet was used by Tom and Nathan as a way of expressing their scientific 
subjectivities, shown most clearly in their perpetual testing of the device, always trying to 
find something else that it might be used for. The tablet here functioned as an affiliative 
object (Suchman, 2005), with Tom and Nathan using the material presence of the tablet in 
meetings to interpellate their colleagues as subjects of the ideology that tablets were useful 
and should be used by as many people as possible. The London Group used tablets to 
express sociality with objects (Knorr-Cetina, 1997) to very different ends. They defined the 
tablet as non-scientific and explicitly disassociated themselves from the object. They 
enacted their scientific subjectivities by constructing Edgar as a tablet expert, a role 
carefully defined as distinct from and inferior to their own expert roles.  
The London Group used the paradigm of expertise to enact hierarchies of knowledge. 
Their inclusion of Edgar in the production of scientific knowledge served to 
simultaneously include and exclude tablet expertise from science. It was included by being 
framed as a functional, background element of the experimental setup, and simultaneously 
excluded by that same framing. The way that expertise was deployed by the London Group 
did not fit the categories of expertise offered by Collins and Evans (Collins and Evans, 
2002, Collins and Evans, 2009). In my analysis, expertise did not function in a way that led 
easily to a schematic definition of this kind. The role of expertise was performative and its 
analytical interest was found in the relationships that it structured and how this was 
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expressed in definitions of the tablet. This supported feminist readings of expertise as a 
characteristic or category that is constructed along lines of gender and other identity 
paradigms (McNeil, 1987a, Jasanoff, 2006), which can be used to reveal the political effects 
of the designation of this category and its effects in people’s lived experiences.  
On the one hand, the tablet offers a multiplicity of uses, suggesting it is radically open 
to a variety of expressions of expertise and could be co-opted by otherwise disenfranchised 
groups or individuals to use on their own terms. On the other hand, the research does not 
offer such an optimistic view, instead suggesting that the tablet provides only new ways for 
existing power relations to be manifested. Tom and Nathan’s relationship with Gloria; the 
London Group’s management of Edgar’s expertise; the Campus Regeneration Board’s 
position of power over academic staff in the Lab in terms of defining the tablet; the value 
of (productive) efficiency being presented as a common sense benefit in LMAs. All of 
these examples demonstrate how uses of tablets had the effect of normalising dominant 
discourses as defined by those in existing positions of power. Alternative uses or 
expressions of expertise would not register as such, as tablets were used within contexts 
that included existing hierarchical social structures. Uses that threatened these structures 
were carefully managed by participants who had the existing social power to define right 
and wrong uses.  
As well as these specific instances in which the research supported or challenged 
existing concepts and framings, the thesis as a whole has demonstrated how the fields of 
Media and Cultural Studies and Science and Technology Studies can be coherently linked 
within a research project. The focus within Media and Cultural Studies on everyday 
practices can be developed in studies of science and technology so that, firstly, the roles of 
people less obviously involved in science are recognised and accounted for and, secondly, 
the roles of mundane technologies such as tablets are taken seriously within the material 
setting of the laboratory. The role of app-based technologies has been shown to be 
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expansive and emergent and can never be assumed. Science and Technology Studies 
understandings of material objects can account for the variously enabling, disabling, 
determining or facilitating function of technological objects and the politics inherent in 
their use. These insights can be applied within media and cultural studies research to 
account for the role of media objects without falling into simple cultural constructivism or 
technological determinism, nor into chasing one’s tail debating these positions. In this way, 
this thesis extends work undertaken in Media Technologies (Gillespie et al., 2014), each chapter 
of which demonstrates the benefits of drawing these two fields together.  
I have drawn on Gibson’s (1986) concept of affordances to examine the role of tablets 
in the laboratory. Affordance ambiguity has developed and extended Gibson’s original 
conception by applying it to a complex technological object that could not be accounted 
for by the idea as developed by Gibson in terms of visual perception. The thesis also 
challenges other adoptions of this concept, especially that of Norman (2002), arguing that 
this way of understanding objects, while offering an excellent prescription for design work, 
has a depoliticising effect. Considering the politics of technologies and their uses is an 
essential part of research and analysis in fields such as Media and Cultural Studies and 
Science and Technology Studies. Affordance ambiguity returns users to their central role in 
thinking about affordances as emergent properties constructed in the relationship between 
people and objects in specific, situated contexts of use. This reinforces the idea that the 
way that an object is defined is performative and inherently political.  
Limitations 
All of the research took place within university laboratories. The technoscientific 
culture that operates in these labs is very different from industry labs. The absence of 
industry laboratories is a gap in this research that could be explored in future. The 
academic structure of UK universities may have played a significant role in the way that 
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tablets were understood. The cultural context of the UK certainly did. The research was 
conducted within a Russell Group university, a former 1994 Group university and a former 
polytechnic university. This range of types of institution may help to give a broader 
understanding of the roles and effects of tablets in science labs. This breadth of course also 
comes with its own pitfalls as it loses the potential insight from examining the similarities 
and differences between two similar institutions.  
Working with a new media technology such as the tablet computer means that the 
research is vulnerable to being superseded by the latest device or a significant shift in the 
cultural construction of tablets. While tablets remain a popular media form, the imaginary 
has certainly developed throughout the process of this research. When I began researching 
tablets they were still very much a novel and exciting device. Many people that I spoke to 
in the early stages of my research had never heard the term ‘tablet computer’. In January 
2012, not long after starting the research, I bought a Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1. Colleagues, 
friends and family were all keen to have a play with the funky new device. A year later in 
January 2013 I bought an iPad Mini. Nobody cared. The novel had already become 
mundane, the uncommon had become commonplace. I mention this to highlight one way 
in which I personally experienced the development of the tablet imaginary and observed 
the changing cultural position of the tablet. What the tablet is has changed.  
I believe that this limitation is curbed in two ways. Firstly, the research at the very least 
can stand as a record of the ways that the tablet was understood in the particular contexts 
described at that particular historical and cultural moment. Secondly, and somewhat in 
contradiction of the first point, the focus on emergent meaning indicates that there is never 
a stable or fixed meaning ascribed to tablets. The thesis has sought to unravel definitions of 
tablets in different contexts. But this has never been with the aim of stating what tablets are 
definitively. The aim has been to understand the effects of the process of definition. In this 
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way, the newness or oldness of the research material should neither increase nor diminish 
the value of the analysis.  
On a similar note, the ethnographic approach and reliance on understanding meaning 
as emergent and situated means that the work is not directly generalisable. It is not possible 
to say that a lab study of tablet use in another lab is likely to follow any patterns observed 
in the work presented here. But this does not mean it does not help to make connections 
with, challenge or justify other research. Suchman, citing Mol and Law (2002), puts it like 
this: 
[…] Methodologically, it means that the value of a case such as that offered here 
lies not in its instantiation of a general theory but in its suggestions for further – 
comparative and contrastive – investigation. Cases, like objects, are multiple, 
afﬁliative and subject to mutual interferences as well as partial connections. 
(Suchman 2005, pp.394-395) 
Other investigations into the use of tablets in labs may well find that they are used in 
totally different ways than observed in this research. This does not mean that we must map 
every use of tablets before a useful understanding of their adoption can be gained. Each 
ethnographic case study is indicative of ways that tablets are used in particular ways for 
particular effects. Differences in use may belie similarities in the fundamental operation: 
expressions of different subjectivities may be achieved in very similar processes. This point 
connects to Tom and Nathan’s interpellation of colleagues as potential members of a 
mutually beneficial network. On its own, research into the uses of tablets can achieve a 
great deal. Combine this research with others and the benefits are exponential. A greater 
body of research allows for a better understanding of the processes that are specific to a 
given case study and those that operate more generally.  
Recommendations for future research 
There are some clear directions that future research in this area could follow to build 
on the strengths and remedy the weaknesses of this work. Firstly, the concept of 
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affordance ambiguity could be developed in other contexts. I believe that this concept can 
be beneficial in the analysis of uses of tablets and other app-based technologies. 
Smartphones can be addressed in this manner. More recent Windows PC operating 
systems have adopted the app paradigm. Thinking about affordance ambiguity in relation 
to these devices may open up the politics of these devices and platforms. Research 
presented at the MeCCSA conference in January 2015 (Yates et al., 2015) considered how 
the concept of affordances might help to theorise digital access in terms of cultural capital, 
exposing the politics of inclusion and exclusion behind drives to digital literacy. This 
suggests a clear direction for the application of affordance ambiguity in other research 
contexts.  
While the laboratory has been the site of research presented here, these themes can be 
developed both within and beyond laboratories. Different contexts of practice may be 
considered. Some obvious suggestions would include considering affordance ambiguity and 
the management of failure of paper replacement technologies in office contexts or 
commercial or educational settings.  
One specific area for further research raised by this thesis concerns lab management 
apps. The adoption of LMAs could act as a focal point for considerations of sociality with 
objects, the automation of the cultural value of efficiency and the role that new media 
technologies play in instantiating new research practices within science labs. Research that 
took this direction would be more explicitly focused on analysis and critique of the 
production of scientific knowledge. This is another more general area in which concepts 
from this thesis such as the tablet imaginary could be developed.  
Finally, the thesis indicates that studies of technology adoption can benefit from being 
situated at the intersection of Media and Cultural Studies, and Science and Technology 
Studies, as I have presented it here. Theoretical analysis of the correspondences and 
conflicts of these fields may in turn indicate further areas for research.  
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Conclusion 
This research has focused on the situated practices of technology users. I have 
presented a range of ways that tablets can be used in the definition of subject positions, the 
expression of institutional power and the regulation of boundaries of knowledge 
production. In every case, it has been shown how the definition of tablets is an active 
process. Some users, such as Tom and Nathan, seemed overall to be empowered by the 
actions of definition. Others, such as Edgar, seemed to be the object of the process of 
definition, not the subject. At times during this research I was dismayed to observe 
instances where I felt individual users were unable to define the tablet on their own terms. 
For example, the tablet being defined as perfect according to the preferences of the 
university institution in the Lab, or Edgar’s disenfranchisement as his expertise was 
downgraded by the careful boundary management of the main neuroscience group. I now 
see that the real value in this research has been outlining the sheer amount of work that 
goes into the definition of an object. The dominant meaning is not easily come by and it 
does not support itself: it must be maintained in the perpetual process of definition. It is in 
specific uses of a technological device that its definition is expressed. This means that it is 
users who are doing the defining. In one sense, this is an incredibly empowering position. 
On the other hand, the definitions that users enacted served to structure and reiterate 
existing power relations. There is a final unanswered contradiction in this analysis. Is the 
vast amount of work that users must undertake to support the definition of the tablet best 
understood as a fragile basis for a dominant ideology, or a ruthless process of 
technoscientific ideological dominance that draws on the unpaid (or in fact paying) labour 
of users to support itself? Are users emancipated by the power to define, or are they 
exploited by the same process?  
These questions were the root of my interest in failure. Failure structured power 
relationships. Observing practices where users defined tablets in one way, then used them 
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in others, cycling through a range of definitions that appeared never to correspond to a 
single material object, I wanted to interrogate the role of failure in discursively managing 
the object and the power relations relating to it. Failure can be an empowering claim in 
practices of resistance. It would have been easy to imagine the users in the Lab claiming – 
against the desires of the management hierarchy – that the tablets just did not work. The 
power dynamic between the London Group and Edgar was characterised by a play 
between the failure of tablets and the failure of Edgar to make the tablets work, in favour 
of the latter interpretation. Tom and Nathan’s personal and professional investment in 
their own tablet project similarly led them to strive to avoid failure. Each of these examples 
speaks to ways in which disciplinary power functioned to avoid or disavow the claim of 
failure of a technological device. This indicates that much more is at stake in the 
management of failure than the simple desire to make a device work.  
In the introduction I argued that the imagery of the stone tablets of the ten 
commandments was relevant to today’s tablet computers because buying a tablet computer 
involves “accepting particular beliefs, adopting a particular value system, and carrying out 
certain ritualistic everyday practices.” The irresistible draw of the tablet comes from its 
promise to offer a wide range of everyday practices (affordance ambiguity) that make sense 
within a variety of value systems (tablet imaginary). The tablet is not the sole property of 
the geek, nor the business person, nor the scientist, nor the person watching iPlayer in bed. 
The lack of restraint of uses or meanings pertaining to the tablet means that it can always 
fulfil its promise, whatever that promise may be.  
Tablet computer users can relatively easily find a range of beneficial uses for their 
tablets. Deciding what they had originally wanted it for seems to be a secondary – and far 
more challenging – problem. It is in the work of definition, of matching the actual uses to 
the imagined promise, that tablet users create and maintain a dominant definition of tablets 
as indispensable, futuristic, and inevitably successful. Working out what a tablet is for 
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entails using it. And finding new uses entails creating new imaginaries. New imaginaries 
demand further articulation, and the process reiterates in what I described earlier as a 
perpetual beta. Does this process suggest that this dominant definition of tablets is fragile 
or ruthless? I would argue that this perpetual beta is a fragile basis for any particular 
dominant ideology. The idea of tablets as futuristic might not make sense this time next 
year, and it seems unlikely that tablet users will forever continue to enact this discourse.  
By promising such a range of uses, tablets open themselves up to the challenging of 
dominant meanings. The idea that tablets are efficient work tools seems particularly open 
to opposition – intentionally or otherwise – by the practices of streaming film and TV, for 
example. The way that boundaries of home/work are policed or self-policed suggests that 
this is a concern for companies or institutions that wish for the dominance of a work-
oriented understanding of the tablet as a modern-day Filofax, rather than a modern-day 
Walkman. Of course, really the tablet is both at the same time. Perhaps the most likely 
form of opposition, the most viable mode of users being emancipated, not exploited, by 
their power to define the tablet, comes from this ambiguity. Tablets might offer a 
particularly simple means to engage in ‘la perruque’ (de Certeau, 1988: pp.24-28), the 
cooption of the means and time of capitalist production (or service provision or some 
equivalent) for one’s own ends. It may well be that behind the adoption of efficient, 
futuristic tablets is a rational decision by users to put on a front of efficiency in order to get 
away with its opposite. While perhaps not changing existing power relations, tablets may 
offer users a means of subterfuge and self-expression that is enabled, but not constrained, 
by those power relations. In this sense, the idea of playbour (Kücklich, 2005, Goggin, 2011) 
might be recuperated as a means of disguising counter-hegemonic practices. Learning to 
use a tablet may well entail learning to labour, but it may also entail learning to avoid work, 
to find moments and means of personal fulfilment provided within the digital spaces of 
capital. While certainly not revolutionary, these practices at least show the potential for 
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tablets to offer ways and means of resistance to imposed capitalist practices. In contrast to 
this optimistic picture, Jordan (2015: p.152) reminds us that the idea of playbour, effected 
within ‘fun’ working environments, is a standard working practice for employees of 
companies such as Google and Microsoft, whose practices are evidently not counter-
hegemonic or resistant to capitalism. Furthermore, entry into this potentially liberating 
space is itself an entry into capital. This fundamental point about any tablet computer 
practice is best exemplified by the ironically named ‘Ultimate App’ (Miller and Matviyenko, 
2014), part of an art project exploring the role of the app as an impossible object. The 
Ultimate App, once opened, simply takes a payment then shuts itself down and has no 
further application.  
The tablet computer’s openness to interpretation and different uses suggests that there 
will never be a clear dominant definition of what it is for (although I would suggest that the 
Ultimate App elegantly expresses its most basic function). The definition seems to be so 
context-dependent that the idea of a single dominant definition may be impossible. But this 
does not mean tablets cannot support a single dominant ideology. The process of perpetual 
beta is a solid basis to maintain a dominant ideology of technological rationality. All the 
time that tablets are used – whether as prescribed by marketing discourses, as demanded by 
workplace hierarchies, or as preferred by an individual – there is a sense that tablets are 
paradigmatic of technological progress. The discourse of new technologies as futuristic or 
efficient might feasibly change as uses of tablets change, but the ideology of technological 
rationality will not.  
One summary of the findings of this research would be that, according to their users, 
tablets can do anything, except fail. As Tom and Nathan’s view of their colleagues showed, 
even the non-adoption of tablets is in some way determined by a discourse of network 
effects in which non-users are considered not only to be not benefitting themselves, but to 
be actively detrimental to technoscientific progress in general. Combined with this, 
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affordance ambiguity – expressed as the idea that tablets can do anything – leaves no room 
for a person to argue that they do not want or need to use a tablet. How can you not need 
something that does everything? There is something both ruthless and irresistible about the 
framing of this question. No matter what a tablet computer is, it will always be able to fulfil 
its promise: a promise constructed in its own self-fulfilment.  
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